No. 29 July-September 1959

SOVIET SURVEY

A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends

EDWARD A. SHILS
PROSPECTS FOR INTELLECTUALS

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TO OUR READERS

We regret the delay in the publication of *Soviet Survey*, due to the strike in the printing trades. This issue was produced under great difficulties, and we hope our readers will overlook any typographical imperfections or errors.

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SOVIET SURVEY

A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends

No. 29 July-September 1959

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SOCIALIST REALISM

A Voice from the Depths

(The author of this article is a young Russian writer who for obvious reasons wishes to remain anonymous.)

I.

What is socialist realism? . . .

The most exact definition of socialist realism is that given in the statute of the Union of Soviet Writers:

> Socialist Realism is the fundamental method of Soviet literature and criticism: it demands of the artist a true, historically concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development. Further, it ought to contribute to the ideological transformation and education of the workers in the spirit of socialism.[1]

This innocent formulation serves as foundation for the whole edifice of socialist realism. It defines at once the relation of realism in the Socialist era to that of the past and what distinguishes it therefrom: both aim at a representation *in conformity with the real,* but socialist realism introduces a new element, the ability to seize upon life *in its revolutionary movement,* and to form the minds of readers and spectators in function with that perspective; that is, *in the spirit of socialism.* The earlier realists or, as they are often called, the critical realists—because they criticised bourgeois society—Balzac, Tolstoy, Chekhov, etc. . . . gave a faithful image of reality: but, not being instructed by the genius of Marx, they could not foresee the future victories of socialism and, in any case, they had no idea of the real and concrete ways of attaining to it. Socialist realism, however, is armed with Marx's teaching: it is enriched by experience of struggles and victories and it has the Communist Party, its friend and very vigilant preceptor, to inspire it. While it is describing present reality it hears the march of history and keeps its eyes upon the future. It sees the 'visible features of communism' invisible to the ordinary eye. It thus constitutes a clear advance upon the art of the past and attains the highest summit of the artistic evolution of humanity, the most realistic realism . . . .

Implicit in the formula in question ('true, historically concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development'), is the notion of an End, of that ideal which embraces all things and to which the *real*—a correct image of which is given—is tending in an ineluctable revolutionary movement To seize this movement, and to help the reader, by transforming his consciousness, to approach nearer this End —that is the meaning of socialist realism, the art which in our epoch is the most clearly orientated towards a definite goal.

That end is Communism, known in its younger days as Socialism. The poet not only writes verses; by doing so he helps in the building-up of Communism. That is just as natural as to see beside him, working at the same task, the sculptor, the musician, the agronomist, engineer, labourer, policeman, lawyer, and the machines, theatres, cannon and newspapers . . . .

Like our whole culture and our whole system, our art is entirely teleological. It is subordinated to the supreme end from which it has its title of nobility. In the last analysis, all of us are living solely to hasten the coming of Communism . . . .

Science has not delivered us from the children's question 'why?'. Behind the relations of causality that science establishes one still sees a hidden and deformed finalism. Science declares that 'man is descended from the monkey', instead of saying that 'the monkey was destined to become Man'. But whatever may be the origin of man, his appearance and his destiny are inseparable from God—that is, from the highest idea of the End that is accessible, if not by our understanding, at least by our

[1] *Report of the First Federal Congress of Soviet Writers,* 1934, p. 716.

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desire to know that it exists. That is the aim of all that is and all that is not—an infinite—and no doubt gratuitous—End-in-itself. For what end could the End itself have? . . .

The modern mind is powerless to imagine anything more sublime and beautiful than the communist ideal. The most it can do is to put back into circulation the old ideas of Christian love or liberty of the person. But for the moment it is not in a condition to project yet another aim.

Western liberal individualists and Russian intellectuals find themselves in almost the same situation, in face of socialism, as were the intelligent Roman patricians in regard to the victory of Christianity. They mocked at the madmen who worshipped the cross (that Roman guillotine), at the ineptitude of the doctrines of the Trinity, etc. . . . But it was beyond their power to put up any serious arguments against the *Ideal* of the Christ in itself. They could, it is true, assert that the best elements of the Christian moral code had been taken from Plato. (Christians of today sometimes say that the communists borrowed their noble ideal from the Gospel.) But could they declare that a God conceived as a God of love was something evil, or base, or monstrous? And can we say that the universal happiness promised us in the communist future is an evil?

We know not how to resist the bewitching beauty of communism. It is too soon to invent another aim, to wrench ourselves out of ourselves and set out towards the distant horizons beyond even communism.

It was the genius of Marx that discovered and proved that the earthly paradise of which so many people had dreamt before him was the End assigned to humanity by destiny itself . . . . At one blow everything fell into place. An iron necessity, a strict hierarchy, had shaped the course of the centuries. The ape stood up on its hind legs and started its triumphal march toward communism. The world of the primitive commune was necessary, so that slavery might come out of it; slavery was necessary before feudalism could appear; feudalism was indispensable to the coming of capitalism, and capitalism so that communism might arise. That is all! The magnificent End is attained, the pyramid is crowned, history is completed.

A sincerely religious man relates everything to his divinity . . . . A Christian, if he wishes to be consistent, must consider the whole life of the world before the birth of Christ as the pre-history of Jesus Christ. In the eyes of a monotheist, do not pagans exist to manifest the will of the one God and, in the end, after a long preparation, to come to believe in the one God alone?

After all that, can one be surprised if, in another religious perspective, ancient Rome is regarded as an indispensable stage upon the way that leads to communism; or if the Crusades are explained, not as ardent efforts of Christianity, but as a phase in the development of commerce and industry, in the interplay of the forces of production which is proceeding everywhere and, at the present time, is ensuring the collapse of capitalism and the triumph of the socialist régime?

You have only to ask a Westerner why the great French Revolution was necessary, to receive a multitude of different answers. But put the same question to any Soviet schoolboy, not to speak of better-informed people, and he will give you an exact and exhaustive explanation: The great French Revolution was necessary in order to clear the way, and hasten the coming of communism. It is a long time since men have had such a clear explanation of the world, perhaps not since the Middle Ages. Our great privilege is to have re-discovered it . . . .

Thus, the universal history of human thought has only existed, so to speak, in order to prepare the way for 'historical materialism'—that is, for Marxism, the philosophy of communism.

And here it was before us, this unique End of the Creation, as beautiful as life eternal and as obligatory as death: and we rushed towards It, breaking all barriers in the way and rejecting all that might retard us on our headlong course. We have freed ourselves without regret from the belief in another world, or in love of our neighbour, or in liberty of the person and other prejudices, now rather down-at-heel and anyway far poorer than the ideal that opened out before us. In the name of the new religion thousands of martyrs of the revolution gave their lives, showing a courage

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and a sanctity in their sufferings that eclipsed the exploits of the early Christians.

But it is not only our life, our blood, our body that we have given to the new God. We have sacrificed to him our snow-white soul, and spattered it with all the dirt of the world. It is good to be gentle, to have tea with jam, to plant flowers and to cultivate love, humility, non-resistance to evil and other philanthropies. But whom have they saved, what have they changed in the world, those old men and old women, those egoists of humanism who built up a quiet conscience, penny by penny, and assured themselves of a good little place in the after-death old people's home?

For our part, we wanted no salvation for ourselves, but for all humanity. And instead of sentimental sighing, personal perfection, and charity bazaars for the benefit of the hungry, we set ourselves to put the universe right according to the best model that ever existed, that of the resplendent End moving towards us.

So that prisons might disappear forever, we built new ones. So that frontiers between countries might vanish, we surrounded ourselves with a Chinese wall. So that work in the future might become a rest and a pleasure, we introduced forced labour. So that no one should evermore shed one drop of blood, we killed and killed and killed.

In the name of the End, we had to sacrifice all that we had in reserve and resort to the same means as our enemies employed; to proclaim the omnipotence of Russia, write lies in *Pravda*[2], put a Tsar on the now empty throne, epaulettes on the officers, and re-institute torture. Sometimes it seemed that for its complete triumph, communism needed only one final holocaust—to give up communism.

Lord, Lord, forgive us our sins! . . .

The results are never the same as the end one proposed at first . . . . The fires of the Inquisition helped to consolidate the Gospel, but then what was left of it? Nevertheless, both the fires of the Inquisition and the Gospel, both the night of St Bartholomew and St Bartholomew himself, add up to one single great Christian culture.

[2] *Pravda,* title of the leading Soviet newspaper, means 'truth'.

Yes, we are living in communism. It no more resembles what we were seeking than the Middle Ages were like Christ, or than contemporary Western man is like a free superman, or man like God. All the same, there is a certain likeness, is there not?

Yes? It consists in the subordination of all our actions, thoughts, and intentions, to this one End, which perhaps has long been a word empty of meaning but continues to have a hypnotic influence over us, and still propels us forward none knows whither. Obviously, then, art and literature could not fail to find themselves gripped in the vice of that system and becoming transformed, as Lenin foresaw, into 'wheels' and 'screws' of the great machine of State . . . . 'Our reviews, whether scientific or artistic, cannot be non-political . . . . The strength of Soviet literature, the most progressive literature in the world, is due to its being a literature which has not, and cannot have, any other interests than those of the people, those of the State'.[3]

In reading that statement in a decree of the Communist Party it is absolutely necessary to remember that, by the interests of the people and the interests of the State—which completely coincide from the State's point of view—one means no other thing than this same communism which penetrates and absorbs everything. 'Literature and art are integral parts of the struggle of the whole people for communism . . . the highest function of literature and art is to mobilise the people for the winning of new victories in the building-up of communism.'[4]

When certain Western writers deplore the lack of freedom to create, to speak out, etc., they start from their own faith in the freedom of the person, which is the basis of their culture but is organically alien to communist culture. A convinced Soviet writer, a true Marxist, not only cannot accept such reproaches, he quite simply cannot understand them. What liberty can a religious man require of his God? Liberty to praise him still more? . . . For a believer in communism,

[3] From a decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party dated 14 August 1946.

[4] *Report of Soviet Writers' Congress.*

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as N. S. Khrushchev has justly remarked in one of his latest declarations upon questions of art, 'for an artist who faithfully serves his people, the question does not arise whether he is free or not in his creative work. The question does not even arise: such an artist knows perfectly how to approach the phenomena of reality; he has no need to "conform" or to force himself. Faithfully to represent reality according to his communist convictions is a requirement of his soul: he holds firmly to his positions; he affirms and defends them in his works'.

These are the aesthetic and psychological principles it is indispensable to know before one can enter into the secret of Socialist Realism.

II

The works of socialist realism are various in style and subject. But in every one of them, either literally or figuratively, explicitly or covertly, the End is present. Either it is a panegyric of communism and everything connected therewith, or a satire upon its numerous enemies, or else it is a picture of life 'in its revolutionary development'—that is, once again, in its movement towards communism.

Thus, every production of socialist realism is sure, even before it appears, of a happy ending: the end may be sad for the hero, who runs every possible risk in battling for communism, but it is always happy from the point of view of the End which transcends the individual; and the author, in his own name or in the words of the dying hero, never forgets to make a declaration of faith in our final victory. The lost illusions, broken hopes, and unrealised dreams so characteristic of the literature of other epochs and other systems, are absent from socialist realism. Even in the case of a tragedy, it will be an 'Optimist Tragedy'—to use the title that Vs. Vishnevsky gave to one of his works.[5] (The heroine perishes at the end, but communism triumphs.)

One has only to compare a few titles from Western literature with those of Soviet literature to be convinced of this. On the one hand: *Journey to the end of Night* (Céline); *Death in the Afternoon* and *For whom the Bell tolls* (Hemingway); *Everyone dies alone* (Fallada); *A Time to Live and a Time to Die* (Remarque); *The Death of a Hero* (Aldington) . . . and on the other hand, in the major key: *Happiness* (Pavlenko); *The first Joys* (Fedin); *It is Good* (Mayakovsky); *The fulfilment of Desires* (Kaverin); *Light over the Earth* (Babaevsky); *The Conquerors* (Bagritsky); *The Conqueror* (Simonov); *The Conquerors* (Chirikov); *Springtime in Victory* (Gribachev), etc. . . .

That admirable End towards which the action tends is sometimes evoked directly, at the end of the work: Mayakovsky, for instance, brilliantly terminated all his important work written after the Revolution with some statement on communism or with imaginary scenes in the life of the future and in the communist State. Gorki, too, who under the Soviet régime wrote chiefly about the pre-revolutionary period, concluded the majority of his novels and plays with a vision of the Revolution triumphant, which was the immediate goal on the way to communism and the final goal of the old world.

Even when the writer does not lead up to so grandiose a conclusion, it exists implicitly, symbolically . . . for example, many of our novels and romances hinge upon work in a factory, the construction of a power-station, the administration of agricultural reforms, etc. . . . . The economic question to be resolved . . . is presented as a necessary stage on the way to the supreme End. Seen from such a definite standpoint even technical processes can take on a dramatic tension and provide interest. The reader gradually learns that, in spite of all breakdowns, the machine-tool will be set to work, or that the kolkhoz 'Victory', despite wet weather, is amassing a rich harvest of maize; and he closes the book with a sigh of relief, feeling that we have taken one more step towards communism.

Since communism, in our view, must be the inevitable issue of the historical process, the motive force in many novels is provided by the impetuous march of time working for us . . . our literature is often concerned with history, past or contemporary, and its episodes (civil war, collectivisation, etc.) are also so many stages upon the road we have chosen. For the

[5] *La Tragédie optimiste* was published in *Esprit* (Paris) in February and March 1951.

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more distant epochs, the ascent towards communism is unfortunately a little harder to show. However, even in the remotest times, a perspicuous writer will know how to give prominence to the 'progressive' phenomena . . . and as for the 'progressive' men of the past—Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible, or Stenka Razin—they were well aware, without evening knowing the word 'communism', that a luminous future was awaiting us, and are incessantly trumpeting about it in our historical novels, rejoicing the readers' hearts by their astonishing perspicacity.

A good deal of Soviet literature consists of edifying fiction depicting the metamorphosis of individuals or of whole communities into communists. Many books, indeed, are centred upon the psychological and moral revolution which is to produce the ideal man of the future. Gorki's *The Mother* exemplified this—a case of the transformation of an ignorant and passive woman into a conscious revolutionary (written in 1906, this is regarded as the first model of socialist realism). The *Pedagogic Poem* of Makarenko is another example (showing how young criminals are converted to the life of honest work), and yet another is the novel of N. Ostrovski which tells *How the Steel was Tempered*, i.e., how our youth was tempered in the fire of the civil war and then in the cold of the first industrial works of Communism.

As soon as the character is re-educated enough to become completely re-orientated and to be conscious of it, he can enter into the privileged caste, held in general respect, which is that of the 'Positive Heroes'. This is the Holy of Holies of Socialist Realism, its touchstone and its highest realisation.

The positive hero is not just a good man: he is a hero illuminated by the light of the ideal of all ideals: he is a model worthy of imitation by all, a 'peak of humanity from whose height one can see the future', according to Leonid Leonov. He has no faults, or, if he has, only in small doses (he may, to a slight degree, lose his temper now and then), just enough to preserve some verisimilitude, and also in order to have something to eliminate while he is rising to ever higher political and moral heights. However, these faults must not be important, and above all must never take away from his fundamental qualities. These qualities of the positive hero are very difficult to enumerate: ideological conviction, audacity, intelligence, strength of will, patriotism, respect for women, readiness to sacrifice himself, etc. . . . . The most essential, of course, are the clearness and definiteness with which he sees the End and strives towards it. Hence the surprising precision of all his actions, his tastes, thoughts, feelings and judgments. He knows, unshakably, what is good and what is bad, he is either 'for' or 'against', and never mixes up black with white. Interior doubts, hesitations, insoluble questions or unfathomable secrets do not exist for him; and in the most entangled problem he finds the solution quite easily, by going straight for the End.

When he appeared for the first time, with Gorki, between 1900 and 1910, and when he publicly proclaimed that 'one must always say yes or no', many people were struck by his assurance and the decisive firmness of his statements, by his tendnecy to preach to those around him and pronounce pompous monologues about his own virtue. Chekhov, who had managed to read *The Petty-Bourgeois*, raised an embarrassed eyebrow and advised Gorki to tone down the shriller declarations of his hero. Chekhov feared pretentiousness like the plague, and he thought that all these high-sounding phrases were signs of a boastfulness foreign to the Russian nature.

But Gorki took no notice . . . . He understood that this was the man of the future, and that 'they only would come through, the men pitilessly straight and firm like swords' (*The Petty-Bourgeois*, 1901).

A long time has passed since then and many things have changed . . . . It was during the thirties that Soviet writers gave up their groups and renounced diversity of literary currents to adopt, almost unanimously, the best and most progressive current of all—Socialist Realism . . . . That is why we have seen novels and plays where everything goes on as smoothly as on wheels; if there is any conflict between the heroes it is only between the progressives and the super-progressives, between the good and the still better. Their authors (Babaevsky,

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Surkov, Sofronov, Virta, Gribachev, etc.) were lauded to the skies and held up as examples. It is true that since the 20th CPSU Congress—one hardly knows why—there has been a slight change of attitude towards them, a tendency to look down on them for having made a 'literature without conflict' . . . which is very unjust.

Wishing not to lose face before the West, we sometimes cease to be logical with ourselves, and throw out grand declarations about the diversity of personalities and the plurality of interests in our society, and therefore about the numerous possibilities of conflict and contradiction that literature is supposed to reflect.

Of course we are different from one another by age, sex, nationality, and even intelligence. But anyone who follows the Party line knows very well that these are only variations within the limits of monotony, discords within the framework of unanimity, conflicts in the absence of conflict.

We have one single aim—communism; one single philosophy, Marxism; one single art, socialist realism. As it has been well put by a Soviet writer of rather second-rate talent, but on the other hand irreproachable for his political views, 'Russia has chosen her own path, that of unanimity. For thousands of years men have suffered from not thinking the same thing. We Sovietists, for the first time, have understood each other: we speak a single language, universally understandable, we think in an identical way about the principal things in life. We are strong in that intellectual unanimity. Therein lies our superiority over other men, rent and dislocated by plurality of thinking . . .' (V. Ilenkov, *The Great Way* (1949), a novel that won the Stalin prize) . . . .

Can we, in such circumstances, reproach certain writers for having over-emphasised this harmony? If they withdrew from the actual conflicts of life, it was only to take a long view of the future—in other words, to discharge as well as possible what they owe, as writers, to Soviet Realism. Babaevsky and Surkov have not deviated from the sacred principles of our art; they have, on the contrary, developed it logically and organically . . . .

If positive heroes have multiplied incredibly, and have far surpassed, in quantity, the other characters whom they overshadow and often replace altogether, this extension is also qualitative: the virtues of the heroes have become extraordinarily developed. As the hero approaches the End, he becomes more and more positive, beautiful, and grand. And, similarly, the sense of his own dignity grows within him, especially when he compares himself with a Western man and persuades himself of his own incomparable excellence. '. . . But the Soviet man is a hundred cubits above the Occidental. He is nearing the summit whilst the other is still marking time at the foot of the mountain'. (This is a sample of the language allotted to simple peasants in our novels.) . . . . We never had heroes of this kind before . . . . During the last century the hero who was in fashion belonged to quite another type, and all Russian literature lived and thought in quite another style. Compared with the religious fanaticism of our epoch, the nineteenth century was atheistic, tolerant, and without definite orientation. It was soft, flabby, feminine, and melancholic, full of doubts and internal contradictions, of remorseful conscience. In the whole of that century, it was perhaps only Chernyshevsky and Pobedonostsev who really believed in God, apart from an indefinite number of peasant men and women who were true believers; but these were not yet makers of history and culture. Culture was made by a handful of melancholy sceptics who had a thirst for God simply because they had no God . . . .

The nineteenth century was altogether one of searchings, of wanderings, of aspirations ardent or otherwise, without the power or the will to find a settled place under the sun—torn by uncertainty and dualism. Dostoevsky, who was sorry Russia was so wide—it needed to be made narrower! — made orthodoxy co-exist with nihilism and found room in his soul for all the Karamazovs at once, Alyosha, Mitya, Fedor (some say even Smerdyakov) and no one knows yet which of them predominated. Breadth excludes faith—it was not for nothing that we narrowed ourselves down to Marxism, so realising Dostoevsky's wish—and Dostoevsky well understood that sacrilege; which is why he was forever arguing with himself and longing

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passionately to put an end to a discussion so offensive to the one God.

Thirst for God, the desire to believe, springs up in desert places. It is not yet faith, and if the desire precedes the faith (Blessed are they who thirst!) it is rather in the way that hunger precedes a meal . . . . It was the hunger of the nineteenth century, perhaps, that made us in Russia pounce with such gluttony upon the nourishment provided by Marx, and swallow it before we had time to distinguish its taste, odour—and consequences. But the hunger itself was due to a calamitous lack of nourishment; it was hunger for God. That is why it was so exhausting and seemed to us unbearable: it forced us to go to the people, to stagger from radicalism into the ranks of the renegades and back again, and yet to remember that we too, in spite of everything, are Christians . . . .

I want to make peace with Heaven,
I want to love, I want to pray,
I want to believe in the Good.

Who is that weeping? who has such longings for faith? Why, let us see; it is the *Daemon* of Lermontov! [6] . . . . It is a very Russian Daemon, too inconstant in his passion for evil to be completely diabolical and too inconstant in repentance to make his peace with God and rejoin the loyal angels . . . . Do you remember what happened to that Daemon? . . . It is the same story with Russian culture throughout the nineteenth century . . . the slightest contact with God led to denial of Him, and the denial of God aroused a nostalgia for the faith unrealised . . . .

The universal Pushkin underlined this oscillation in *The Prisoner of the Caucasus* and other poems of his youth, before developing all its implications in *Eugene Onegin*. The theme of Eugene Onegin is simple, anecdotal: whilst she loves and is ready to belong to him, he is indifferent, but as soon as she is married to another, he loves her passionately and without hope. That commonplace story includes all the contradictions that Russian literature maundered about ever afterwards right up to Chekhov and Blok . . . .

[6] A celebrated poem by Lermontov (1842).

The 'useless man' is the name usually given to the central hero of this literature—Onegin, Pechorin, Beltov, Rudin, Lavretsky[7] and many others—because, for all the noble impulses stirring within him, this hero is incapable of finding a meaning in his life, and sets a deplorable example of the man without a purpose: he is necessary to no one. He is generally of a meditative disposition, prone to introspection and self-flagellation. His life is full of unrealised projects, his fate is sad, slightly ridiculous. The fateful role in his life is usually played by a woman.

If only he were a low fellow, incapable of elevated sentiments. But no! this is a worthy man, and the most charming of women bravely gives him her heart and her hand. But instead of rejoicing in this, and looking on the bright side of life, he begins to take unconsidered action and, against his own wishes, he does everything to ensure that the woman who loves him shall never be his . . . . As for the women, all the innumerable Tatianas, Lisas, Natalias, Bellas, Ninas, they are as resplendent as the intact and inaccessible ideal cherished by the Onegins and Pechorins who love them so clumsily and always without success. It was they who in Russian literature were synonymous with the ideal, who stood for the supreme End: their ephemeral nature lent itself to this very well . . . .

In Blok's poem *The Twelve*—a work on the frontier between two hostile or mutually exclusive cultures—one episode puts the full stop to the development of the sentimental theme of the nineteenth century. The Red Guard, Petka, carried away by a fit of anger, accidentally kills his well-beloved, Katka the prostitute. This crime, and the suffering caused by the loss of the loved one, resuscitate the old drama repeated ever since Lermontov's *The Devil, Masquerade*, etc., of which there are numerous variants in Blok's own work. But whereas the earlier heroes . . . after having turned their way, he ends differently. His more conscious

[7] The references are to Pechorin, in the novel *A Hero of our Time*, by Lermontov (1839); Beltov, in Herzen's novel *Whose Fault is it?* (1847); Turgenev's *Rudin* (1856); and Lavretsky, the hero of Turgenev's *A Nest of Gentlefolk* (1859).

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souls inside out, became 'stuck' in a state of incurable remorse, and Petka is going the same comrades push him forward and re-educate him:

—Sure, he was going to show us
His soul inside out. Get on!
—Keep your dignity!
—Control yourself!
And Petrushka slows down
His hurried pace . . .
He lifts up his head,
He's recovered his gaiety . . . .

That is how the new hero is born, such a hero as has never been seen. In the bloody struggle against the enemy, in the sufferings and the labours of the new epoch, he cures himself of sterile reflections and useless twinges of conscience. Proudly 'throwing his head back' and noticeably more cheerful under the flag of the new God whom Blok by force of habit calls Jesus Christ, he marches into Soviet literature.

The useless man of the nineteenth century, who became still more useless in the twentieth, was alien and incomprehensible to the positive hero of the new epoch . . . . 'Who is not for us is against us' was the attitude of the new culture. Where it still paid any attention to this type of ineffectual man, it was to show him that he was by no means useless, but harmful, dangerous, negative . . . .

This revaluation of the useless man, and his rapid transformation into a negative character, were in full swing during the twenties, the time when the positive hero was shaped. When the two were put side by side, everyone saw clearly that there could be no aimless hero, there were only people for or against; and that the useless man was, all things considered, only an enemy in disguise, a vile traitor to be unmasked and punished without delay. That is what Gorki wrote in *The Life of Klim Samgin,* Fadeyev in *The Nineteen,* and many others elsewhere. K. Fedin, in *The Towns and the Years,* emptied his heart of the last drops of pity for the formerly enchanting hero. The one discordant note was, perhaps, *Quiet Flows the Don,* in which Sholokhov portrays the tragic destiny of a useless man, Grigori Melekhov, and bids him a fully sympathetic farewell. But because Melekhov was a man of the people and not of the intelligentsia, people winked at this. Nowadays, this novel is regarded as a model of socialist realism—one which, of course, has no imitators.

Meanwhile, the other useless men who wanted to save their lives renounced their past and were rapidly re-educated into positive heroes. As one of them said lately: 'There is nothing in the world more hateful than neutrality . . . . Yes, yes, I am Red! Red, devil take you!' (K. Fedin, *An Extraordinary Being,* 1949). The malediction is not now aimed at the Reds, of course, but at the Whites.

Thus did the hero of nineteenth century Russian literature perish ingloriously.

In content, in spirit, and in the hero it praises, Socialist Realism is much nearer to the eighteenth than to the nineteenth century. The eighteenth century had, like us, the idea of the integral State, the feeling of its own superiority, the certainty that God was for it . . . . Like the socialist system, the eighteenth century imagined itself to be the centre of creation and, dazzled by the excellence of its own virtues, 'putting itself on a pedestal and resplendent with its self-praise', it proposed itself as an example to all times and all peoples. This religious conviction was so strong that Derzhavin[8], in *The Portrait of Felitsa* . . . . eulogising the ideal reign of Catherine II, prayed that:

. . . the distant savages
Covered with hair or even scales,
Attired in foliage or bark,
Crowned with the feathers of winged birds,
Incline before the august throne
And hear the voice of the laws;
While down their sunburnt face
Tears flow in torrents . . .
Thrilled through with happiness,
May they forget their equality
And all submit to Her.

The literature of the eighteenth century created a positive hero who has many features in common with the hero of our literature: he is 'friend to the common good', he 'strives in his spirit to surpass all others'—that is, con-

[8] Derzhavin (1743-1816), a great Russian poet of the classical school.

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tinuing to raise his moral and political status; he has all the virtues; he indoctrinates everyone, etc. . . . . That literature knew nothing of 'useless men'. It was equally ignorant of the destructive laughter which was the chronic malady of Russian literature from Pushkin to Blok and, after having tinged all the nineteenth century with irony, attained its maximum in the decadence. '. . . Outbursts of exhausting laughter which begin with a smile of diabolical and provocative mockery and end in revolt and sacrilege' (A. Blok's *Irony*, 1908) . . . .

Thus returning to the eighteenth century, we have become severe and serious. Not that we have forgotten how to laugh, but our laughter has ceased to be shameless and disrespectful . . . . It is laughter with a severe face and uplifted forefinger: 'This or that is not done; it ought not to be so!' Laughter wholly cleansed of ironical acidity. Instead of irony has come pathos: the positive hero is bathed in that element. We have ceased to be afraid of the grand word, the resounding phrase. The solemn and swelling style of the ode is what we like . . . . We represent life as we would wish it to be and as it must become when it has bent us to the logic of Marxism. That is why socialist realism might more aptly be called 'socialist classicism'.

In their theoretical works and articles, Soviet writers sometimes use the terms 'romanticism' or 'revolutionary romanticism'. Gorki said a good deal about the fusion of realism with romanticism; he always had a nostalgia for 'the exalted illusion that uplifts', and maintained that the artist had a right to embellish life by painting it better than it is. These appeals were not fruitless, although . . . obviously, one cannot frankly avow that what one wants is a beautiful falsehood. No, no, God forbid! We are against illusion, against idealisation; we want nothing but the truth, but besides that, we depict life 'in its revolutionary development' . . . we do not want to prettify life; it has no need of that to be beautiful. We do not mean to prettify it but only to show the seed of the future that it contains. Revolutionary romanticism—which is equivalent to this 'seed of the future', this 'revolutionary development', is actually inherent in this life that we represent truthfully, and which is romantic in the highest degree . . . .

Truth to tell, romanticism is much to our taste, and Gorki knew it: he tends towards the ideal, he makes wishes pass for realities, loves pretty knick-knacks, is not afraid of fulsome phrases, etc. . . . . That is why he has always had a certain success among us. Yet romanticism . . . for all the status he has conferred on it, has occupied a much less important place in our art than might have been expected. It makes itself felt chiefly in the beginning of socialist realism; and in its maturity, during the last thirty years, the romantic tinge grows rather faint.

Romanticism is intimately linked with the *Sturm und Drang* period of Soviet literature—the first five years of the Revolution when life and art were dominated by unbridled passions, and when the ardours of that surge towards a happy future had not become strictly regulated by governmental policy . . . . Both by those who took part in the Revolution and by those born after it, its memories are cherished as sacredly as those of a dead mother. It is easier for us to allow that everything since then is a betrayal of it than to speak of the Revolution itself with reproach or suspicion . . . .

We are living between the past and the future, between the Revolution and Communism . . . . We have had the Revolution; how could we dare disavow it or blaspheme it? We are psychologically 'jammed' between the two. And if—supposing it imaginable—our enemies overcame us and made us go back to the pre-revolutionary style of life (or join in Western democracy—it matters little), I am persuaded that we should start all over again from the previous point of departure—the Revolution.

While working at this article I have many times found myself dropping into irony—that literary indecency! But at the same time I was trying to avoid such expressions as 'Soviet power'! I preferred to replace them by synonyms—'our State', the 'socialist system', etc. . . . . For it is enough, for me, to pronounce the words 'power of the Soviets' immediately to imagine the Revolution, the storming of the Winter Palace, the crepitating ribbons of the machine guns, the bread cards, the siege, etc.;

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and to speak of all that with disrespect would make me sick. If I have something against the socialist State—and not so very much, either—I have nothing whatever against the Soviets. Is that odd? Perhaps; that is just where the romanticism comes in.

Yes, we are all romantics about our past. And yet, the farther we get away from it and the nearer to Communism, the weaker is the romantic glamour that the Revolution imparts to our art. That is understandable; romanticism corresponds to only a part of our nature, and sometimes is even opposed to it. 'The madness of the brave, that is the wisdom of life', wrote the young Gorki. It is quite true that, just when the Revolution was happening, madmen were necessary. But can one call a five year plan 'the madness of the brave'? Or the leadership of the Party—or even, for that matter, a Communism arriving inevitably by the logical march of history? When every point is thought out, reasonably foreseen, and divided into corresponding paragraphs? A queer madness. H'm; you hadn't read your Marx, comrade Gorki!

When it sets up an ideal, romanticism has not enough sense of the obligatory: it takes its wishes for reality. That is not bad, but it smacks of the arbitrary, of the subjective. What we desire is real, because things ought to be so. Our life is beautiful, not only because we wish it so, but because it must be—it has no choice.

All these arguments, unspoken and unconscious though they are, have led, little by little, to a drying-up of the ardent current of romanticism. The stream of art has congealed under the ice of a classicism which, being more definite, rational, finally more teleological, has supplanted romanticism. As early as 1922, A. Effros, in *The Messenger on the threshold*, declared that 'The classical spirit has already come in upon us from all sides. Everyone is breathing it, but people either know not how to distinguish it, or what to call it, or they are quite simply afraid to speak of it' . . . .

The first heroes of Soviet literature marched to the assault of capitalist fortresses in shoes of bark worn to shreds, their mouths full of oaths. They were coarse and natural . . . . Now they have an air of correctness, they have good manners and are neatly dressed. If they sometimes lack taste, that only denotes the national and social character of our classicism, born of the Russian democracy. But neither the authors nor their heroes have any doubts about it; they do their very best to be handsome, polite, cultivated, and they want to do 'the done thing' down to the smallest detail.

> Under the white ceiling, the ornamental lustre twinkled with its pendants of transparent glass threaded like beads of ice. The tall silvered columns sustained a dazzlingly white dome, spangled with festoons of electric lights.

What is this? A palace of the Tsars? No, it is an ordinary club in a little provincial town.

> On the platform, near the gleaming wing of the piano, stood Rakitin, dressed in a dark suit, his necktie flowing like a blue river down his chest . . . .

You think this is a singer, some fashionable tenor? Not at all; he is a worker for the Party. Now let us look at the people. They are not swearing, fighting, or drinking like fish. That was all right formerly. Nowadays, if they drink, it is at a wedding breakfast around a table loaded with delicate viands, and then in response to a toast:

> Casting a glance around at the guests, Terenti coughed discreetly into his hand, and smoothed with trembling fingers the silvery waves of his beard.
>
> —First of all, let us congratulate the young couple and drink to their health; may they beautify the earth!
>
> The guests assented with a friendly hubbub, and a crystal clinking of little glasses.
>
> —May they honour their parents!
>
> —May they have children with good health!
>
> —May they be a credit to the kolkhoz!

The novel from which these quotations are taken, E. Maltsev's *With all his Heart* (1949), is similar to dozens and hundreds of others. It is a sample of classical prose of mediocre literary quality. These banalities have long pervaded our literature, passing from one author to another without much change.

Every style has its hall-mark. But classi-

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cism, more than others, is prone to clichés, to pedantic observance of definite norms and canons. It is one of the most tenacious of styles. It brings in new elements or adopts them chiefly at the beginning; later on, it strives faithfully to follow the established models and is averse from any search for new forms, experimentation or originality . . . .

Mayakovsky was too revolutionary to become traditional. Even now, he is accepted less for his poetry than for his political significance. In spite of all the panegyrics heaped upon him, his rhythms, his images, and his language seem too audacious to most contemporary poets. Those who want to follow in his footsteps only copy his manner; unable to seize what is essential; his audacity, invention, and passion. They copy his verses without following his example. Perhaps this is because Mayakovsky was the first classicist, right at the beginning; and, having no predecessors, he built on virgin ground . . . . Or perhaps because he had genius; in any case, his poetry is filled all through with the breath of novelty: a breath that vanished from our literature with his death.

True, geniuses are not born every day, and the state of art rarely satisfies contemporaries. Still, it must be confessed that, as many others have said, our literature has done nothing but deteriorate for the last two or three decades. As they have developed and come to creative maturity, K. Fadeyev, I. Ehrenburg, V. Ivanov and many others have written worse and worse. Since our writers in the mass went over to socialist realism—early in the thirties—literature has languished. Some rare flashes such as those at the time of the Patriotic War have not saved it.

For this contradiction between the victory of socialist realism and the feeble quality of literary production, socialist realism is often blamed, from a belief that great art is impossible within its limitations, that it is deadly to art in general. Mayakovsky, first of all, enables us to refute this . . . . Art does not fear dictatorship, nor severity nor repression, not even conservatism and the cliché. Art, when it has to be so, can be strictly religious, or stupidly official, or without individuality and still be great art. We enthuse before the style of Ancient Egypt, or Russian iconography, or folklore. Art is fluid enough to fit into the Procrustean bed that history offers it. But there is one thing it cannot endure—eclecticism.

Our misery is that we are not sufficiently convinced of socialist realism: that, after having obeyed its cruel laws, we fear to go on right to the end of the road we ourselves have traced out. Were we only less cultivated, no doubt it might be easier for us to attain the degree of integrity indispensable to the artist. But we have been to school, we have read various books and learnt all too well that there were remarkable writers before us—Balzac, Maupassant, Tolstoy . . . and one other; let us see, who was that? Ah, yes! Chekhov! . . . . *That* has undone us. We wanted to become famous, to write like Chekhov at the first attempt. From that unnatural liaison proceeded monsters.

In the very term 'socialist realism' there is a manifest, insurmountable contradiction. An art that is socialist—which means religious, orientated to a unique End—cannot be created by the literary means called 'realist' in the nineteenth century. A picture perfectly true to the real, including all the details of everyday life, the psychological analyses, the landscapes, portraits, etc., does not lend itself to depiction in a language of teleological speculation. If socialist realism really wants to rise to the level of the great world-cultures and create its 'Communiada' there is only one way—to have done with realism; to renounce its pitiful, and anyway futile efforts to create a socialist *Anna Karenina* or *Cherry Orchard*. When once it no longer wants to conform to a reality that is non-existent for it, it will be able to express the grandiose, unbelievable meaning of our epoch.

Unfortunately, that development is hardly likely. The events of the last few years have driven our art along a road of half-measures and halt-truths. The death of Stalin dealt a mortal blow to our system of religious aesthetic, and to replace this by reviving the worship of Lenin is difficult. Lenin is too much like an ordinary man, he has too realistic an aspect—small, bald, and in civilian garb. Stalin, now, he had been specially created for the hyper-

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bole that awaited him. Mysterious, omniscient, omnipotent, he was the living monument of our epoch and only lacked one quality to become God—immortality.

Ah, if only we had been more intelligent; if only we had surrounded his death with miracles! We should have given it out on the radio that he was not dead but had gone up into heaven, whence he was still looking at us, silently, over his mystical moustache. His relics would have cured paralytics and people possessed with devils. And children, before going to bed, would have been praying by their windows, with their eyes turned towards the bright stars of the celestial Kremlin.

But we did not listen to the voice of conscience. Instead of betaking ourselves to prayer, we set to work to unmask the 'cult of personality' that we had created. We ourselves have blown up the foundations of that classical masterpiece which, had we waited but a little longer, might have rivalled the pyramids of Cheops or the Apollo Belvedere, in the treasure house of universal art . . . .

The strength of a theological system consists in its permanence, its harmony, its order. Once you allow that God has carelessly sinned with Eve and that, jealous of Adam, he sent that unhappy husband away to labour at land reclamation, then the whole conception of the creation of the world is done for, and it is impossible to revive the faith . . . .

Meanwhile, our art is marking time between a realism and a classicism, both incomplete . . . . In the panegyrics, vulgarity and tartuffery sound more and more clearly; and the writers who now attain success are those who describe our achievements in a fashion as consistent as possible with reality, and our defects with tact, delicacy, and in a fashion as inconsistent as possible with reality. Any work that errs on the side of 'excessive verisimilitude', of 'realism' is a fiasco. That is what happened to Dudintsev's novel *Not by Bread alone*, which aroused much comment and was publicly anathematised for having sullied our shining Soviet reality.

But is it possible that the old, good-and-honest 'realism' can be the only secret heresy that is tempting Russian literature? Is it possible that all the lessons we have had are lost, and that we want nothing better than a return to the naturalistic school and a critical orientation? Let us hope that is not the whole story, and that the demand for truth will not obstruct the work of thought and imagination.

At present, I place my hopes in a phantasmagorical art, which would have hypotheses instead of a goal, an art in which the grotesque would replace the realistic in the description of everyday life. This is what would best respond to the spirit of our epoch. May the unearthly imaginations of Hoffmann and Dostoevsky, of Goya and Chagall, of Mayakovsky (the most socialist realist of all), as well as those of many other realists and non-realists—may these teach us how to express truth with the aid of the absurd and the fantastic!

In losing our faith, we have not lost enthusiasm before the metamorphoses of God that are taking place before our eyes, before the monstrous peristaltic upheaval of his entrails and his cerebral circumvolutions. We know not where to go; but, having understood that there is nothing to be done about it, we begin to imagine that we must create enigmas, put forward suppositions. Shall we perhaps invent something astonishing? But that will no longer be Socialist Realism.

(A fuller version of this article appeared in French translation in Esprit.)

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THE SOVIET WRITERS CONGRESS

Along the Middle of the Road

Ronald Hingley

THE most important event of the Third Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers (Moscow, 18 to 23 May) was the removal of Alexey Surkov from the powerful post of First Secretary and his relegation to the relatively obscure position of Secretary, so that he is now no more exalted in rank than twenty-five other equal-ranking Secretaries. Surkov is an energetic and forceful man whose name has become identified with the practice of placing too much emphasis on committee work and administration, of interfering with authors' manuscripts and allotting them 'creative assignments' (*tvorcheskie kommandirovki*). This latter phrase—not surprisingly—has acquired an ironical flavour among Soviet writers.

To those who have kept their ear close to the ground, Surkov's demotion will have come as no great surprise. For some time there have been indications that he has made powerful enemies among his fellow-writers and that these have been intriguing to accomplish his downfall. Since Surkov took a leading part in the recent campaign against Pasternak, some Western observers have interpreted his demotion as part of a move to reinstate Pasternak in the Union. But it is unlikely that this motive has been a factor. Among the people who have got rid of the First Secretary it is probable that only a minority—if any—hold any active brief for *Dr Zhivago*. The rest have just got tired of being pushed around.

Fedin, who succeeds Surkov, will certainly push them around a great deal less. Like Leonid Sobolev, who heads the RSFSR branch of the Union, he is not a Party member. What is more important, he is not by temperament a leader or organiser—probably this is the very reason why he has been chosen. As one of the most distinguished living Soviet novelists he brings great literary prestige to his new office, while as an intellectual (and leading chronicler of the Soviet intelligentsia's evolution) he offers a striking contrast to his predecessor. Surkov is by no means a negligible poet, but in recent years everyone has come to regard him as a literary *apparatchik*.

The manner of Surkov's removal has been interesting. He has not been in any way disgraced and the whole matter has been handled with the greatest possible decorum. During the proceedings of the Congress we had hardly any hints that he was about to go. He was simply voted out of office when the Congress was over. On the first day he had presented a long report: 'The tasks of Soviet literature in the building of communism'. This report formed in theory the theme of the majority of the speeches which followed during the next five days. But very few of the speakers referred to Surkov by name. By those who did mention him he was not greatly abused, but he got absolutely no bouquets—in contrast, for example, with Tvardovsky and Sholokhov.

This report of Surkov's was long, boring, and heavily larded with Soviet literary clichés. That was to be expected. What was surprising was that some of the later speakers criticised it precisely because it *was* boring, thus introducing a dangerous new principle into the conduct of Soviet congresses and one which, if it became established, might ultimately prove entirely fatal to them. For example, Valentin Katayev, after mentioning the names of three promising young prose-writers, went on to say: 'I could also mention a lot of other names, but I don't want to turn my speech into the monotonous reading of the traditional litany which has already become so painfully boring to everyone'. This was a back-handed reference to the enormous catalogues in Surkov's report—catalogues of authors who, he claimed, had served Soviet literature in various ways.

One of the more outspoken attacks on Surkov was made in an interesting speech by Anatoly Kalinin from Rostov-on-Don. He complained that the Union had 'caught a disease' which caused many writers to spend most of their

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time in committee meetings instead of at their own desks—a theme which was echoed by many other speakers. He also said that: 'The poet Alexey Surkov is in some sense a victim of the Secretary of the Union Alexey Surkov. If one half of all those emotions which he has scattered with lavish hand on committee tables had gone to the building of his poetical strophes, then perhaps today readers might be enjoying more than one long poem produced by his pen'.

Kalinin's speech contains several lyrical and almost sycophantic references to Sholokhov, and raises some interesting questions. Why did Sholokhov himself not speak at the Congress? He had made a memorable contribution to the Second Congress in 1954 with his vicious attack on Simonov. He is everywhere acknowledged as Soviet Russia's greatest writer, so that his failure to perform at the Third Congress could not fail to excite comment. Was he even in Moscow? Or sulking in his *stanitsa*? He is probably no friend of Surkov, and it seems to me quite possible that he 'put up' Kalinin to make this speech. In an unpolemical conference it was one of the most polemical contributions and may well reflect His Master's Voice.

A SPEECH by the Moscow poet Nikolay Gribachov contained an even more outspoken condemnation of Surkov's opening report. He said that such reports 'degrade our literature, insult and oppress our writers. At the First Congress of Writers of the USSR Leonid Sobolev said that the Party and the Government had given us all rights and had taken from us only one right—that of writing badly. It would have been a good thing if we had at the same time been deprived of the right to such reports as that with which our Third Congress began'.

Gribachov speaks with satisfaction of the atmosphere of businesslike calm in which the Third Congress is proceeding 'after a serious ideological struggle, complicated by the unprincipled racket and unhealthy hullabaloo kicked up by little-talented and para-literary (*okololiteraturny*) persons'. This is rather tantalising. Gribachov may of course be referring to the well-known series of rows about Dudintsev's *Not By Bread Alone* and the two *Literary Moscow* compilations. But it seems possible that he is referring to much more recent squabbles which preceded the Congress, of which we have little knowledge and which have hardly been allowed to erupt into its decorous atmosphere or into the rather less decorous atmosphere of the preliminary Congresses of Republican Unions.

This atmosphere of decorum forms a strong contrast between the present Congress and its more hard-hitting predecessor in 1954, when many harsh words were exchanged. It is perhaps the price which writers have had to pay for the removal of Surkov. It is not often that the Party permits a leading figure to be removed in this way from below, and the procedure has been entirely different from that of more familiar Soviet demotions. Surkov has not been humiliated. In fact he is still waiting in the wings. If necessary he can be reinstated. He may even become more useful to the Party as a threat than he was as a boss.

However this may be, the replacement of Surkov by Fedin remains a step away from illiberalism in the affairs of the Union. An element of greater tolerance is also to be found in what I judge to be the second most important event of the Conference—Khrushchev's address which took place on the last day and has been interpreted by some commentators as offering an 'olive-branch' to the writers. It certainly offered them a respite from boredom. He spoke impromptu. Although his speech, as reported in *Pravda*, may have been doctored after the event, it still makes very lively reading. It appears to especial advantage after the dull and incantational harangues which had preceded it.

This was of course far from being Khrushchev's first irruption into the literary world. He took a vigorous part in suppressing the 1956 movement of writers towards greater freedom of expression. Having handled these freedom-writers somewhat roughly, and having successfully stamped out the 'revisionist' heresy for which they stood, he has now slightly shifted his position to one of armed benevolence. He spoke almost with approval of Dudintsev's *Not by bread alone*. Although 'certain ill-

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wishers abroad' (a common formula at the Congress) had been wrong in claiming that *Not by bread alone* was very nearly the greatest work of Russian literature, it did contain 'certain pages deserving of attention'. Indeed, Mikoyan had once remarked that in places Dudintsev's arguments were an exact repetition of Khrushchev's own. Dudintsev's error had been to exaggerate and to generalise. 'But he was never our enemy and was not an opponent of the Soviet System'. This drew applause from the delegates.

Does this graciousness imply that Khrushchev is now prepared to allow greater latitude to writers? Scarcely. He compared the present status of the heretics of 1956 with that of a reformed thief—they had better not lapse into crime again. 'There is a correct proverb' (another typical turn of phrase) 'one doesn't kick a man when he's down'. Khrushchev made is quite clear that these writers *had* been kicked into a posture of submission, and that they would be well advised to remain prone. Otherwise they would get kicked again.

One abiding feature in Khrushchev's attitude to the writers is the ingrained contempt for intellectuals felt by the 'worker' or practical man with mud on his boots or machine-oil on his hands. He revealed this in the genially patronising manner of his whole address, and also in his preamble, where he was careful to put writers in the same class not merely as composers and artists, but also as film executives and other 'equally remarkable branches of the Soviet creative intelligentsia'. And he went on to point out that 'life is always incomparably richer, deeper, and more full-blooded than the very best artistic production'.

PERHAPS Russian writers particularly need this douche of cold water, since when given the slightest chance, they tend to adopt the postures of major prophets or arbiters of destiny no less easily than they adopt the postures of servility. In particular, Khrushchev is anxious that they should not usurp the function of the Central Committee by taking too seriously their role as critics of Soviet society. 'Listen, friends, if there's anyone who reveals and lays bare deficiencies and vices, whose hand will not tremble when doing this—these matters (I have retained Khrushchev's 'impromptu' syntax in my translation) are the affairs of the Party, they're handled by its Central Committee'. One feels that Khrushchev's ideal of a writer is a man who devotes his days to some man-sized job with lathe or tractor, and spends his evenings helping to compile a collective illustrated brochure about youth in the Virgin Lands. Even the most pliable of Soviet writers will not quite stand for this. As a reasonable man, Khrushchev is prepared to humour his writers to some extent. But he feels that they need to be repeatedly reminded of their true place.

Few of the preceding speakers at the Congress needed such reminders, to judge from the trouble they took to conform with the ritual of servility. But at least four senior figures did not speak at all. Apart from Sholokhov, whom I have already mentioned, these were Leonov, Ehrenburg, and Simonov. These four had all taken a prominent part in the Second Writers Congress. Is their failure to speak at the Third Congress to be interpreted as an example of 'the heroic feat of silence' (the form of passive resistance often adopted by disgruntled Soviet authors) or are they in disgrace? Of the four Leonov, at least, cannot be much in disgrace, since he has been elected to the Secretariat.

Of the remaining speeches at the Congress (which had 89 speakers in all) there is on the whole not very much that need be said, owing to their conformist character. Not surprisingly, the most independent and interesting contribution was that of Tvardovsky. Tvardovsky complained that 'we still seem to be paying a certain tribute to the inertia of our existence of yesterday'. He criticised the 'lifeless phraseology' of certain speeches and their preoccupation with boring statistics. As any visitor to the USSR knows to his cost, Soviet citizens in all walks of life are obsessed with figures, the recital of which obviously has on them some mysterious therapeutic effect. Nowhere is this obsession more ridiculous than in the sphere of literature, where, as Tvardovsky points out, quality means everything and quantity nothing. He said that he would rather have seven decent plays which

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he would like to see again and again than seven hundred plays 'written in the period under review'. The important task was the raising of quality. There were all too many writers willing to take responsibility for 'literature as a whole'. It was time some of them began to think more of taking personal responsibility for their own individual work. The most provocative sentence in his speech was a blow against the self-congratulatory complacency of many other speakers: 'We must say to our literary Yesterday, and even to our Today, "We can't go on living like this and we shan't go on living like this".'

Tvardovsky's speech was not calculated to set the Moskva River on fire, but it was a healthy sign. As some of his previous escapades show, he is a loyal but liberal-minded Party member who believes that the Party can afford to allow writers more latitude than it at present contemplates. He recently published an interesting poem in *Novy Mir* in which he complained against an act of censorship carried out against his work in *Pravda*. He is a loyal communist, but one whose fortunes serve as a useful barometer of the state of Soviet letters.

NO Russian public function is complete without some sort of *skandal*. The *skandal* in this instance was provided by Paustovsky. He did not speak at the Congress, probably because what he had to say struck too violently against the predetermined atmosphere of decorum. But he published an article in the *Literary Gazette* of 20 May, one of an otherwise undistinguished collection by various authors issued 'a propos of the Congress'. This takes a position far in advance of Tvardovsky and shows Paustovsky as a courageous and unrepentant rebel. It says much for the relative state of freedom of Soviet letters, when compared with their darker days, that such an article was printed at all.

Paustovsky gives a warning to those writers (including many of the speakers at the Congress) who take it upon themselves to speak in the name of the people. He warns them that readers are very well able to distinguish sincerity from an ability to adapt oneself (*prisposoblenchestvo*) and that they can differentiate a genuine from a merely 'shouting' link with the people. He speaks with distaste of various literary 'isms', and though he does not mention Socialist Realism among these, he was writing for people trained to read between the lines. He deplored the tradition that novels must always have a falsely happy ending and a balance between light and dark colours nicely calculated in favour of the former. Thank goodness *Anna Karenina* had been written before the appearance of this tradition. He wondered why, in the forty-first year of the existence of the Soviet system, it was still necessary to give the appearance of proving its superiority to the capitalist system 'as if we ourselves doubt this and marvel at it as at some incredible miracle'.

Paustovsky's most outspoken sentence reads: 'Perhaps the reason why we shout so much and so loudly about truth in literature is because truth is what we haven't got enough of'. He also made an eloquent plea for the use of good Russian and the abandonment of jargon. 'The language is being bureaucratised from top to bottom, beginning with the newspapers and radio and ending with our ordinary everyday speech.' Would the Congress secure freedom for the writers? Or would it occupy itself with submitting them to petty-minded interference and raking up old quarrels? It was time to stop calling one's friends enemies just because they spoke unpleasant truths and did not play the hypocrite.

One or two of the later speakers at the Congress took Paustovsky to task for writing this article, but considering its explosive quality he got off very lightly. The criticisms levelled against him were vague and half-hearted.

The appearance of Paustovsky's article raises an interesting and mildly comforting speculation. We tend all too easily to think of recent Soviet literature as divided into two quite distinct and opposing categories: (a) run-of-the-mill 'Socialist Realism' of a drearily conformist type; (b) protest literature such as that associated with the year 1956. In fact, however, a third type of writing has been quietly gaining ground. This consists of works which either avoid politics altogether, or at least dodge the sharper implications of politics. They naturally make fewer headlines in the West, but they

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include much interesting writing nevertheless. To this 'neutral' category belongs some of Paustovsky's own work, the stories of Antonov and such works as Nilin's *Cruelty* and Panova's *Sentimental Novel*. The appearance of such works would have been almost unthinkable under Stalin. What hopes does the Third Writers Congress offer for their future?

The other two categories have had their fates settled decisively. Run-of-the-mill Socialist Realism will continue to struggle on. Protest literature is out. As for 'neutral' writing—that too has been under attack. But the attack has taken a very devious form. The opponents of the 'neutral' school have framed their attack on it as a plea for greater 'contemporaneity'. It so happens that the 'neutral' writers are more at home describing either pre-revolutionary events or dealing with Soviet society of the twenties, for which there now seems to be a general feeling of nostalgia. The supporters of 'contemporaneity' attack this approach under the label of the 'theory of distance', that is, the idea that a writer can most effectively treat events with which he is not in too direct contact. Many words were spilled on this subject at the Congress. But these fulminations remained abstract. Individual practitioners of 'neutral' writing were not pilloried. This clearly means that they are to be allowed to continue, and of the various signs of 'liberalism' for which one searches in the Third Congress this is the most important.

One important result of the Congress has been a radical re-organisation of the Union's administration. As set up at the Second Congress of 1954, this consisted of three main bodies:

1. A Board (*pravleniye*), consisting of well over a hundred members.
2. A Presidium of about 40 members.
3. A Secretariat of 11 members.

As the result of changes now adopted at the Third Congress the Board remains, but the Presidium has disappeared entirely, while the Secretariat has been expanded to include 28 members (26 Secretaries in addition to the First Secretary, Fedin, and the Organisational Secretary, K. V. Voronkov). Fifteen members of the new Secretariat are the heads of Republican Unions of writers. Since these are not normally resident in Moscow, it seems that the affairs of the Union will now generally be decided by a small Inner Secretariat, consisting at the most of 13 members.

One effect of this change has been to reduce the participation of senior writers in the administration of the Union. Sholokhov, Ehrenburg, Simonov, V. Katayev, Panova, and Pogodin were all members of the old Presidium. With its abolition they inevitably lose influence. As already suggested above, some of these writers may be boycotting the Union at the moment—or they may be being boycotted by it on Party instructions. It is difficult to tell.

To judge by the contributions of the minority nationalities to the Congress, few of their new representatives on the Secretariat are likely to lend distinction to its work. As each trundled out his pathetic bundle of painfully mastered ritualistic jargon, a vista began to spread before one's eyes of a far-flung literary empire from which the dust shall never rise. Although they had nothing interesting to say, at least some of these 'funnies' lent a certain wild poetry to the proceedings through the medium of their extraordinary names. However ephemeral his actual contribution may have been, no one is likely to forget entirely a man called Toktobolot Abdumomunov.

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Sartre — Camus — de Beauvoir

A SOVIET VIEW OF EXISTENTIALISM

E. Evnina

(During the last year or so the number of references in the Soviet press to Camus and other contemporary French writers has been increasing. We print below an abridged version of an article published in Voprosy Literatury *(No. 4, 1959) which is the first comprehensive treatment in years of French existentialist literature in a Soviet literary magazine.)*

THE existentialist novel—and indeed existentialist art and philosophy generally—became important in the war and post-war years. In our discussion of it we shall endeavour to show how the decadent philosophy and æsthetic of existentialism leads the artist into a blind alley, and how difficult it is for some writers to triumph over the existentialist canons.

Existentialism, which originally blossomed in pre-Fascist Germany in the systems of Heidegger and Jaspers (end of the twenties and beginning of the thirties) is a decadent, reactionary philosophy. Like most philosophical systems of the imperialist age, it has invented nothing, but has merely combined eclectically various elements from old familiar doctrines. At bottom it is one of the countless varieties of subjective idealism, which puts the philosopher's 'I' at the centre of the universe. The very term 'existentialism' is intended to convey an endeavour to comprehend human existence as it presents itself to the consciousness. This means that, unlike the classical systems of bourgeois philosophy (Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, etc.), which strove to embrace the whole world, or the whole of being in the broad sense of the word, within their purview, existentialism sees the main problem of philosophy in the individual consciousness of the subject, or, to be more precise, of the modern bourgeois intellectual, with his characteristic problems—the freedom of the individual, his 'choice,' and his behaviour in the world about him.

Thus, contemporary bourgeois philosophy *no longer poses universal problems;* it excludes economic and social questions from the circle of its attention, and in effect avoids answering the main question about the paths of world development. True, the objective world is present in the systems of Sartre and other French existentialists, but only in an impoverished form, as the absurd, devoid of regularities, causes and consequences, and hence incomprehensible to man. In this absurd world man finds himself 'abandoned,' helpless and alone, incapable of actively getting to know reality and transforming it. The effect of such a philosophy is to leave man no weapon against capitalist slavery. It serves the purposes of imperialist reaction.

French existentialism, which emerged on the eve of the second world war and was widely disseminated during and after the war under Sartre's leadership, has its peculiarities, since the historical events of recent years have left conspicuous marks on it. It reflects most vividly the horror and bewilderment of the individual confronted with Hitler's annihilation camps and the atomic threat to peace.

In the fundamental theses of his enormous work *L'Etre et le Néant* (1943), Sartre still starts from the main postulates of existentialism. He insists here on the fortuity and meaninglessness of being, which in his view 'has neither cause nor reason nor necessity,' on the helplessness of reason and the absurdity of human existence. Life is pictured in his philosophy not as a constant process of learning about the world and mastering it, but as a ceaseless flight from death and the hostility of being. The idea that man is alone and abandoned runs through the whole treatise. Sartre sees the main distinguishing mark of existence in the constant alarm caused by 'the shadow of death,' in the condition of anxiety, dizziness, and nausea caused by the distressing uncertainty of the world.

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But the peculiarity of the French existentialists' historical destiny lies in the fact that their typically decadent twentieth century philosophy met on its path the Fascist invasion, the occupation of France, and the nationwide resistance to the invaders. All this was bound to affect the practical behaviour of Sartre and his group at this tragic moment in the history of his country. The question arose: whom to follow, which camp to join?

Sartre could have followed his predecessors (Jaspers and Heidegger, who condemned all social activity, and in the years before Fascism preached complete passivity and concentration on oneself; or Nietzsche, whose philosophy became the basis of German Fascism), and ended up in the collaborationist camp, the camp of his country's enemies. But outraged national sentiment brought both Sartre and Albert Camus, like many other French intellectuals, into the camp of the Resistance. This choice was bound to have some effect on the views of the French existentialists, separating them from their German predecessors, and causing them to accent somewhat differently such concepts as 'freedom,' 'responsibility,' the problem of 'choice,' positive 'action,' 'engagement,' etc. In the years of Hitlerite occupation, Sartre's principle of the 'freedom of the individual' became the basis of an anti-Fascist though extremely nebulous ideology for leftist intellectuals united in their rejection of Fascism. This abstract conception of freedom, however, contained within itself extremely contradictory elements, which were further developed in the post-war period.

AFTER the liberation of France, and amidst the complex interplay of progressive and reactionary influences, the thinking of Sartre and his comrades in arms was partly coloured by the undeniable influence of Marxism and the workers movement on those broad strata of the French intelligentsia who had no party affiliation, but had passed through the school of the Resistance, and resented the encroachment of American imperialism on France. Hence the obvious feeling of the existentialists that their philosophy could not remain in the form in which they had received it from Kierkegaard and Heidegger, but was in need of substantial correctives. It is here that we should seek the reason for Sartre's numerous attempts to join the progressive camp of peace and bring his system closer to Marxism.

On the other hand, existentialism could not help reflecting as well the reluctance of certain circles amongst the modern intelligentsia abroad to part company with their individualistic class habits; their fear of absorption by the mighty working class movement; their panic dread of that so-called Soviet 'tyranny' about which the reactionary press in the imperialist world howls with all the stops out. Under these pressures, the existentialists slide back into extreme reactionary positions, and often enter into savage polemics against Marxism.

These incessant vacillations between the two camps vividly reflect the crisis and confusion of large groups amongst the bourgeois intelligentsia today, which tragically senses the deadly threat of advancing imperialism, makes occasional attempts at self-defence against it, yet for fear of losing its cherished 'freedom of the individual' cannot make a decisive turn and take up its stand with the working class, the only consistent fighter for the radical transformation of the world.

The wobbly political positions of the French existentialists, like the perpetual redrawing of boundaries within the existentialist school itself, are in reality the result of the fact that they never could triumph over the subjectivist and idealistic bases of their philosophy. A sharp division between man's consciousness and the reality around him is characteristic of their thought. On one hand—the consciousness of the isolated individual, on the other—absurd reality, hostile and inaccessible to man; in these two phenomena the existentialists see an absolute and ineluctable contradiction. There is an equally sharp division in the existentialist system between the categories of freedom and necessity, which are understood in an idealistic and subjectivist fashion.

This division between individual consciousness and the objective world, and between the individual act and the social activity of the masses, is the starting point for the attempt

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to find a theoretical basis for the behaviour of the isolated individual—that new Robinson Crusoe of the twentieth century, artificially liberated by the existentialists from all social ties, as though a real human being in our age could live in complete isolation from society. This is the fallacious principle which determines the whole ideology of the existentialists, including their æsthetics, and the character of the favourite existentialist hero, who brings with him into the world his permanent loneliness and his hopelessness. That is why the modernistic novel, which had introduced this lonely and utterly despairing hero long ago, finds a philosophical basis for itself in existentialism.

HELD together by the idealistic principles of their philosophy, the existentialist writers by and large continue and carry further the struggle with realism begun by the modernists at the beginning of the century. (Camus's literary career is most instructive in this context.) At the same time, such social shocks as the Nazi occupation, the Resistance, the threat of a third world war, together with the influence of the national resurgence, the mass movement for the defence of peace, etc., are bound to confront the most sensitive of these writers with the necessity of reflecting the great social conflicts of modern life, forcing them to retreat from their philosophical and æsthetic principles, and bringing them somewhat closer to realism. (Simone de Beauvoir's novel *Les Mandarins,* in particular, bears witness to this evolutionary proces.) No complete and generally accepted existentialist æsthetic exists, just as there is no completeness and unity in the philosophical system and social position of the existentialists.

In our analysis of the existentialist novel we shall try to examine the complex interweaving and the varied evolution of all these extremely contradictory elements in the works of the French existentialists Jean-Paul Sartre (b. 1905), Albert Camus (b. 1913), and Simone de Beauvoir (b. 1909), who are at once philosophers—authors of philosophical essays, treatises, and articles—and the creators of literary works (novels, plays, stories, etc.).

[*There follows a detailed discussion of Sartre's* Les Chemins de la Liberté, *with particular attention to the ineffectuality of his hero, and his illogical attitude to the communist Brunet.*]

Lack of sympathy and pity for people—this is the reproach which Sartre levels at the communists. But how does Sartre think that this love and pity should express itself? As they did in his Mathieu, who despairingly joined the soldiers in drowning their sorrow and defeat, with a lucid awareness of his complete impotence in face of their destiny and his own?

In spite of this prejudice against communists, Sartre, who went through the school of the French Resistance, cannot help noting the objective fact that the communists were the only people who did not lose their heads in the circumstances of defeat and occupation, but took the lead in organising the struggle against Fascism. This is why Sartre, while falsely endowing Brunet with the antipathetic characteristics mentioned, yet cannot deny the extraordinary strength of will, the resolution, courage, and self-control which he displays in the harsh conditions of camp life. From the first Brunet begins to rally the communists and all patriots capable of taking part in resistance. He introduces physical training in the camp, keeps an eye on the morale of his comrades, organises extra rations for the weakest, looks for ways of combating priestly propaganda in favour of passivity and resignation. In short, for all Sartre's efforts to make him look like a little 'führer' and a misanthrope, Brunet provides precisely the organisation and the help, in the highest sense of that word, which people need in the painful moment of national catastrophe.

The criss-cross of truth and falsehood in the portrayal of the communist Brunet shows Sartre's reluctance to admit that 'pitying' people does not mean simply sharing their despair, but leading them forward, dragging them out of the abyss into which they have fallen. Because he does not understand this, or does not accept it, he makes his onslaught on uniquely sound people, who are capable of leading the masses into the struggle to change their lot.

At the end of the novel Sartre deliberately

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plays false with the logic of Brunet's character, doing violence to the novel's uniquely effective figure, so as to make him too feel himself helpless and alone, like all of Sartre's despairing intellectuals. The novel ends joylessly and hopelessly at the moment when the French prisoners-of-war are being carried off to Germany, and Brunet for the first time in his life is touched by doubt and pity for a comrade—the young print-shop worker who tried to escape and was killed by the German escort.

It is significant that, while he objects to the way of the communist militants, as over-simple and dictated, in his opinion, not by sympathy for people but by narrow-minded fanaticism, Sartre himself cannot answer the question how else they should act. His Schneider—the character who after Mathieu's death expresses the author's thoughts and is obviously intended as a contrast to Brunet, not only proposes no other way but is himself willy-nilly drawn to people of heroic action. When Brunet asks why he helps the communists to organise resistance amongst the prisoners-of-war, although he does not agree with the policy of the Communist Party, Schneider answers with an uncertain smile: 'So as not to be left alone... We must do something, mustn't we?"

Thus, the whole Sartrean complex of doubts, contradictions, and unsolved problems is imprinted for all to see on the trilogy *Les Chemins de la Liberté*. A straight line leads from these unsolved problems to Sartre's contradictory and inconsistent actions in subsequent years.

IN the first half of the fifties we witnessed a marked shift to the left on the part of Sartre and his immediate followers, obviously caused by the frenzied onrush of imperialism and the growing threat of war on the one hand, and the consolidation of progressive forces in defence of peace on the other. To this period belong Sartre's polemic against Camus's anti-revolutionary book *L'Homme Révolté* and his series of articles, 'Les Communistes et la Paix,' in which he supports the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union.

At about the same time Sartre brought out such works as *Commentaires sur l'Affaire Henri Martin* (1953) and the play *Nekrasov*, which were aimed against the forces of reaction and anti-communist propaganda in France. At the same time his closest companion in arms, Simone de Beauvoir, wrote a telling indictment of modern reactionary thought in her articles 'La Pensée de Droite Aujourd'hui' and the novel *Les Mandarins* (Prix Goncourt 1954), in which she argues the need for the left intelligentsia to collaborate with communism. This period then is marked by the maximum rapprochement of the Sartre group with the progressive camp of peace.

But the eclectic principles of Sartre's philosophy, which deprive him of political consistency, came to the fore again in autumn 1956 in connection with the Hungarian events, which international reaction, as is well known, tried to exploit to the full against the Soviet Union and the communist movement. Since 1956, Sartre declares that it is impossible to collaborate with the communists and offers a platform in his journal for every imaginable kind of revisionist utterance. In his philosophical work *Questions de Méthode* (1957) he attempts to combine eclectically some elements of Marxism, Existentialism, and Freudism. This marks Sartre's latest move away from the progressive camp. But at the same time he remains a member of the National Committee of French Writers, and when de Gaulle was coming to power he signed the progressive French writers declaration in defence of the Republic.

During the struggle over the referendum Sartre took up a definite progressive position, and found himself in the opposite camp from Malraux and Camus, for instance. What his future course will be, with whom he will travel from now on, the living history of our time will show.

In justice to Sartre we must say that his former ally, Albert Camus, both in his literary work and in the political arena, has much more obviously trodden the path of reaction.

CAMUS'S first works, the philosophical essay *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* (1942) and the plays *Caligula* and *Le Malentendu* (1944), rest on a vehement rejection of the world, where 'chance

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reigns triumphant' and man's only choice is between the 'stupid happiness of stones' and the 'bed of dead men.' *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* is preceded by a long tract on the absurdity of existence, the absurdity of man and his judgment. A special place is occupied by what Camus regards as the absurd gap between human reason, with its 'despairing' yearning for lucidity, and unreasonable reality, which cannot reply to man's 'interrogation,' since it is nothing but chaos and utter anarchy.

These basic philosophical ideas are close to Sartre, but Camus clothes them in a completely different artistic form. Whereas Sartre deals with the immediate present, exhibiting to us the crushed French intellectuals of the thirties and forties, with their typical 'quest of freedom' in their typical milieu of Parisian cafés and restaurants, Camus deliberately abstracts from all concrete circumstances, and prefers a symbolical, parable form. In this he is considerably helped by the exotic surroundings of Algeria, where he sets the action of most of his works.

Camus's first story, *L'Etranger*, like *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* with which it coincides in time, tries to show the eternal gap between human reason and the absurd world. The story centres on the heavily emphasised indifference to the world of its hero, Meursault, a French clerk in Algiers, who shares neither the feelings, nor the ideas, nor the ambitions, nor the calculations of the characters around him. His mother's death, the love of the beautiful Marie, the murder which he unintentionally commits, prison life, even the sentence of death pronounced by the court—everything leaves him unnaturally indifferent.

Sartre's heroes, as we have seen, were looking for something, tried to define their positions, were upset, rebelled like Yviche, or were racked and tortured like Mathieu, showing in one way or another an awareness of their wretched position in the world. Camus's hero, on the contrary, has no awareness, is tormented by nothing, reasons about nothing in particular, and, above all, has no inclination at all to revolt. (He revolts just once, against the priest who is sent to him in prison, but he immediately passes from anger to his habitual languid indifference to life and to people.) The gulf between the inner, spiritual world and the world around and outside is, then, deeper and more hopeless here than in the case of Sartre's heroes.

The outside world in its turn, as seen through the eyes of Camus's heroes, is an extraordinarily incoherent agglomeration of absurd accidents, unmotivated actions and collisions, which have neither cause nor consequence. Camus's story is attached to no particular time, we do not know when it takes place, and although the year of its composition, 1942, was for France one of terrible trials inflicted by the Fascist occupation, there is nothing in the story told us to recall this situation, except perhaps the feeling of dreary hopelessness, which supposedly rules triumphant in the world. Camus prefers not to touch on great events, and demonstrates this hopelessness in petty happenings and the chance observations of his characters.

The gap between man and his fellows is just as hopeless as that which divides him from the absurd world around him. In his story Camus wants to demonstrate, apart from everything else, the complete impossibility of mutual understanding between people. This is made especially clear by the court scene, the speeches of witnesses, defending counsel. and the prosecutor, from which it is obvious that they are infinitely remote from understanding even such a simple soul as that of the defendant Meursault. So he goes to his death, uncomprehended and condemned by these people, towards whom he feels neither hatred nor even dislike. Man can do nothing—he cannot even explain himself to people, let alone intervene in life, and remake his own or the common lot. This is Camus's absolutely hopeless philosophy.

The accentuated laconism, restraint, and absence of emotion in the language and the whole style of the story correspond to a lack of personality in the hero, who tells it. The last chapters, which show how Meursault awaits execution, may remind us, because of the similarity of situation, of Victor Hugo's *Derniers Jours d'un Condamné*. But what a difference in the style and substance of these

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two works. How much emotion, revulsion, and indigation in Hugo, how rich the condemned man's range of feelings and sensations, a strident protest in itself against the violent termination of a human life, and how cramped and impoverished is the human intellect and the whole spiritual world in Camus's story. No protests, no outpourings, no deductions and explanations, only the bare statement of facts, and surprise at what is happening. The language of Camus's hero consists of laconic phrases usually signifiying direct actions: I went, saw, did, said, etc.

Beginning with this story, Camus practises extreme economy of language, and, apparently as a result of this, contemporary bourgeois commentators have proclaimed that his style is that of the classical period, a return to the 'great principles of the 17th century.' But we can legitimately ask what is great about the extreme poverty of feeling which Camus's hero displays? What is there to admire in this artificially impoverished soul, equally devoid of great thoughts and deep emotions? The French literary expert Pierre-Henri Simon seems nearer the truth when he says in his analysis of *L'Etranger* that Camus, setting out to prove his thesis that the world is unreasonable, has 'made things easier for himself by inventing a man more unreasoning than ordinary people, and a world more deformed than the real world we know.'

Camus's next philosophical novel, *La Peste* (1947), written five years after *L'Etranger*, is his best literary creation. It reflects the glow of that national upsurge which resistance to the Fascist annexers brought to France. Camus joined the Resistance, edited the underground newspaper *Combat* (Gaullist), then wrote his *Lettres à un Ami Allemand*, in which he accused the Nazis of 'aggravating still further the injustice of man's destiny.'

[*There follows a lengthy analysis of* La Peste *and the character of Rieu.*]

THE end of the forties was a period of evolution in which Camus went further in his rejection of the idea of action and struggle, instilled by the heroic Resistance of the French people. In 1947 he gave up his journalistic work on *Combat*. In 1951 he published the philosophical essay *L'Homme Révolté*, in which he arrives at the complete rejection of revolutionary acts, and even urges the forces of revolt to rise against revolution where it has already been realised. The book deserves special attention as the most shameful document which has emerged from the French existentialist school. Dread of socialist revolution and a radical change in the social system have brought its author to the negation of all revolutions, beginning with the great French Revolution of 1789. Significantly, Camus's counter-revolutionary conclusions caused alarm and indignation amongst the existentialists themselves. *L'Homme Révolté* was not only subjected to annihilating critcism in their own circle, but caused a schism in Sartre's school.

Camus's book begins with the sweeping declaration that we must 'pass judgment on' an age which has wiped out, enslaved, or killed seventy million people in the space of fifty years. Since Camus calls himself an anti-Fascist and anti-imperialist, we might think that the responsibility for these terrible statistics will be placed on imperialism in its death throes, with its world wars, which fall within the fifty years in question, its Fascist aggression, and its death camps, which the Hitlerites spread almost throughout Europe, its atom bomb dropped by the Americans on Hiroshima, its colonial wars which have been and are being waged in all the continents of the world . . . . But no, imperialism is not guilty; the whole meaning of *L'Homme Révolté* is that the guilt for these torrents of human blood rests with—revolution. It is against revolution that Camus sharpens his pen, employing both abstract metaphysical argument and the hoariest inventions of reactionary propaganda.

Camus's main 'discovery,' which he makes into a weapon against revolution while preserving the 'rebellious' look of his philosophy, is the idea of 'revolt.' As long as man is in revolt against some mythical 'destiny' or some god or other—like Prometheus and Sisyphus—all is well. (Did not Camus in his first essay *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* try to show that Sisyphus was happy?)

But when the author comes to living history,

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in which man in revolt takes up arms and kills his enslavers in order to create at last human conditions of life, Camus revolts in his turn and lays a curse upon him. From that moment on the book about 'revolt' turns into a book aimed against revolution. Camus uncompromisingly condemns all regicides. 'It is scandalous and disgusting to represent as a great moment in our history the public murder of a weak and good man,' he asserts, referring to Louis XVI, who was executed by the great French Revolution of 1789. Camus further declares that the revolution of 1789 introduced into history 'the principle of endless repressions,' that the real ambition of the Convention was 'to lay the foundations of a new despotism,' etc.

These arguments of Camus take him much farther even than bourgeois-liberal historians, who long ago admitted that the French Revolution was a great progressive turning point in the life of France. But in his hatred of revolution, and especially of victorious revolution, to which he applies the term 'Cæsarist,' he fails to see anything in it but 'violence,' 'terror,' 'tyrannous' ambitions, etc. Camus joins the chorus of blackest reaction, and asserts that just as the society which came out of the womb of 1789 rushed into war against Europe, so the society born of 1917 is striving for world mastery, and hence that 'total revolution will end in the creation of a world empire.'

Hence his ratiocinations on 'Soviet imperialism,' drawn of course from the American arsenal of anti-Soviet propaganda. Camus supplements his attacks on the October Revolution and on Soviet policy with attacks on Marx, and also on the Hegelian dialectic, which in his view is to blame for 'Russian Communism's impious attempt' to 'compare man with God'. Here Camus really gives himself away completely, since in spite of all his declarations about the inhuman injustice of fate, he displays his revulsion from any transformation of the existing order of things. Camus's philosophy is in essence a philosophy of absolute inaction, of fatalism, and in the last analysis of complacency acquired in an imaginary revolt which upsets no-one and changes nothing. This superficially rebellious but in reality acquiescent attitude is a particularly convenient one for distracting the masses from a social struggle.

Camus however goes still further. In the chapter entitled 'Revolt and Revolution' he tries to prove the necessity for rebellion against revolution. At a time when the whole world is split into two camps—the camp of socialism and the camp of imperialism—Camus has the audacity to say outright that 'the fate of the world today is not decided, as might appear to be the case, in the struggle between bourbeois and revolutionary forms of production . . . . It is decided between the forces of revolt and the forces of Cæsarist revolution.'

French Marxist critics are therefore right in remarking that Camus, who taught his Sisyphus to suffer patiently and adapt himself to his inhuman fate, now urges not long-suffering but revolt against the 'only real way out which billions of people have found.' Camus's revolt is directed 'only against those who want to remake the world,' says Pierre Daix in an article on the occasion of the award of a Nobel Prize to Camus.

CAMUS'S book, as already mentioned, provoked furious controversy amongst existentialists. This controversy opened with a serious analysis of *L'Homme Révolté* by Francois Jeanson, a contributor to Sartre's journal, who noted the 'far from fortuitous whirlwind of enthusiasm' which greeted Camus's anti-revolutionary and anti-Soviet book in the rightist camp (eulogistic articles in *Le Monde, Observateur, Parisien Liberé,* etc.). Jeanson criticised and ridiculed with particularly lethal effect Camus's idea of 'pure revolt,' which in reality is directed against revolutions ('in practice against them alone,' says Jeanson). And even this existentialist author expressed surprise at the conspicuous fact that Camus, who is revolted by the needs of revolutionary society, is not in the least bit revolted by the crimes which the bourgeoisie daily commits against striking miners, tortured Malagasies, Vietnamese burnt alive by napalm, Tunisians annihilated by punitive legions, etc.

Jeanson's article was published in May 1952 in the existentialist journal *Temps Modernes.*

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In its August number readers found an open letter to the editor signed by the author of *L'Homme Révolté*, which announced his break with the school of Sartre, and an 'Answer to Albert Camus,' signed by Sartre.

The most curious thing in Camus's letter is that he goes over from self-defence to attack and accuses Jeanson and Sartre of defending Marxism, asserting that Jeanson's article can only reinforce the Marxist philosophy of history. In conclusion Camus loftily declares himself a 'defender of the truth,' and an 'advocate' of oppressed peoples, which brought a rather caustic retort from his former friend and patron Sartre.

Sartre supported Jeanson's critical attitude towards *L'Homme Révolté*, and showed that Camus's book, with its attacks on the Soviet Union, is not a defence of the oppressed, but on the contrary is grist to the mill of those who 'want to intimidate all honest men' by shouting about Soviet 'atrocities,' to gag them so that they cannot protest against the injustices of the bourgeois world. Like Jeanson, Sartre trenchantly criticised Camus's extra-historical and extra-social theory of evil, proclaiming that one should revolt not against the gods or against death, but rather 'against social conditions which increase mortality.' Developing further his thought about the necessity for positive action, which appeared in his philosophy during the years of the Resistance, Sartre declared that 'the thing is not to defend the status quo of a particular society but to change it.'

The dispute on first principles between two such famous representatives of French existentialism as Sartre and Camus clearly showed not only the discord and the diagonal opposition of views within the existentialist ranks on the question of action or reconciliation with what exists, but also the absence of any solution within the framework of their system, since the problems of the concrete revolutionary situation, the aims and methods of revolution, raised in this dispute, were bound inevitably to lead people into a broader arena of thought than the sterile existentialist thesis of the absurd and chaotic world. In particular, social and economic problems, which are usually excluded from existentialist philosophy, and also the problem of active struggle against the encroachment of imperialism, forced themselves on the attention of the left wing of Sartre's school (Sartre himself, Simone de Beauvoir, Francis Jeanson, and others).

As for Camus, his decisive turn in the direction of reaction, signalised by *L'Homme Révolté*, inevitably affected his creative work.

La Peste reflected the light of the Resistance, and so Rieu and his friends, while professing themselves helpless, none the less made an attempt to save people; but in his next story, *La Chute*, Camus has lost even these remnants of humanism. In this story there is no question of active intervention in human destinies. There are no social cataclysms either. It is concerned with the confession of a lonely man, who has despaired of everything, who no longer has any desire to work and sacrifice himself in the name of mankind, as Dr. Rieu did, who unlike Dr. Rieu does not think that mankind is worthy of admiration or even compassion, but on the contrary has only words of infinite contempt for it.

We learn from the confession of Jean-Baptiste Clement, the hero, once a healthy and self-satisfied man, a brilliant barrister, successful Don Juan, tireless dancer and sportsman, whose mental clarity and harmony were plain for all to see, how he gradually collapsed and became disillusioned with life and with himself in particular. Instead of harmony he discovered in himself disorder and dissonance; instead of fellow-feeling with others, trivial desires, indifference, and egoism. It is significant that Camus this time sets out to expose not the conditions of human existence but the intrinsic imperfection, squalor and insincerity which he says exist in the very character of man. Total loss of faith in and respect for man, a tendency to portray him as utterly vicious, to degrade his morality and the integrity and power of the human intellect, have long been favourite themes of modernist art. By locating the source of ugliness inside the human soul, the modernist writers can freely 'withdraw' the reader's attention from life's real problems, and especially from social problems.

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But perhaps, after all his self-exposures, Camus's hero will check his endless fall into the void and take some steps to change an existence which is completely meaningless? No, not at all. Camus's hero quite consciously defines his lot in life as that of 'a false prophet crying in the wilderness and *refusing to leave it*' (my italics—E.E.). Emptiness and despair—these alone are the voluntarily chosen lot of his prophet. We see Camus returning to the utter purposelessness and absurdity of life, which he asserted long ago in *L'Etranger*, but now he stresses even more insistently the absurdity at the very core of human nature.

IN his collection of short stories *L'Exil et le Royaume*, published in 1957, Camus shows a still more resolute aversion to social reality, which he hates. Man's real life now turns out to be his 'exile,' while his authentic life, his 'kingdom,' is some inner life into which he can enter only beyond the bounds of workaday reality. In the story *Les Muets*, for instance, in which Camus for the first time presents us with a social subject (striking workers and their conflict with their boss), the workers' 'exile' is their social 'madness,' while their authentic existence, their kingdom, is not their rebellious feeling against the employer who rejects their conditions but, on the contrary, their pity for him when they learn of his child's illness. He tries, then, to foist upon us, in this scheme of 'exile' and 'kingdom,' the despicable and stale little 'thought' that all men are unhappy, and all of them (bosses as well as workers) deserve compassion. This 'thought' directly illustrates the well-known philosophy of social reconciliation.

So then, whereas in the case of Sartre we had to stress over and over again his contradictions, his continual waverings between the camps of progress and reaction, in the case of Camus we must give a more definite opinion: both in his political attitude to the camp of socialism and in his writing he has taken up a sufficiently clear reactionary position, and no longer shows any tendency to waver in the direction of progress. It is natural that Camus and no other should now be the fashionable prophet of the young generation of French writers, like Robbe-Grillet, Nathalie Sarraute, Samuel Beckett, etc., who preach the emptiness and worthlessness of real life and fling themselves into a furious campaign against the classics of realism, who tried to defend definite moral norms.

Progressive circles in France were surprised and outraged by the award of a Nobel Prize to Camus in 1957. Pierre Daix wrote in *Lettres Françaises* that, whereas previously the Swedish Academy had awarded the prize to such truly important writers as Romain Rolland (1915), Anatole France (1921), Roger Martin du Gard (1937), Francois Mauriac (1952), who represented the real France, one could see in the award of a Nobel Prize to Camus only encouragement for the particular political position which he represents.

'The Nobel Prize Jury has seldom given the award for work so threadbare, so lacking in warmth and power,' wrote Annie Ubersfeld in 'Albert Camus ou la Metaphysique le da Contrerévolution' (in the Marxist journal *La Nouvelle Critique*, No. 92, 1958). She noted that Camus's revolt was directed only against creative revolution, i.e. against socialism under construction. 'But does not this sort of revolt mean inevitably supporting capitalism with its cortège of wars and poverty. Can we give Camus's work any other description than ideological support for capitalism?"

These words find clear confirmation in the fact that Camus, with his political sympathies and antipathies, occupies a well-defined position in the present struggle between progressive and reactionary forces. Two speeches which he made in Sweden when he received the Nobel Prize are particularly significant in this context.

In them we hear once more the familiar motifs from *L'Homme Révolté*, where Camus, taking up arms against revolution, yet professed to be the 'advocate of the poor.' It has had no effect whatsoever on Camus that those who once thought like him have disowned him. The reactionary camp, which simultaneously surrounded him with scarcely credible respect and 'showed its gratitude' with a Nobel Prize, on this occasion proved stronger and more influential. Camus has begun to

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assert still more blatantly that his mission is 'the service of truth and the service of freedom.' In an age when millions of people are being liberated from the yoke of imperialism Camus, basing himself on anti-Soviet legends, goes on screaming that 'the number of convicts and martyrs has greatly increased on our planet'. . . .

Camus today is a figure of great significance for the determination of the character of contemporary modernism, which is by no means a 'servant of pure art', absorbed in its æsthetic quests. Behind the 'renunciation' of the world and the despair of Camus's prophet, who spoke to us in *La Chute*, we discover not the face of a solitary hermit who shuns the world, but that of a savage and aggressive foe, who openly enters the lists against realism and the camp of socialism. This is what lies at the end of the road for modern anti-realist art.

[*The article now turns to Simone de Beauvoir, and, in a lengthy analysis of* Les Mandarins, *finds evidence that she has taken a turn towards self-identification with the working class and realistic literary methods.*]

All these new features in Simone de Beauvoir's novel convince us that she is on the way towards a rapprochement with realism. Her further career supports this. In 1957, after a visit to China, she published a book in which she shows the achievements of the Chinese communists, and defends them against the attacks of French reactionary thinkers. In 1958 she printed in *Temps Modernes* excerpts from her autobiography, in which she gives serious attention to the moulding of the human mind and the close connection between this process and the child's social circumstances, milieu, and upbringing, which was always a distinctive feature of the realistic method.

From all that has been said it is clear that there is no longer a single existentialist tendency. The contradictions which existed within it have torn it to pieces, pieces which are almost sculpturally personified in the positions of Camus, Sartre, and Simone de Beauvoir.

Camus is moving sharp right and has arrived at frankly counter-revolutionary views (in *L'Homme Révolté).* While preaching renunciation of all activity (in *La Chute),* he simultaneously joins in hostile actions against the camp of socialism and peace (his attitude to the Hungarian events, his anti-Soviet utterances, the attacks on realism and especially socialist realism in the speeches he made in Sweden, etc.).

Sartre remains in an intermediate position: on the one hand, he followed an uncompromisingly anti-Gaullist line throughout the period when de Gaulle was coming to power; on the other hand, he systematically supports revisionists in his journal. Perhaps it is because of the continual vacillations that we have seen no new work of literature from his pen for a long time past, and that his cycle *Les Chemins de la Liberté* remains unfinished.

Simone de Beauvoir, on the contrary, is as we have seen drawing closer in her politics to the progressive camp of peace (her book on China), and from the artistic point of view is moving towards realism by bridging the gap between individual and mass action, which is the dominant feature of existentialist works. Simone de Beauvoir's heroes to a considerable extent triumph over the irrationality and subjectivism which reign supreme in modernism; in a sense they triumph over themselves and break through to a rational understanding of reality and its objective laws. This opens up for the writer a way of escape to the realistic portrayal of the world.

The vicissitudes of the existentialist novel show us perhaps particularly clearly that in political life and in literature also a third path, between the paths of reaction and progress, is impossible. All that is live and genuinely progressive gravitates nowadays towards the realistic method, which is bound up with the study and portrayal of reality in its true aspect, and with the quest for those emergent phenomena and processes within reality which will lead mankind to a new life. Conversely, any attempt to break with objective reality, to retire into the closed world of the mind, and to create a metaphysical opposition between man and the world around him, inevitably leads the writer into the camp of the blackest reaction, as happened with Albert Camus.

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FREUD AND PAVLOV

Report of a Soviet Conference

(With the publication of this official account of a special conference convened recently in Moscow by the Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences on 'Problems of Ideological Struggle with Modern Freudism', we continue our factual survey of Soviet attitudes towards Western psychology (see Bassin's article in Soviet Survey, *No. 27, and Dr. Emanuel Miller's 'Freud and Pavlov' in No. 28). The present review, by P. P. Bondarenko and M. Kh. Rabinovich, published in* Voprosy Filosofii, *1959, No. 4, is of particular interest because it presents not the opinion of an individual writer, but the new line in Soviet psychology. This new official attitude is much better informed and much more sophisticated than the line of ten or even five years ago. It also clearly reveals the limitations of the thaw that has taken place in this particular field. Ten years ago the very problems raised at this conference would have been ignored as utterly irrelevant, and a special conference to discuss these topics—in however one-sided a fashion—regarded as wholly unnecessary. What has induced Soviet specialists to concern themselves with theories dismissed two decades ago as not merely incorrect but beneath debate? One reason is the change in the intellectual climate over the last few years, another the general campaign against 'revisionism' in all its forms. There may be other reasons, about which it is too early to speculate.* Soviet Survey *will continue to publish relevant material on these trends, and invites the comments of its readers.)*

IN October 1958 a scientific conference on problems of ideological struggle with modern Freudism was held in Moscow on the initiative of the Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR. Members and Corresponding Members of the Academy of Medical Sciences and scientists from the Academy's Brain and Neurological Institutes, the Pavlov Physiological Institute of the USSR Ministry of Health, and other scientific bodies in Moscow and Leningrad took part in the conference. Members of the Faculty of Philosophy in the Academy of Medical Sciences also participated in its work.

The reactionary idealistic teaching of S. Freud was widely influential in medicine at the end of the 19th century and in the first quarter of the 20th. Freudism originated as one of the theories which sought to explain the causes and the nature of neuroses, but later began to lay claim to the role of a universal doctrine, extending its influence beyond the medical and biological sciences to the field of the social-economic and historical disciplines.

This ideological expansion of Freudism was, however, to be observed only abroad, since in Russia Freudism was critically received from the very beginning by progressive representatives of theoretical and clinical medicine.

Freudism was subjected to unanswerable criticism in the Soviet period, too, especially in the twenties and thirties when some psychologists (I. D. Yermakov, A. Salkind, etc.) began to propagate it here. Freudism did not take root in Russia, because it was opposed by the materialistic teaching on nervism of Botkin, Shechenov, Pavlov, and Vedensky, which formed the basis of the clinical-physiological interpretation of pathological processes and prevented the dissemination of anti-scientific Freudian ideas in Soviet medicine.

An entirely different situation arose in the countries of the capitalist West, especially in the USA, where Freudism was applied not only in medicine, but in philosophy and sociology and even in such practical fields as the study of the organisation of production; in the fields of ethics, aesthetics, pedagogics, etc. Freudism, a typical product of bourgeois ideological reaction in the epoch of imperialism, was used by bourgeois ideologists to dope the masses in the interests of imperialism and as an ideological weapon in the fight against Marxism.

The spread of reactionary Freudian ideas has

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provoked in recent years growing ideological opposition from progressive representatives of medicine, psychology, and philosophy in the West. In the ideological struggle with Freudism the philosophical falsity of the doctrine and its methods have been conclusively demonstrated.

All these circumstances oblige Soviet scientists to take an active part in the ideological struggle against Freudism which has developed in the West.

This was the basic task on which the conference was required to work.

THE conference opened with an introductory speech by Professor S. A. Sarkisov, member of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences.

In bourgeois countries, said Sarkisov, many doctors and sociologists have accepted Freud's anti-scientific theory, which asserts that the basic forces determining human behaviour are unconscious biological instincts originating in the sexual experiences of infancy. Attempts to make use of Freudian psycho-analytical methods not only in medicine but in industry as well are characteristic of these bourgeois scientists. As long ago as 1949, at the Congress of the French Communist Party in Strasbourg, there was criticism of attempts on the part of Freudians to use psycho-analytical methods to mislead and pacify the workers.

With the help of psycho-analysis Freud's reactionary followers try to persuade the worker that all the difficulties of his existence have their root cause in himself and not in bourgeois society, that they are not the consequence of the production relationships which exist in an exploiter society.

The well-known British critic of Freudism, O'Connor, affirms that Freudism is also now utilised in the 'National Bureau of Psychological Strategy', organised in the USA in 1950.

All plans for waging psychological cold war provide for measures to reduce the social role of the working class, to inculcate in it a passive attitude to the fight for the improvement of its own position.

Not only Marxists but other progressive scientists abroad also voice criticisms of reactionary attempts to utilise Freudism in this sort of way. Thus, the psychiatrist Joseph Wortis of New York, a former disciple of Freud, published in 1955 his notes of conversations with Freud in a book called *Fragments of Analysis with Freud*. The author points out that he has abandoned Freud since his theory is devoid of any scientific foundation.

This is the conclusion also of E. Pumpian-Mindlin, author of *Psycho-analysis as a Science*, in which he maintains that most Freudian tenets cannot be confirmed by experimental data.

Another who has broken with Freudism once and for all is J. B. Furst, author of a book known to the Soviet reader—*The Neurotic, his Surroundings and his Inner World*—which criticises in detail the whole Freudian system.

The twentieth International Congress of Psycho-analysts, held in Paris in August 1957, tells us a great deal about the state of Freudism today. The numerically dominant United States delegation read a series of papers in which there was a clearly visible tendency to simplify and standardise psycho-analytical methods. The French delegation strongly opposed the proposals of the American Freudians. Serious differences of opinion on other matters too emerged at the Congress, which testifies to the lack of unity in the Freudian camp.

THERE have recently been several conferences, symposia, and discussions abroad at which the basic theories of Freudism were discussed in relation to the principles of I. P. Pavlov's physiological teaching. As an example we may mention the scientific *conversazione* in Freiburg (February 1957) on the theme of 'Freud and Pavlov', where attempts were made to reconcile the two doctrines.

Equally typical in this connection is the article published in the Johns Hopkins Journal for May 1957 under the title 'Freud and Pavlov'. In this article it is stated that the difference between the Freudian and Pavlovian schools can be expressed in two words: 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity'.

'Soviet scientists', said Professor S. A. Sarkisov, 'are not joining as actively as they should in the ideological fight against modern Freudism now in progress in the West, which means that

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we are not carrying out one of the instructions of the twentieth Party Congress, where it was stressed that the peaceful co-existence of the two camps must not lead to the slightest relaxation of the ideological struggle against ideas and trends in bourgeois science and philosophy inimical to Marxism-Leninism.'

F. V. Bassin, Doctor of Medical Sciences, gave a major paper on 'The Critical Analysis of Modern Freduism'. Describing the main stages in the development of Freudism, the speaker pointed out that at the beginning of his career Freud was still trying to base his theoretical structure on certain neuro-physiological data. Later on, however, he arrived at extreme subjective-idealistic theoretical concepts.

In this period Freud produced the notorious theory of factors which repress impulses striving for realisation—the theory which operates with the concepts of the Ego, the Super-Ego, and the Censor; and the psycho-analytical methods of bringing thwarted emotions into the open were evolved.

Freud's efforts to extend his concepts to the sphere of sociology, his theory that civilisation originated in the Oedipus complex, his idea that wars were inevitable as a manifestation of man's congenital aggressive instincts, his denial of social progress and acceptance of an inherent destructive tendency in human beings caused by the workings of the death instinct, and his other sociological lucubrations—were anti-scientific.

Describing the state of Freudism today, the speaker noted the appearance within the framework of 'orthodox' Freudism of various rival trends (Hartman, Kris, Loewenstein, etc.) which carry further the 'revision' of Freudism begun in his day by Adler.

Another special feature of modern Freudism is its tendency to make use of the latest neuro-physiological data obtained from the study of the structure and functions of subcortical formations of the brain to provide a basis for the fundamental idea of Freudism—that of the determining role of the 'unconscious' in human behaviour.

Such reactionary trends in the utilisation of Freudism (especially in sociology) have provoked criticism from several scientists (H. Wells, A. Mette, Muller-Hegemann, Felghiesi, etc.). Critical literature has revealed the anti-scientific character of Freudian theoretical concepts and the futility of psycho-analytical methods in the treatment of illnesses, which is proved on the basis of extensive statistical data.

But the influence of Freudism abroad is still a long way from final defeat. So much so that one of the founders of cybernetics, Wiener, declares that there is a profound harmony between the basic formulations of Freudism and the ideas of modern physics.

Psycho-analysis remains the ideological basis of a trend widely supported in the USA—that of psycho-somatic medicine, so-called.

Freudian ideas are used not only in the field of psychology, but in aesthetics, the theory and history of art, and the study of literature, as an extensive literature shows.

IT should be noted that the struggle against Freudism in the West is greatly complicated by the fact that its critics are not sufficiently strict and thorough. Some critics show a tendency to compromise between the doctrines of Pavlov and Freud. W. Penfield, B. Russell, and also some Indian neurologists have given expression to this point of view. At the Freiburg Conference of Psycho-analysts in 1957 these views were upheld by Mikorei, Tairich, Seipert, Saller and others.

Soviet scientists therefore have the important task of showing that it is impossible to reconcile and harmonise these two essentially incompatible doctrines—that of Pavlov and that of Freud. We must decisively refute the false thesis that Freudian theory contains some valuable elements which can be used in science. We must show that the idea of a pathogenic conflict of impulses was put forward by clinical medicine and Pavlovian physiology in Russia many decades ago and quite independently of Freud's theory, and moreover that in Pavlov the idea had a strictly scientific basis and presentation. Particularly valuable in this connection are the researches of the Pavlovian school into the dependence of deep functional and organic disorders of the higher nervous system on so-called 'collisions' and emotional contradictions.

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Freud's error lay not in the fact that he gave much attention to the problem of conflict but in his formulation of the problem. I am thinking of the famous Freudian theory that neuroses and dreams are not only caused by the repression of impulses but symbolically express their content. In adopting such a far-fetched interpretation Freud made a triple mistake. First, he renounced the study of neuroses as the consequences of disturbance to the normal interrelation of nervous processes; secondly, he entered on the path of subjective idealism when he based his explanation of neuroses and dreams on the theory of symbolism; thirdly, he put the study of the pathogenesis of neuroses and psychoses on the wrong track with his subjective psycho-analytical methods.

Freudism has never given and cannot give any objective data to support the claim that neuroses arise as the result of some special process by which repressed emotions are symbolically transformed.

From what has been said above the following conclusion must be drawn: the Freudian psycho-analytical interpretation of the problem of conflict must be rejected; the Pavlovian school and materialist psychology have been scientifically exploring this problem, from scientific standpoints, for a long time past.

An important Freudian thesis is the idea that the impulse to a particular action can influence a man's behaviour even when it is unconscious. But in Freudian doctrine this thesis is given a mystical interpretation. I. P. Pavlov, in the addresses which he gave at his 'clinical Wednesdays', on more than one occasion pointed out that complex mental experiences and emotions may be inhibited and leave a deep trace. The Pavlovian school has analysed these latent traces in its study of the phenomena of de-inhibition, the phenomena of camouflaged conditioned reflexes, and other similar phenomena.

The fact that such unconscious impressions can influence behaviour was demonstrated long ago in a series of clinical experiments by Moll, Forel, K. I. Platonov and others, and also in the later researches of D. N. Uznadze and his pupils, who studied the influence of unconscious psychological mechanisms on the sphere of conscious reception and motor activity. Gershuni's research on the analysis of sub-sensory stimuli took the same direction.

All these facts show that the problem of the influence of unconscious factors on behaviour has been studied independently of Freudism and has been given a scientific interpretation from materialistic standpoints.

THE recent past is marked by the efforts of the Freudians to make use of the latest neurophysiological data to provide a foundation for their false conceptions of the determining role of the unconscious in behaviour. As you know, from the beginning of the forties onwards a number of facts have been established which broaden and deepen our understanding of the mechanisms by which the central nervous system works. Activising and inhibiting, ascending and descending influences from the reticular system of the brain stem and the thalamus have been discovered. It has been demonstrated that currents of impulses travel in the specific and non-specific projection systems of the brain along neuron orbits of the annular type, often oriented along the brain verticals and supplementing the horizontal cerebral tracts. An intimate connection between the processes of higher nervous activity and cortical-subcortical impulses has been established. These new data have been improperly used by the modern Freudians to support their false doctrine of the leading role of innate irrational factors in behaviour.

In this connection it must be said that the most important of the facts mentioned were discovered by the method of electro-physiological and neuronographic analysis, and that they are all in complete accord with I. P. Pavlov's general theory, formulated several decades ago, of the tonic effect of sub-cortical structures on the functioning of the cortex. The latest researches have only made more precise our ideas about the possibility of particular subcortical systems exercising a local, selective influence on the functional state of cortical structures; about the influence of these systems on more complex forms of cerebral activity; about the immediate participation of subcortical formations in the transmission of im-

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pulses which form a conditioned link; and about other matters.

Since these cortical-subcortical connections have a bilateral character, they acquire an essentially new significance from the functional point of view also. Any subcortical influence in the conditions of these bilateral connections acts only as a non-autonomous link in a complex chain of mutually conditioned reflector processes.

Many investigations in recent years have shown that a reflex action characteristically starts its progress with the despatch of impulse currents not only into the cortical apparatus of higher analysis and synthesis but also to various nervous structures at lower levels of localisation, causing changes at these levels and the formation of all forms of complex reflex activity of an adaptive character. But from the very fact that such activity is adaptive in character, and intended to bring the organism into equilibrium with its surroundings, it follows that subcortical influences cannot be regarded as factors primarily determining the dynamics of surface reactions.

Reflex activity is a biological phenomenon, caused by changes in surroundings and ensuring the adaptation of the organism to these changes on the basis of analysis and synthesis of the relevant signals. Therefore the decisive role in this adaptive activity is played by the higher forms of analysis and synthesis of the cerebral cortex. As for the sub-cortical influences which stimulate the cortex, they first of all show in operation a mechanism formed in the process of phylogenesis for the self-regulation of the functional state of the higher cerebral levels.

A large number of investigations into the reticular formation of the brain, recently carried out in the Soviet Union and abroad, have a particularly great significance for the correct understanding of cortical-subcortical interrelations.

We should note particularly the importance of the electro-physiological proof that the ascending sub-cortical influences observed in the processes of falling asleep and awakening can be primarily induced by the cortical formations themselves.

The new data, cited by no means fully here, are fundamentally incompatible with the Freudian treatment of subcortical influences as processes independent of the cortex, and with the false Freudian idea of the functional predominance of the subcortex and the determining role of the 'unconscious' in behaviour.

The history of Freudism, F. V. Bassin concluded, vividly illustrates how an incorrect scientific method and a false concept can lead science into a hopeless impasse and are exploited for reactionary ideological ends.

Representatives of psychiatry, physiology, neurology and psychology joined in the discussion of the paper. E. A. Popov, Member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, and Professor O. V. Kerbikov criticised the application of the method and theories of psycho-analysis in psychiatry. They gave a number of examples to demonstrate the arbitrary character and the subjectivism of the method of 'free association', which enables the Freudians to 'prove' whatever they like.

The representatives of classical psychiatry (Kraepelin, Serbsky, Gannushkin) totally rejected Freudism. The fight against Freudism abroad is now being waged in clinical psychiatry also. In their refutation of the notorious Oedipus complex, which, according to Freud's teaching, is the chief cause of neurotic illnesses, anti-Freudian clinicians have put such questions as the following: how can the Oedipus complex occur in children fed artificially and not from the mother's breast? what happened to the Oedipus complex in the matriarchal period, when children did not know their fathers? what happens when children are brought up from infancy in orphanages? In all these cases, if the Freudians are to be believed, children are fully guaranteed against neurotic illnesses throughout their lives, since they have not passed through the Oedipus complex stage. These simple questions proved fatal to the Freudians. To this day they are powerless to answer them, since the facts refute all their attempts to reply from Freudian positions.

REPRESENTATIVES of modern Freudism in the USA (Horney, Sullivan) depart from the older positions of Freudism in explaining the reasons for psychological illnesses. They

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declare that the source of neuroses is an unrealistic idea of one's 'Ego' and the collision of this idea with reality. They therefore consider the most essential task of psycho-analysis to be the revelation of contradictions between the secret desires of the individual and the life around him. These desires, moreover, are not exclusively sexual in character.

The representative of the Institute of Higher Nervous Activity of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Medical Sciences N. G. Gartshtein, observed that under the influence of Jaspers' phenomenological views and the metaphysical conceptions of Freud, an idealistic trend had developed in psychiatry, which aimed at explaining psychological illnesses by studying the 'hidden connexions' of mental life. A notable representative of this trend was L. Brown who in his work *Psychogenic Reactions* saw as the chief merit of Freudism its denial of materialism and its proximity to mysticism. Brown expresses the opinion that the study of psychogenic reactions must be carried out on the basis of 'depth psychology of self-consciousness'. He divides the psyche into three strata, of which only the third is 'truly conscious'. This is the stratum in which all processes of an intellectual-volitional character, including emotions and impulses, take place.

Another representative of this trend, Birnbaum, divides the human psyche into five strata or spheres and thinks that the form and character of the reactive condition change according to which of the spheres is damaged.

The exploration of the problem of psychogenic illnesses undertaken by Freud and his followers has at its base the crudely biological system of 'pansexualism'. The social nature of the human personality is thus ignored.

The theory of conflicts as the chief pathogenic factor in neurotic conditions was elaborated by Freud's followers—Schilder, Mayer, Alexander, Schultze, Spier, Jones, etc. We see Freud's influence in the works of Kurt Schneider, Reichardt, Rider and many others.

The director of the Institute of Psychiatry of the USSR Ministry of Health, D. D. Fedotov, replied in his speech to critics from the Freudian camp. The December 1957 number of the American journal *The Monthly Review* published an article by D. D. Fedotov entitled 'What is our Attitude to Psycho-analysis?' which described the critical attitude of Soviet scientists to Freudism, and offered proofs that this pseudo-scientific doctrine does not assist the progress of science and has not justified itself in medicine. There were rejoinders to Fedotov's article from prominent American Freudians—Dr Lawrence Kubie, who published an article entitled 'Pavlov, Freud and Soviet Psychiatry', and Norman Rider with his article 'A Psycho-analyst's Reply'.

The two authors are united in their endeavour to defend the sanctity of Freudian positions at any cost, even by means of crude forms of polemic which loses sight of the bounds of decency. Thus Rider, for instance, writes that it is a quite futile occupation to answer the old arguments of Soviet authors, which, he says, are not the result of an objective experimental approach to psycho-analysis but the expression of an 'official government point of view'.

This of course is not a very powerful argument in defence of Freudism, as Rider refuses to recognise that Soviet science bases its exposure of the anti-scientific character of Freudism on dialectical materialism and the physiological doctrine of I. P. Pavlov.

Rider's assertion that Freud and his followers discovered an objective method for the investigation of the brain is completely unfounded, for everyone knows that the methods of psycho-analysis are based on purely subjective psychological techniques. Equally false is Rider's assertion that the psycho-analytical conception of the determining influence of the 'unconscious' on man's consciousness finds confirmation in the fact that man is not shut off from the outside world, from that reality of which he is a part.

FREUDISM distinguishes three aspects of mental processes: the topographical, with the two psychic spheres—the conscious and the unconscious; the dynamic, which characterises the movement of psychic processes between these two spheres; and the economic, comprising the distribution and exchange of charges of psychic and sexual energy. The organ of consciousness is the cortex of the brain, which wraps around

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the brain as the consciousness wraps round the unconscious part of the psyche. But whereas the cortex is protected from the outside world by the skull, it is separated from the lower parts of the brain by nothing at all. Therefore the consciousness, says Freud, is much more exposed to the action upon it of internal than of external stimuli. All these favourite Freudian assertions end as a rule with the conclusion that human consciousness is determined not by experience and social practice but by instincts and sexual complexes pushed down into the 'unconscious'.

The other critic, Kubie, writes that Soviet scientists show a lack of elementary understanding, not only of psycho-analysis but even of Pavlov's teaching. By way of example he points out that Soviet scientists never refer to those works of Pavlov in which he speaks of the similarity of his views to those of Freud on fundamental questions. Kubie himself, however, does not name any such works. Trying to harmonise and reconcile the teaching of Pavlov and Freud, Kubie says that their methods supplement each other, and that the differences between them are purely technical.

With even greater frankness he objects to the basic tenet of Soviet science that the main source of psychological illnesses, or neuroses, is to be found in the social and economic conditions of people's lives. Social-economic and political conditions, in Kubie's opinion, play a part, but a secondary, not a decisive part, in the chain of events causing a neurotic process. Freedom or equality, poverty or wealth, leisure or over-tiredness, idleness or excessive work do not in themselves cause neurosis, Kubie maintains. In this conclusion he is at one with the majority of American psycho-analysts. These assertions clearly reveal the class character of Freudism, which has put itself at the service of American imperialism. That is why Freudism has found a second home in the USA, as H. Wells correctly says.

N. I. Grashchenkov, Member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, and A. V. Snezhnevsky, Corresponding Member, dealt in their speeches with Freud's philosophical views. They consider incorrect the statement of some authors that at the beginning of his scientific career Freud was a mechanistic materialist and an adherent of physiological conceptions. In their opinion Freud was never a materialist, although his teachers were the eminent neurologists Meinert and Brucke in Vienna, and Charcot in Paris. Freud's philosophical outlook was formed under the influence of such double-dyed idealists and mystics as Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and E. Hartmann.

Freud borrowed his ideas of symbolism from the German idealist Berne, who propagated the method of 'free association' before Freud. Freud worked on the construction of a psychological basis for Nietzsche's philosophy, especially after he began to extend his theory to the field of sociology.

Freud was a typical representative of subjective idealism in his outlook. In his work *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud taught that at the basis of psychic activity lies the reflex. But the sensory part of this reflex, according to Freud, reflects not the external objective world but the world of symbols. The consciousness, in his view, communicates with the outside world through the senses, which report the outside world to the consciousness in symbols. Thus the reflector theory of the psyche in Freud had a subjective-idealistic character from the start.

P. K. Anokhin, Member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, and V. N. Myasishchev, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, drew attention to the need for a profounder and more concrete approach to the critique of Freudism, without over-simplification of Freudian views. It was necessary to put forward opposing scientific-materialistic data to explain those complex intimate questions which Freudism has monopolised, trying to give them its own intepretation. It must be remembered that Freudism has not remained constant; it has changed, and its arguments have changed also. It cannot be said that Freudism ignores social phenomena: it distorts their nature and gives an incorrect explanation of people's behaviour. Thorough-going criticism of the sexual motives of human behaviour forced Freudism to replace sexual impulses in its theories with the death impulse, the destructive urge, the struggle between the life and

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death instincts. These reactionary ideas of Freudism became a component part of Fascist ideology.

It was necessary to squeeze Freudism out of those scientific fields which it was trying to exploit for reactionary ends, and to give a scientific-materialistic explanation of psychological phenomena. Up to the present, said Professor P. K. Anokhin, we have been preoccupied with the examination of the brain as a screen which reacts, forgetting that the brain retains a certain residue of impressions which is outside the sphere of consciousness. This is the enormous baggage which can be called the brain's memory, where accumulated facts are preserved for a life-time. The physiology of higher nervous activity does not seriously study the problem of the utilisation of accumulated residual impressions in the brain and their influence on the sphere of consciousness and on behaviour. Pavlovian doctrine is an immense force in the struggle against Freudism, as its supporters in the USA realise. The fight against Freudism in America is actively carried on by the Pavlov Society of the USA, whose president, Gent, is in the front line of the struggle against American Freudism.

A NUMBER of statements by Leningrad scientists (B. V. Andreev, I. E. Volpert, L. G. Pervov) criticised the Freudian treatment of the problem of dreams. Applying the purely subjective methods of analysis by 'free association', and heaping together the fortuitous, disjointed, chaotic thoughts of the person under examination, the Freudians become completely arbitrary in their conclusions and enter on the path of indeterminism. The dream—a product of the working of the 'sleepy' brain, a special state of consciousness—its physiological mechanisms, and its content as a reflection of the external world, are a subject for scientific study. Pavlovian physiology has shown the way towards this.

A large literature dealing with the problem of dreams has been published in the West, and there exist many other theories besides that of Freud. In Western Germany, for instance, Jung's theory enjoys great popularity. Bjerre, Schultz-Hencke and others have put forward their own theories. Thus, Bjerre regards dreams as one of the ways of assimilating all kinds of difficult problems of everyday life. Comparing the process of dreaming to the process of digestion, i.e. giving it a biological significance, this author regards dreams as a form of adaptation to life's difficulties. In his opinion they assist the renewal and rebirth of the individual. Giving the meaning of dreams a mystical, 'prophetic' character, Bjerre regards dreaming as a process which tells a man what he must do in the future to solve the difficult problems of living.

Jung, dealing with the problems of dreams, thinks that a man's 'archetype' is revealed to him in them. Unfortunately not much scientific and popular scientific literature is published here which throws a materialistic light on the problem of dreams. Yet there is much experimental material, amassed by the Pavlovian school, for the scientific-materialistic illumination of this complicated problem. B. V. Andreev made the point that it was necessary to study the physiological mechanisms of that group of phenomena which may be called sub-conscious. The forms in which human consciousness manifests itself differ in different states of being (during sleep, under hypnosis, when over-tired, in neuroses, etc.). Normally, the working of the two signal systems is well co-ordinated, but in a number of cases their co-operation may be impaired, and then psychic activity is carried on with the primary signal system playing the main part, which produces a special form of the state of consciousness. Interesting experiments in this field are being carried out in Professor F. P. Mayorov's laboratory.

THE head of the faculty of Philosophy in the Academy of Medical Sciences, Professor P. P. Bondarenko, devoted his speech mainly to questions of ideological struggle with Freudism in the field of sociology. He pointed out that Freudism is used by bourgeois sociologists as a weapon in the fight against Marxism. It is significant that not only philosophers and sociologists but also doctors belonging to the so-called school of psycho-somatic medicine in the USA draw sociological and political conclusions

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from Freudian conceptions (Alexander, Corsini, Kaufman and others). F. Alexander, founder of the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis, maintains that there exists a direct dependence between the emotional character of individuals and the political behaviour of whole peoples and nations. In his opinion, nations and peoples react in the same way as individuals, small nations and peoples supposedly behaving like small children, which is the reason for their political instability and immaturity. Hence, Alexander concludes, these small nations need the tutelage of 'adult' nations. What is this but one of the typical theories of colonialism copiously fabricated in the USA and other imperialist countries?

A widespread tendency in modern bourgeois sociology is that of the so-called psychological schools, which attempt to investigate all the fundamental problems of social life—law, politics, class struggle, wars and revolutions, etc. —on the basis of psychology. The representatives of this trend, reducing sociology to psychology and so in effect denying its existence as a social science, use the anti-scientific conceptions of Freudism in their theoretical systems. The most active adherents of Freudism in bourgeois sociology (E. Jones, D. Harding, R. Money-Kyrle, W. Trotter, etc.) deny the existence of objective economic laws in the development of society, and class struggle in conditions of capitalism; they preach extreme subjectivism, the arbitrary play of chance in social history, and declare the individual consciousness to be the ultimate foundation of social life, or rather not the consciousness but an irrational element known as the unconscious.

Freudian sociologists endeavour to trace all the complex and various forms of human behaviour to a few unchangeable irrational first causes, such as the sexual instinct, the death wish, etc. They regard man not as a social but as a biological creature, whose whole life activity is governed by innate instincts and unconscious impulses. The Freudians think that in his behaviour man acts under the influence of the 'unconscious'; they deny in effect the role of reason and social forms of consciousness in human behaviour, and liken human society itself to a herd of animals. The Freudian Bogardus expresses this idea more cynically than anyone, when he declares that a crowd of human beings is closely akin to a herd of animals, so that one can learn from the behaviour of the herd the mechanisms which govern human society, which is grounded in biological instincts.

It is not surprising that the Freudian sociologists represent class war and the revolutionary acts of the toilers as an elemental display of instincts in an unbridled pathological form.

Freud applied his notorious concept of the Oedipus complex to explain the role of great men, who make history and play the role of father substitutes in relation to the masses. Explaining the rise to greatness of individuals in history, he indicated that great men win power over others because the vast majority of people have a consuming need to be under authority. This need, according to Freud, is an expression of that yearning for the father which dwells in human beings from infancy.

Freudism in sociology, then, denies the leading role of the masses in history, reducing them to the position of a passive crowd, governed by the great men who make history. There can be no doubt that in this the Freudians are meeting the social requirements of the bourgeois ruling classes.

The scientific conference on problems of ideological struggle with modern Freudism aroused much interest among the medical public. The resolution adopted expressed the desirability of developing and intensifying the struggle of Soviet scientists against the anti-scientific ideas of Freudism on the basis of dialectical materialism and the physiological doctrine of Sechenov and Pavlov. The resolution further emphasises the need for resolute criticism of improper attempts on the part of foreign authors to harmonise and reconcile the totally opposed teachings of Pavlov and Freud. Attention is called especially to the reactionary nature of the efforts of modern Freudians to extend Freud's theory to the field of social and political phenomena. The psycho-analytical trend in the humane sciences is one of the most hostile forms of bourgeois ideology, and it is the urgent task of Marxist sociology and philosophy to unmask it.

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SOVIET SCIENCE

Achievements and Problems

John Turkevich*

IN evaluating Soviet science and the successes it has had, it is important to appreciate just where world science stands. There have been startling developments in the last twenty years. I have only to recall the sequence of events. In 1939 Strassman of Germany split the uranium atom. This was reported to Professor Bohr at Princeton (visiting professor at Princeton at the time) by letter; he called a conference of scientists at Princeton because it was realised at that time that the Germans might make a weapon. The Manhattanville Project was started by a number of university professors. In 1942 the first pile was operating; in 1945 the bomb was used, three weapons were made, the war was over. We found then that our rival in nuclear weaponeering was not Nazi Germany, but the Soviet Union. From 1945 on, one of the greatest armament races in the history of mankind got under way. In 1949 the Russians had a uranium bomb; in 1953 they and we exploded a weapon. It is still a question whether they or we did it first. In the period between 1939 and 1953, in fourteen years, the whole gamut of weaponeering was encompassed.

At the same time it might be said that the development of science now is almost as explosive as one of these bombs. For instance, there is the development of calculating machines, which will enable us to solve most of the logically foreseeable and formidable scientific problems. They are going to remove the obstacle of routine thinking, complicated thinking, to the development of man's study of nature. Also, biochemistry is making tremendous strides.

It is against this background that you have to consider the development of science in any country; the country that can make these great advances in science will not only have the power to support national security; it will also have a higher standard of living, and will be able to dominate the minds of others by its successes, and so have tremendous psychological effect on the world. The success of the Soviets in the development of the Sputnik is just one example of the powerful propaganda value of today's science. In science, as in other fields (church, military, business, politics) there are in any country certain components (tradition and organisation, training and achievements, personalities) which have great importance apart from the formal status of that particular activity in society. It has taken those of us who are interested in Soviet science a long time to impress upon the people of this country that the Soviets inherited a great scientific tradition. The names Mendeleyev and Pavlov are familiar to every educated man. There are Russian names equally familiar to the specialist in all the sciences, experts who have made notable contributions in their field. Whether it be astronomy, zoology, or chemistry, there have been some outstandingly competent scientists in Russia from about the middle of the nineteenth century and up to the present.

These scientists came from the intelligentsia, and the fate of the intelligentsia after the revolution needs recalling. Since science occupies an important place in the Marxist scheme, and since production and economics are thought to determine the political and social structure of the country, the party in power, exercising control over economic life, must also control those who are going to change economic life. The Soviet government's policy towards scientists underwent a number of changes. First they were dismissed, and an attempt was made to build up a new class of scientific workers drawn from the proletariat. Children of the intelligentsia were barred from the universities, as can be seen from the age profile of the Soviet scientists; there is a break, around 53-54. The leadership is aged 53 plus; below them there

* *This article is based on a lecture given by Professor Turkevich at the Russian Research Center of Harvard University.*

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is a gap of about ten years, and then the younger people come in. This has affected and will continue to affect both the type of work they do and the spirit prevailing in Soviet laboratories. However, there were enough of this intelligentsia left, in spite of the ravages of the revolution and the loss of the exiles, to start Russian science on its own, particularly when it was sponsored by the Soviet government. They were indeed given a recognition which had not been given them by the Imperial government, and Soviet scientific institutes started out on their road of development. So, the first element of strength of Soviet science, one that has to be considered in its evaluation, is the inheritance of this intelligentsia.

The interesting thing is to see just how this is going to develop. You have this group of the 'oldsters' of 55 years and over, who now dominate the Academy and its institutes. One thing that can be said about the present Soviet set-up is that they have too many assistants; the groups are too big. This is a bad thing for specialised scientific jobs in science, although it is all right if you are out to produce a process. This is the old German approach, where Herr Professor goes through the laboratory with his 'followers' walking behind him, and their followers behind them, etc., and he has 150 students and he asks them to raise the temperature five degrees. This is not going to produce Nobel prizewinners. I understand that the laboratories are just crammed with under-thirty-fives; they are doing their research work in every corner, but meanwhile the seniority dam holds.

Now two things are going to happen. One is that the older people are going to die off, and then instead of having people in their forties you are going to have younger people coming into the key positions. This always revitalises an organisation. Secondly, expanding contacts with Western science will act like adrenalin shots. This is a general tendency in science—the competitive aspect of it. You go to a scientific congress, you hear of somebody doing something, and you say, 'I'm going home and do a better job'. Undoubtedly the Russians are reacting the same way. Look at the increase in Nobel prizes awarded in the United States. There were very few before 1914, when Richards got his; and I expect the same thing to happen in the Soviet Union.

ONE of the interesting things we found out when the curtain was lifted four or five years ago (we saw it particularly at Geneva when we met many of the top Soviet scientists) was that the leaders in Soviet science are members of the old intelligentsia—children of the old intelligentsia. Certainly there were others in the group. There must be others in the Soviet Union not originating in that class, but most of those we normally see at international congresses outside the Soviet Union do come from that class and they are extremely able. Not only are they intelligent, well-educated, and competent; they are highly cultured as well. It is to me a very hopeful and promising phenomenon that a politically unacceptable class, persecuted for a long time by the Communist Party, has survived in the Soviet Union. People of culture and learning cannot be wiped out easily. This is one of the lessons of communist rule in the Soviet Union.

This raises the interesting question as to what a scientist does when he works in a dictatorship.

Certain fields are simply avoided in the Soviet Union because of the genetics controversy. Biology has been in a very sad state (genetic biology), and people shifted into biochemistry. Nesmeianov admits that experimental biology is in a pretty poor state. In a report made last year he said they were not without blame for this; there was too much of a feeling in the biological sciences that decisions and scientific arguments could be won by tying labels and slandering people.

Another example comes from the application of quantum-mechanics to chemistry. This was an offshoot of the genetics controversy. When it was decided in favour of Lysenko, orders were sent down from the Academy Presidium: every branch of science must be examined in the light of this decision. What they did was to pick on somebody who was well known in the West, whose work had been translated in the West, and give him the full treatment. In chemistry they picked on a man named Serkin, who had written an excellent book on the

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resonance theory. That field of study just disappeared, though now they are trying to revive it. Sor far there are no takers!

A second element of strength, and a very important one in the Soviet Union, is the fact that science is organised. Their whole concept of the place of science in society is different from ours in that respect. We must forget about the earlier ideological problems; so far as I can tell, there has been very little ideological pressure in the last two or three years. Whether the Soviet Union has learned its lesson from the Lysenko Conferences I do not know, but certainly ideological pressure is now played down. Soviet society is very highly organised, and science is appreciated. Indeed, it might be said that the Soviet Union is a 'technocracy' rather than a communist state. They are a group of technocrats, and I suspect that science, their highly organised science, has an interesting tie-in with their leaders and politicians, since many of their leading scientists have also been teachers at one time in the universities attended by these technocrats.

Nesmeianov, the President of the Academy of Sciences, has frequently said that science in the Soviet Union is organised like an army; Nesmeianov, himself an organic chemist, is commander in chief of the army, and has under him a Chiefs-of-Staffs Committee which is the Presidium. The Presidium has twenty-five members; the dominant personality in the Presidium, aside from Nesmeianov, is Topchiev, who is also an organic chemist and a man with wide international connections. In addition to being an academician and General Secretary of the Academy, he is also the acting minister of higher education and chairman of the committee which appoints professors. He is what I would call a *tiazhely*. He has no sense of humour, or at least his sense of humour was one which I could not appreciate. He told me my Russian wasn't good enough, but if I stayed over in Moscow for about ten years or so I would 'pick up Russian'. I smiled and said no thank you, not just now.

THE Academy covers not only the natural sciences, but also what we usually call the humanities and social studies. In all such institutions there is a group which determines policy. It decides what are the important things to study and where they are going to put the money, and it exerts great influence. Nesmeianov's philosophy, or strategy of scientific research, runs something like this: Of all the problems in science, and there are a large number of problems (every scientific problem solved always generates a large number of new problems), there are a certain number of key problems. The solution of these key problems is going to open up a wider path into the future than the solution of other problems. This gives a directed type of research. From what we can gather, the Academy, so to speak, says: 'Now we are going to push atomic energy, hydrogen bombs, weaponeering, space science, and certain other things'. The way they implement the decision is also interesting.

To make a break-through at these key points, to tackle what he calls *uslovnye zadachi* (the key problems), they bring in the heavy artillery. It consists of high-energy accelerators, large telescopes, radio telescope installations, special microscopes. These are the methods to effect the break-through and solve some of the key problems, and there is a greater appreciation of them there than there is in the United States. The Academy, with the government and the Party behind it, will throw vast sums of money into such heavy artillery. To give an illustration: one of the two main approaches in science is the analytic approach. One might say that the whole goal of science is to take the material world apart into smaller and smaller bits, analyse it, and then put it together again, not necessarily closer to the heart's desire. In analysis, you bring more and more energy to bear on matter. The alchemist only used fire in trying to decompose things, and was not successful. The beginning of the 19th century brought in the electric battery. Then the concentration of energy increased. With radioactivity we got about two million volts instead of one volt. Just before the war, with the cyclotron, we got 100 million volt installations. After World War II we got 400 million volt installations. Then we jumped to three thousand million volts and six thousand million. At this time the Russians were lagging behind, though they had a very

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good cyclotron just before World War II. They came out with a machine of 600 million volts something like six or seven years ago. But although they had put a lot of money into this thing, they were late. We had already skimmed off the cream with the 400 million volt machine, and there was little left for the Soviet Union with the 600 except a 'mopping up' operation. Scientists, particularly in physics, move in droves. They come to one field, and they 'clean it up', move on to another and clean that up. That is why it is so important to get in there fast with a lot of stuff. They came in late, when we were already working with six thousand million volts, and we beat them again when Segre in California found the anti-proton, the first element that had negative charges. I have been made aware of the sense of disappointment felt in the USSR because they didn't discover it.

At Geneva we were talking about a six thousand million volt machine and the Russians announced that they were building one of 10 thousand million. One has already been built, and has been in operation since April, 1957. Its magnet alone weighs 30,000 tons. Now this is not something that a small university, or even a large one, does. Nor can a small country build these things; it has to be done by a major power. Of course, we weren't worried—we just announced one for 25 thousand million volts, and a machine of this power is being built right now at Brookhaven. The Russians countered with 50 thousand million volts! The race is getting bigger and bigger, and in this race the smaller countries have no part.

THIS directing from above (and you have to have something like that to have a science such as the Soviet Union has) has its drawbacks. First of all, you have to win some of the bets, which is why the success the Soviets had with Sputnik, while it wakened our country to a realisation of the competition it was facing, also gave Soviet science its first big boost after the atom and hydrogen bombs. Certainly the atom and hydrogen bombs must already have convinced the Soviet political hierarchy that Soviet science and technology were excellent. (The world would be a different place if the USSR could not deliver an A or H bomb.) With the Sputnik, Soviet science has acquired a tremendous amount of confidence because of its great propaganda and prestige value.

In the United States we work on entirely different lines. We are highly disorganised, highly individualised. The freedom of a scientist is held to be sacred. A university professor can do just about anything he wants to, or he can do nothing, and some of them choose to do nothing. This freedom gives science a large measure of flexibility. The important things in science are the unpredictable ones—the great discoveries that were not expected. As you look through the enormous number of publications put out by Soviet institutes and universities, you are struck by their drabness. They are what we would call in chemistry 'pot-boiling' experiments. Every once in a while you see a spark, but these sparks do not seem to have been exploited. There are three in particular that were made after the war. There was the so-called Cherenkov radiation in nuclear physics, the phenomenon whereby a particle that is thrown off with a velocity greater than the velocity of light has to slow down until it reaches the velocity of light, and in doing so exudes extra energy in the form of a trail of blue light. This has been very useful for detecting particles, particularly high energy particles, and since the world of physics is moving into high energy particles, this, of course, was a very useful observation. We know little about Cherenkov, though he made one of the great prestige discoveries of the Soviet Union. He is said to be assistant to the director of one of the biggest physics laboratories, but he has never left the USSR.

Another important Soviet discovery in physics was made by Zavoiski: this is called the electron spin resonance. It is an interesting way of using radar to measure the magnetic moment of the electron. It is a very beautiful and elegant discovery. But, though made in 1946 in the Soviet Union (and soon afterwards in the United States and England as well), the Russians never exploited it. The clean-up or mopping-up work was done by the British at

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Oxford, and by the Americans.

The third important example relates to the use of catalysis in petroleum chemistry. The conversion of petroleum into high aviation gasoline is a fascinating and very important process. The petroleum you get from Pennsylvania is no good for gasoline engines; it is a low grade fuel. But if it is passed over the proper material at the proper temperature, you get the right kind of gasoline. Kazanski, head of the Soviet Institute of Organic Chemistry, and a very fine organic chemist, had been studying the effect of platinum on these processes. He had worked out the beginnings of the process, but it was the Americans (and particularly the Americans of Russian extraction who could read the Russian literature) who exploited the thing and established the so-called platforming process. When I spoke to Kazanski about it, he shook his head and said, '*Propustili*—we missed it'. There it is. With centralised control at the top, the Presidium cannot watch everything and often lets things slip by.

THIS, then, gives roughly the philosophy of their organisation. It is partcularly useful in their system, where the facilities for scientific work, in spite of what the papers say, are limited. Their high-grade personnel is also limited, and have to be concentrated on this problem or that problem. But I think that with the increase in the number of their scientists the situation may change. They may have more individual liberty in choosing the problems they want to work on. Nesmeianov made an interesting commentary on this. In one of his addresses he emphasised the importance of universities and deplored the fact that scientific research is concentrated largely in Moscow. There are a few institutes in Leningrad, and the Kharkov and Kiev groups. There has been an attempt to set up a scientific city in Siberia, but the scientists seem reluctant to respond. Research is concentrated in Moscow, and not in the universities but at the research institutes. Nesmeianov wants to change this. He made an interesting remark: 'You know (he was addressing the annual assembly of the Academy) that most of the major discoveries in science have not been made in institutes. They have been made in the West, in universities.' The underlying idea, which is of the greatest importance in fundamental research—possibly not sufficiently recognised over here, and certainly not practised in the Soviet Union—is that in addition to the powerful research installations and the best instruments and the best ways of looking at nature, it is necessary, for effective research, to have a combination of teacher and student working on something new.

There is some recognition of this in the fact that Soviet research institutes also bestow degrees; but they may be getting their young men a little late. Their job is not so much to turn out large numbers of graduates as to train the high grade specialists. There is something like an apostolic succession from one scholar to another, and a relationship between teacher and student that is not susceptible to mass treatment.

Great stress has been placed on the amount of science in the Soviet secondary curriculum, a highly competitive system for university entrance. I am inclined to think they carry this too far. Judging from my Princeton undergraduates, to whom I give the course in general chemistry, one year of high-school chemistry is enough. If he has three years before college he loses the zest for what I am going to tell him. The important thing in the teaching of any subject is the interest of the students. You must have a certain amount of factual material, but if you have too much of this you give them mental constipation. This, I think, is happening in the Soviet Union. They are forcing things beyond the ability of the young to assimilate. I would like to see a more relaxed attitude towards education, something that is missing from mass education in the Soviet Union.

Another interesting feature of Soviet science is its exploitation of Western scientific literature and scientific knowledge. The importance of this is easy to grasp. If you are setting up an organisation to plan for the future you must have the facts. You must conduct an intelligence operation and find out what others are doing in order to decide what you are going to put your money on. It is important not only to have all this scientific literature avail-

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able and classified, as a basis for planning decisions, but also to have a grasp of it that can only come from personal contacts and visits to laboratories. That is why Soviet scientists, and particularly their planning group, are so anxious for these contacts. They are going to spend millions of roubles, and have to know where to put them. They have to exercise a judgment which can only come from having the literature available and knowing what the other side is doing.

This recalls to me an incident at Geneva where I gave a paper on the use of isotopes for studying catalysis (which is my particular field in chemistry) at the United Nations Conference on Atomic Energy. I had had dealings with the Soviet delegation during the two weeks and our relations had been very cordial. They were gracious enough to come in a body to hear my paper and one or two of them argued with me (I don't think successfully). After the meeting, the second in command, the Minister of Cultural Relations in Science (I never could figure out just what his role was except that he tried to sell an atomic plant to France and was using my wife as an interpreter) came up to me and complimented me on my paper. I said it was very pleasant to compete with the Soviet Union not in military and economic matters but in science, in the search for knowledge, and I used the word 'competition', *konkurentsiya*. Oh, he didn't like that at all. He shook his head and said it was a bad word, *plokhoe slovo*. He said it had very bad connotations in the Soviet Union. It means getting ahead by crushing the other fellow. He said, 'We have a better word and a better way of doing this. The word is *sorevnovanie* and it means getting ahead by climbing on the other person's shoulders'. It seemed to me that he was letting the cat out of the bag—this, essentially, is co-existence. They're out to build on us!

In this building up process, they have to know where our shoulders are, and so four or five years ago, Nesmeianov started a journal called *Referaty*. This is a journal of abstracts such as the world never saw before. They abstract everything in science and technology that they can lay their hands on. In one year, the *Referaty* are greater in volume than the entire *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Every article by anyone dealing with science is abstracted, indexed, cross-indexed, cross-referenced; on top of that they have a new journal called *Express Information* which gives the latest news from the scientific front. The parallel with an army is striking: intelligence operation, information coming into the planning staff, the staff figuring out what they are going to do, sending this information back to the various units in the field. Nesmeianov himself says that science operates pretty much as the army did when attacking a building in Stalingrad. We are in on one floor, we're mopping up all the people around it, but we've got to break through to the next floor where the opposition is. We have to find a weak point in the ceiling, then we attack through it and we all rush in and Soviet science cleans the place up. These are the elements of strength in the Soviet Union and we have to keep them in mind—their ability to plan, their ability to use resources, their ability to place their human resources where they want them.

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PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE

(This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-criticism, *and it was hailed in the Soviet press as an epochal event.* Voprosy Filosofii *(1959, No. 5) devoted a special number to it. Lenin wrote it at a time when the transformation of classical into modern physics had not yet registered with the general public, and although the future philosopher-king had conscientiously studied the philosophical texts, he had little knowledge of the issues attracting the the attention of philosophically inclined mathematicians and physicists such as Poincaré and Mach. Moreover, personal and factional struggles were projected on to questions of cosmogony, and when Marxism-Leninism became a state doctrine, institutionalised obstacles were erected to the open acceptance of contemporary developments in the natural sciences. Since then Soviet philosophers have been exercising their wits to square the canonical writing with new theories in fields ranging from quantum physics to histology and mathematical logic. The scientists had to work from the other end; they had to reconcile the pragmatic requirements of science with Lenin's* obiter dicta. *In this quasi-Aristotelian framework an organised effort was made to tackle this dilemma, and a conference devoted to it was held in Moscow. We give below a report on the conference, published in* Voprosy Filosofii *(1959, No. 4), which suggests that some scientists are inclined to 'put an end to the dogmatic approach to scientific problems'.)*

A CONFERENCE on the philosophical problems of science, called by the Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Education, took place in Moscow on 21-25 October 1958, with 620 philosophers and scientists from the Soviet Union and several other countries participating. The conference heard and discussed the following papers:

Lenin's Materialism and Empiriocriticism (Academician M. B. Mitin);

Lenin and the Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics (M. E. Omelyanovsky, Member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences);

The Correlation of Forms of the Movement of Matter in Nature (B. M. Kedrov, Doctor of Philosophy);

The Philosophical Content and Significance of the Theory of Relativity (A. D. Alexandrov, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences);

On the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Academician V. A. Fok);

Cybernetics and Science (Academician S. L. Sobolev and Professor A. A. Lyapunov);

Some Methodological Problems of Cosmogony (Academician V. A. Ambartsumyan);

On the Role of Physics and Chemistry in the Investigation of Biological Problems (Academician V. A. Engelhardt and G. M. Frank, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences);

The Problem of the Origin of Life in the Light of the Discoveries of Modern Science (Academician A. I. Oparin);

The Leninist Theory of Reflection and Modern Physiology of the Sense Organs (N. I. Grashchenkov, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences).

The conference opened with an introductory speech by A. M. Nesmeyanov, President of the Academy of Sciences. He pointed out two special features in the development of natural science today—the profound differentiation and specialisation of the sciences, and at the same time their contact and mutual interpenetration. These tendencies gave special urgency to the philosophical generalisation of scientific discoveries. Some scientists adopted the positivist slogan that 'science is a philosophy in itself', and surrendered to the illusion that they can do without philosophy in their scientific work; in reality they became prisoners of the very worst philosophy. Scientists must make efforts to obtain a thorough creative mastery of dialectical materialism. The main task of the

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conference was to reinforce the creative unity of philosophers and scientists, which would make it possible to raise the theoretical level of science and facilitate the speedy solution of its most important problems.

Academician Mitin said that . . . in the last few decades representatives of idealistic philosophy had made great efforts to prove that the concepts of physics are merely symbols and have no connection with physical objects. A very typical example was the speech made at the Twelfth International Philosophical Congress in Venice by the neo-positivist Philip Frank, who declared that 'all attempts to maintain materialistic or spiritualistic systems in connection with twentieth century science have failed'. Though he tried to hide behind a mask of neutrality towards the main philosophical trends, Frank developed a typically idealistic conception of the philosophy of science, reducing the whole question to the semantic analysis of scientific concepts. Thus, impotence in the solution of the philosophical problems of science was just as characteristic of modern idealist philosophers as it had been of Machism.

A characteristic of some foreign scientists was their desire to stand aloof from the struggle between philosophical trends. Thus, the physicist Pauli, who published in 1927 an article on 'Phenomena and Physical Reality' in the Swiss journal *Dialektik*, stated that he adhered neither to materialism nor to idealism. But in associating himself with the definition of objectivity given by N. Bohr, and asserting that the objective method is 'that on which one can reach agreement with others', he took up a Machist position. In his study of quantum-mechanical processes Pauli drew conclusions about the indeterminism which, he thought, prevails in micro-processes. Like many foreign scientists Pauli did not know dialectical materialism.

The objective character of atomic phenomena had been proved by the application of atomic energy. If science had learnt the laws of the microcosm and compelled the electron to 'work' for man's practical needs, then there could obviously be no talk of 'the free will of the electron'. The idea of indeterminism also fell to the ground.

In quantum mechanics the apparatus changes the object in the experimental process. For this reason, some scientists deduced that 'there exists no object without an apparatus', 'the apparatus creates the object', etc. In actual fact the fundamentally new role of the apparatus in quantum mechanics by no means cancelled out the question of the objective reality of micro-particles. All that was necessary was to allow for the influence of the apparatus on the object. This naturally required new and very subtle methods of analysis and experiment, and correspondingly new concepts.

Foreign scientists had recently shown a growing interest in dialectical materialism. A highly significant fact in this context was Louis de Broglie's renunciation of the neo-positivist views which he had held for 25 years . . . .

M. E. Omelyanovsky dealt in detail with the solution offered by modern idealist philosophy to the problem of objective reality. While the positivist philosophers were openly trying to banish the concept of objective reality from science the physicists, on the contrary, strove to preserve it. Heisenberg, for instance, said that the concept of the 'real' played just as vital a part in quantum mechanics as in classical physics. At the same time, he wrongly separated the concepts 'objective' and 'real'. Objective in Heisenberg's view meant that which is described mathematically, while the real could be described only in the concepts of classical physics. Still, Heisenberg often came close to a correct understanding of certain philosophical problems. He wrote for instance that 'elementary particles, colliding with a great exchange of energy, can be converted one into another. This state of affairs can be most simply described by saying that basically all particles consist of an identical substance; they are different stationary states of one and the same matter . . . . There is only one matter, but it can exist in different discrete states'. Disregarding certain terminological inexactitudes, the formulation quoted here could be accepted as correct.

The physicist M. Born asserted that the scientist in his sensual impressions 'must see more than hallucinations, and that something

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more is information about the real world'. For Born, electrons, atoms, and fields were part of the external world which exists independently. To those philosophical doctrines which deny this he gave the name of 'physical solipsism'. He saw the key to the rational understanding of reality in the idea of invariability. What ordinary people call 'real things' are 'invariables of perception' which the reason constructs by means of an unconscious process. In Born's views we could discern a recognition of the dialectial character of physical reality, but the assertion that invariables are constructed by the reason was wrong.

Quantum mechanics testified to the enormous importance of dialectical materialism for modern physics. Referring to three ways of dealing with the problem of synthesising the corpuscular and the wave pictures of the behaviour of micro-particles, and analysing each of these three viewpoints, Omelyanovsky said that they expressed the connection between corpuscular and wave properties in a form inadequate to the identity of opposites, which was one reason for their shortcomings.

In conclusion, the speaker criticised the neo-Thomist Wetter's book *Philosophy and Science in the Soviet Union*. He emphasised in particular that there were no grounds for Wetter's assertions about the compatibility of the dialectical-materialistic and the neo-positivist interpretations of quantum physics.

PROFESSOR B. M. Kedrov observed that the most characteristic feature of modern science was the intertwining of the sciences and the appearance of several border-line areas of knowledge. This made necessary a more thorough study of the correlation of the forms of the movement of matter in nature. There were two main approaches to this problem; the structural and the genetic. Correct results could be obtained only if both aspects were simultaneously taken into account. In the advance of science there were two deviations from this path. The first consisted in divorcing the higher forms from the lower, and regarding the higher forms of movement as absolute. Such modern idealist trends as neo-vitalism, holism, etc., were shot through with this tendency. The metaphysical separation of higher and lower forms of motion was a gnoseological source of idealism.

The second deviation was the attempted mechanistic reduction of higher to lower forms of motion, of the complex to the simple . . . . The speaker pointed out that mistakes had been made in the critique of resonance theory. The positive significance of the theory lay in its revelation of the quantum-mechanical aspect of chemical phenomena. This, however, had given rise to the mistaken idea that the essence and specific nature of chemical and moreover biological processes was fully exhibited in their quantum-mechanical characteristics. But this was only the debit side of those great successes in chemistry which quantum mechanics had already brought and promised to bring in future . . . .

The speaker gave the following as the main forms of the movement of matter in nature: the quantum-mechanical, the macro-mechanical, the sub-atomic physical, the chemical, the molecular-physical, the geological, and the biological. The geological form of the movement of matter is a new concept, introduced by the speaker.

A. Alexandrov, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, emphasised that the theory of relativity was a physical theory of space and time.

The principle of relativity expressed the uniformity of the structure of space-time. On the basis of this assumption, and with certain mathematical transformations, it was possible to prove that there exists in space-time a system of co-ordinates in which these transformations from one totality to another have preserved the ratio of effect and have the appearance of ordinary Lorenz transformations. Thus, since the structure of space and time was endowed with transformation invariance, both the inner laws and the interactions which determine that structure also had the same property.

The speaker formulated the concept of space-time as follows: space-time is the multiformity (plurality) of all events, considered only from the point of view of its structure, which is determined by a system of relationships of pre-

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cedence (or subsequence), abstracting from all other properties.

Space-time is four-dimensional multiformity.

The speaker emphasised that he considered the general principle of relativity, which asserts the equal validity of all systems of co-ordinates, in the same sense as the particular principle asserted the equal validity of inertial systems of co-ordinates, impossible. Einstein's attempts to discover a general principle of relativity, and the confusion of this general prinicple with 'co-variance', were a purely mathematical error, arising from an exaggeration of the role of the relativity principle, which obscured the true nature of the theory of relativity as a theory of absolute space-time. The speaker reduced the general theory of relativity to a theory of gravitation.

Academician V. A. Fok pointed out that the fundamental distinctive characteristic of the objects with which quantum-mechanics was concerned was found in the specific nature of the method used to describe them. The limitations of this method were the result of the existence side by side in these objects of wave and corpuscular properties. The limitations set upon the classical description of atomic objects were formulated with the help of what was known as Heisenberg's inequality. By taking this into account one could avoid the paradoxes implicit in the classical method of description. The formulation of the conditions which made possible the avoidance of such paradoxes was the work of N. Bohr, and he called it complementarity . . . . The quantum method of description essentially involved a concept of probability. But it did not follow from this that it refused to describe the individual properties of an object. Probability was introduced in quantum-mechanics as a primary concept, serving to characterise the potential possibilities inherent in an object, whereas in classical physics, in the kinetic theory of gases for instance, probabilities were arrived at as a result of averaging.

Dealing with the question of determinism in quantum-mechanics, the speaker pointed out that in quantum-mechanics, as in modern physics generally, causality was preserved, but there was no room for determinism in the Laplacean sense.

Bohr's original formulations of his quantum theory were not quite precise. He did not, for instance, draw a distinction between the concepts of causality and determinism. This gave grounds for accusing Bohr of positivism. The incorrect positivist interpretation of Bohr's ideas by some of his pupils had became known as the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum-mechanics, or the Copenhagen school. But it was better not to use this term, since what mattered was not Bohr's mistakes, but the rational nucleus which his ideas contained. The speaker related that a year and a half ago he had had a talk with Bohr in Copenhagen, and pointed out to him the imprecision of his formulations. Not long ago he had received Bohr's new work, *Quantum Physics and Philosophy*, which stressed the objectivity of quantum-mechanical description and its independence of the perceiving subject, accepted causality, and rejected only Laplacean determinism. There was no mention in the article of uncontrolled interaction between apparatus and object. It was therefore possible to agree with Bohr completely after this correction of his formulations, and the term 'Copenhagen School' should not be used in a pejorative sense . . . .

ACADEMICIAN S. L. Sobolev thoroughly acquainted the participants in the discussion with the subject of cybernetics. He dealt with the principles on which electronic machines work, and the questions of programming. Sobolev made the point that in living organisms too we had to do with regulating systems, with the transmission, processing, and storage of information. Since cybernetics studied processes without regard to the concrete or biological means by which they are carried on, processes in living organisms also were a proper subject for its investigations. Attempts were being made to imitate certain features of animal behaviour, and even conditioned reflexes, by means of machines. Experiments of this kind made it possible to verify the completeness of the description of any biological process.

Cybernetics had great importance for the

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study of the problem of heredity. Heredity was a sort of transmission of information by parents, a stream of information from the parent organisms to the organisms of their progeny. The development of the living organism started from embryo cells, in which the information transmitted to them by the parent organisms was somewhere stored. The embryo cell stored the information which it must utilise to regulate the subsequent development of the living organism . . . .

The speaker stated that cybernetics gave a stimulus to the construction of regulating machines. It had greatly influenced mathematical logic, and also the mathematics of computation. The solution of a number of problems would have been impossible without the creation of mathematical machines.

In conclusion, Sobolev said that the views expressed by some writers, to the effect that cybernetics was a pseudo-science, idealistic, mechanistic, etc., were the result of a misconception, and could have originated only in total ignorance of the actual content of cybernetics.

Academician V. A. Ambartsumyan in his paper on 'Some Methodological Questions of Cosmogony' said that the creation of artificial earth satellites was of enormous practical and philosophical importance. We had now begun to look at the world from a broader viewpoint, abandoning geo-centrism, not only in theory but in practice.

Touching on the question of the structure of the Greater Universe, he said that the phenomenon of the red displacement in the spectrum of the galaxy and the nebulae, and Doppler's effect, were of fundamental importance. Some scientists, trying to interpret this phenomenon, arrived at what they called the theory of the expanding universe . . . . Others, refusing to accept what was behind the phenomenon, forgot the fundamental significance of this fact. In that part of the universe which we observe, the separation of galaxies one from another, their dispersal, really did happen.

The universe we observe was not uniform in the macroscopic sense. The reproduction of matter in space, which we observe, was extremely heterogeneous, and that not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. Astronomical observation destroyed the over-simplified model of a homogeneous universe, and the supposition on which it was based that there was a linear dependence between velocity of withdrawal and distance.

Something new was the discovery that in some systems there was a great dispersion of velocities. Accumulations had been discovered consisting of galaxies with such high velocities that they part from one another, because the force of Newtonian gravity does not suffice to hold them back.

In conclusion V. Ambartsumyan referred to the need to put an end to the dogmatic approach to problems of science which could be seen in some philosophers.

Several scientists spoke in the discussion of these papers. Professor M. V. Shirokov criticised the views of A. D. Alexandrov on the theory of relativity. He did not agree with the rejection of the general theory of relativity and its reduction to a theory of gravitation, arguing that such a presentation amounted to a denial of the objective reality of fields of inertial forces and the effects which they produced, such as the change in the acceleration of the force of gravity with change of latitude, the phenomena of trade winds, the change in the frequency of light as it rounds a closed contour, etc. The rejection of the general principle of relativity as a general law of nature took us back to the Newtonian conception of the forces of inertia as unreal. . . .

Professor D. D. Ivanenko, pointing to the great successes of the theory of elementary particles, advanced the hypothesis that since there existed definite connections between these particles, there might exist some 'proto-matter', the search for which was becoming an immediate task for science. The only attempt which could be made along these lines, it seemed, was the construction of a non-linear spinning theory of matter . . . .

In constructing our picture of the world as a whole it was necessary to raise the question not only of the origin of the stars but also of the origin of elementary particles. In this connection the question of anti-particles was very important. These questions were closely bound up with cosmogony. Roughly speaking,

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it was a matter of the discovery of anti-worlds and the connection of the prevailing charges of our universe as a real factor with other factors.

Professor E. Kolman noted that philosophical thought was seriously lagging behind physics. The theory of elementary particles needed especially careful attention. He expounded in detail the new theory of matter, the content of which had been formulated by Heisenberg. An important feature of the new theory was that it regarded the field not only as continuous but as discrete . . . . In Kolman's view, Heisenberg's theory represented the final break with 'stupid mechanistic determinism' and put dialectic determinism in its place. But Heisenberg's own philosophical views had proceeded from positivism to objective idealism. The same transition from subjective-idealistic views to objective idealism was characteristic of other modern physicists, in particular N. Bohr and M. Born . . . .

Professor Ya. P. Terletsky criticised V. Fok for defending the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum-mechanics and ignoring other points of view. Terletsky thought it a matter of immediate necessity to develop the trends which gave an interpretation of quantum-mechanics different from that of Copenhagen . . . . He gave particular attention to the theory of de Broglie and his pupils, and drew the conclusion that on the general philosophical plane this theory did not go beyond the framework of dialectical materialism . . . .

Professor P. K. Anokhin dealt with links between physiology and cybernetics. He saw an example of the great significance of cybernetics for the physiology of the nervous system in its establishment of the significance of feedback. With the introduction of precise mathematical calculation cybernetics could bring to the notice of the physiologist regularities which he could not discover for himself. It was very important that specialists in cybernetics in their turn should have a knowledge of physiology. Every external agent which acted on the nervous system of an organism not only caused a current of nervous impulses but also gave form to the material apparatus necessary for future action. The study of this process could be very useful in the construction of calculating machines.

Academician Naan, of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, said that the application of the relativistic theory of gravitation to the problem of the structure of the universe was a great scientific success. But the metaphysical absolutisation of the results obtained and the idealistic phantasies built round them had seriously obscured the meaning of these results and damaged the credit of relativistic cosmology. From about the end of the twenties onwards, the view was gradually established in the West that the metagalaxy and indeed the whole universe had a catastrophic origin. This view offered favourable soil for various idealistic speculations.

Unfortunately, instead of analysis of the problems of modern cosmology . . . one often found in our philosophical literature assertions that particular theories were untenable because they contradicted the tenets of dialectical materialism. But modern cosmological theories did not in themselves contradict either dialectical materialism or the basic laws of physics. In this context the need had arisen to solve a number of questions such as that of the origin of matter in its pre-stellar state. The hypothesis of a collision between matter and anti-matter, with the formation of highly concentrated radiation, might prove acceptable. . . .

D. I. Blokhintsev, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, noted three different conceptions in the interpretation of quantum-mechanics, and emphasised that he considered untenable the conception of Bohm and de Broglie, which Professor Terletsky supported. A fundamental step was needed which would radically change our ideas about particles and space; we needed a completely new idea, totally different from classical conceptions . . . .

THE conference then heard the papers in the biological section.

In the paper given by Academician V. A. Engelhardt and G. M. Frank, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, it was emphasised that the exploitation of methods offered by physics and chemistry opened up great prospects for the penetration of the material essence of the phenomena of life . . . . The application of isotope indicators

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had made possible the discovery of fundamentally new regularities in metabolic processes, which were beyond the reach of ordinary chemical methods. It had been found that in the process of metabolism there develops quite unexpectedly a speed of transition which was previously unsuspected. Complicated organic complexes, forming part of biological structures which could not be discovered at all by ordinary chemical methods, were formed, broke down, and were recreated.

There had been a fundamental change in our ideas about the ways in which matter moves. It used to be thought as a rule that break-down in the metabolic process went on right up to the appearance of the end products. It had been found that large molecular fragments could be used again for the building of complex structures, so that there could be a repeated reconversion in the process of break-down, and repeated synthesis using over again the same products of partial de-compensation.

Electronic optics, electronic microscopy, and the diffraction of X-rays had opened a new era in the study of the structure of living matter in the sub-microscopic molecular sphere. A new field was coming into being, which could be called molecular morphology. A continuous ladder of structural relationships in the spatial organisation of living matter was being established, beginning with the structural protein molecules and going right up to the elements of the cell visible through an ordinary light microscope. The speaker also thought possible the cybernetic approach to elementary living processes, to the automatic control of chemical reactions in the organism by particular cells in the organism. This field might provisionally be called micro-cybernetics . . . .

The speaker asserted that the whole sum of data at our disposal testified to the primacy of metabolic processes as the basis of the phenomenon of life. In view of this the part which chemistry had to play in the investigation of biological processes was easily understood. It was therefore to some extent justificable to regard the physical processes and properties of a living system as merely effects of metabolic processes . . . .

Academician A. I. Oparin stressed that, as the symposium on the origin of life (Moscow 1958) had made clear, the evolutionary approach to the solution of this problem was now generally accepted. The programme of the symposium was based on three stages of the development of matter: the original appearance of the simplest organic substances, the hydro-carbons and their immediate derivatives; the conversion of these basic substances on the earth's surface into complex organic amalgams, in particular into substances like the proteins; the formation of new molecular systems, complexes endowed with metabolic properties.

The main subject of disagreement at the symposium was the question of the subsequent course of evolution. Not long ago it was widely held that in the original medium ('bouillon') there somehow or other appeared, perhaps by pure accident, a complex molecule whose structure determined the basic properties of life. This concept of a genic molecule, at first vague, was later given concrete expression in chemical terms with the proposition that the molecule in question was that of desoxynucleinoproteid. But a growing volume of biochemical data, particularly that which figured at the Vienna Congress, upset ideas that DNK has so much importance in the matter of life-determining properties. One paper in particular pointed out that not only DNK but also RNK, the complex carbo-hydrates and the lipoids—in effect the whole cellular complex—must play a part in the transmission of heredity . . . .

DNK was commonly supposed to have the property of reproducing itself in the form of an identical molecule of DNK. At the same time it could somehow transmit information to the protein molecule, determine the structure of the proteins and their ferments, determine the disposition of amino-acid refuse. But we had absolutely no experimental data giving any indication of such a transmission of information. It often caused surprise that when DNK was used in practical work it underwent great changes under the influence of X-rays and other factors, which would bring about tremendous changes in the organism if that molecule really were the life-determining factor. In fact no

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such changes took place . . . . The idea of a living molecule was receding further and further into the background, refuted by facts, while the idea of an initial multi-molecular system was finding more and more confirmation. We must look for the beginning of life not in the original appearance of DNK or some other molecule; the beginning of life lay in a complex, which later on, in the course of its development, could include DNK also.

N. I. GRASHCHENKOV, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, said that the formation of the specific properties of the sense organs, as of the organs themselves, was the result of interaction between the organism and its surroundings, the result of the formative role of the milieu . . . . The main factor in the mechanism by which the sense organs operated was reflector activity; the interrelations between the milieu and the sense organs were based on reflex mechanism. Reflex activity was not a mere mechanical transmission of stimulus; it was a more complex chemical process, based on biochemical changes. Apart from the general regularities, modern physiology was studying particular regularities in the functioning of the sense organs. The phenomenon of adaptation, or adjustment to stimuli from the outside world, had become particularly important . . . .

All the organs of sense were closely interconnected. It was therefore possible, when one of the sensory systems grew tired, went out of action, and did not give impulses and information to the higher nervous formations, to act upon other systems connected with it in such a way as to re-activate it. The inter-relation between these systems, the inter-connection between nervous apparati, relied on direct contact between peripheral and central apparati; nerve fibres ran from each formation, ending at one or another group of nerve cells: if the stimulus had to be transmitted to higher levels, it was again transmitted to the nerve fibres, and so on indefinitely up to the level at which the particular stimulus, being analysed and synthesised, became a sensation and entered our consciousness, which was connected with external factors and conditioned by the external world . . . .

[In the debate on the biological papers] *Sisakyan, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences*, said that . . . progress in the experimental techniques of bio-chemistry had created new unprecedented possibilities of learning about the bio-chemical functions of intra-cellular structures. With the progressive structural differentiation of the object of bio-chemical investigation went the danger of divorce from knowledge of the integral organism. The regularities established for isolated structures could not be mechanically transferred to the cell and the organism as a whole, although the study of those regularities brought us closer to an understanding of the organism as a whole. The bio-chemical interpretation of intra-cellular elements did not reject the idea of the integrality of the organism and of the cell as a biological unit, but on the contrary was based on this idea. . . .

S. L. Rubinstein, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, emphasised that the researches of Soviet scientists had shown that reception—both extro-reception and intro-reception—was carried out on the reflex principle. On the general methodological plane, the question of the reflex character of the activity of the sensory organs was the question of determination of the activity of that apparatus and the end product of its activity-sensation. According to the theory of reflexes the result of an influence from outside was conditioned by the responsive activity of the brain . . . .

The key to the solution of problems connected with the activity of the sensory organs and the theory of knowledge, and of other most important and controversial problems of modern science, was a correct understanding of the determination of phenomena, to the effect that external causes act through internal conditions. Pavlov's teaching on higher nervous activity, while giving reality to the principle of determinism, succeeded in revealing the internal conditions specific for the activity of the brain, which modify the external relations of the organism with the milieu which acts upon it.

Together with the theory of higher nervous activity on the one hand and gnoseology on the

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other, psychology formed an essential link in the system of disciplines which study the consciousness of man. It was necessary to put an end to the negative attitude to psychology which had grown up in the Soviet Union in recent years, and which was harmful in practice and methodologically mistaken. Pavlov's teaching did not liquidate psychology, but created new and powerful instruments for its development . . . . The relationship between psychology and the theory of higher nervous activity was analogous to that between biology and bio-chemistry . . . . The laws of higher nervous activity played an important and essential role in explaining psychological activity, but they did not exhaust its special characteristics nor define its specific regularities, that is to say the regularities which give it its leading role.

Professor G. Platonov said that the main defect of the papers read at the conference was the absence of criticism of idealistic views in science and philosophy. He thought that there had recently been a widespread tendency amongst scientists to under-estimate the importance of the struggle with idealism. Platonov criticised E. Kolman's preface to N. Wiener's *Cybernetics and Society*, in which Wiener had said that peaceful co-existence was the only sensible relationship between scientists of opposite camps. He also criticised the position of the *Botanical Journal*, which had come out with criticisms of the views of Academician T. Lysenko.

Professor Kostrikova criticised the representatives of the gene theory of heredity, and especially the work of Professor Dubinin. She did not agree with the views expressed by Academician Sobolev and Professor Lyapunov on cybernetics, especially their treatment of a number of successive generations as a mere stream of information. She uncompromisingly rejected their assertion that 'the mechanism of transmission of information from the parent organism to the embryo cells is unknown'. She thought that this view was tantamount to a denial of development in living nature.

A. L. Ryzhkov, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, said that scientists often made incorrect use of dialectical method, which was above all a method for discovering new results. Attempts to define life using only one criterion were absolutely fruitless. In the world of viruses, for instance, fundamentally new phenomena, which science had not previously encountered, had been discovered . . . . Ryzhkov criticised Oparin's conception of the origin of life, saying that it was remote from real relationships. Nucleic acid could never originate in nature in the way which Oparin imagined . . . .

A. A. Prokofieva-Belkovsksaya (Institute of Biophysics of the Academy of Sciences) said that work carried out at the end of last century and in the first half of the twentieth century in the fields of cytology, experimental genetics, and embryology, had provided an enormous volume of facts which proved that at the basis of heredity was the inheritance of concrete structural elements of the nucleus and cytoplasm of nucleoproteid nature. The capacity of these structures to reproduce themselves, connected with the presence in them of ribonucleic acid, led to the regular and orderly transmission of these structures from one generation of cells to another, which was the reason for the inheritance of types of metabolism, forms and functions of organisms. Some of these structures were constant components of cytoplasm. These were the cycrosomes, metachondria, and plastoids. Their behaviour in a number of generations of cells was at the basis of cytoplasmic heredity.

The greatest precision in reproducing themselves was a characteristic of the structural nucleo-proteids, which entered into the composition of the cell nucleus and formed chromosomes in it. Precision in their distribution through daughter cells was built in by evolution in all animals and vegetables in the complex process of mitotic division of the cell.

Over a period of about ninety years cytologists, embryologists, and geneticists had collected a huge amount of material which confirmed the hypothesis that the primary and basic function of mitosis consisted in the equal distribution of hereditary factors, located along the chromosome, between two daughter cells.

The development of this field of investigation was very closely bound up with the development of chemical methods of investigation, one

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extremely important example of which was the investigation of the cell nucleus by means of radio-active compounds. The basic regularities of mitosis were the splitting lengthways of each chromosome and the separation of its halves at opposite poles. This ensured a high measure of constancy in the chromosome assortment of the substances of the cell nucleus in a series of cell generations. These regularities were universal. They forced us to assume that such behaviour on the part of the cell nucleus when the cell divides was connected with its fundamental vital properties . . . .

Professor Panichev (Head of the Department of Marxism-Leninism at the Higher Medical Institute in Sofia) criticised the statement of Frank and Engelhardt on the possibility of determining the mechanism of heredity by physico-chemical methods. He cited examples of inheritance taking place when DNK was absent. The facts forced us to abandon the thesis that DNK was the sole physico-chemical substratum of heredity.

Professor Konnikova (Academy of Medical Sciences) criticised Oparin's conception of the origin of life. The weakest spot in his theory was his treatment of the transition from inanimate to animate matter. There was a sharp break in his account of the progressive complication of matter after the emergence of polypeptids and nucleotids, and before the appearance of protein. The more complex substances, and protein in particular, did not arise in a non-biogenic way, but were formed only in a living organism. It followed that the chemical form of the movement of matter could not attain a level of complexity at which there was formed a chemical substance capable of causing biological phenomena to occur and of serving as the structural material of the primary form of life: there was no immediate transition from the chemical to the biological forms of motion. One of the sources of this conception was Oparin's belief that the essential feature of life was not the exchange of the complicated chemical substance protein but the harmony and perfection of the chemical reactions carried out by super-molecular structures for purposes of self-preservation. A logical deduction from such a view of the nature of life was the denial of chemical evolution as a stage immediately preceding the emergence of life. In denying the non-biogenic formation of protein, Oparin's conception was opposed to reality.

Professor Kolbanovsky said that science as yet had no agreed view on the place of psychology in the system of sciences. The basis of psychology was the physiology of the higher nervous activity, which revealed the mechanism of psychological phenomena. At the same time all psychological phenomena could not be reduced to their physiological basis. Psychology was at the meeting point of natural and social science.

At the end of the conference the Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, P. N. Fedoseev, made a statement . . . . He indicated the need for profound and serious work on the part of Marxist philosophers and scientists on the philosophical generalisation of modern scientific discoveries . . . . He called for a strengthening of collaboration between philosophers and scientists and stressed the impropriety of importing methods used against hostile ideology into scientific discussions. Fedoseev also pointed out the importance of concrete analysis of scientific questions, observing that the absence of such analysis could lead to mistakes, as for example the nihilistic rejection of cybernetics by certain philosophers.

The conference adopted a resolution which noted the need for further exploration of the philosophic problems of science and for closer collaboration between philosophers and scientists. The resolution mentioned the desirability of founding a special journal on philosophical problems of science, and of airing these questions widely in scientific journals.

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JUDICIAL PRACTICE AND LEGAL REFORM

Leonard Schapiro

CRIMINAL law reform has been repeatedly discussed, and put off, in the Soviet Union for nearly a quarter of a century. The problem arose in 1935, when the draft of the new Constitution was published, because Article 14 included criminal law and procedure among the subjects assigned solely to the Union. Since up till then legislation on crime had been the province of the republics, and the source of criminal law and procedure was (and still is) the republican codes of criminal law and procedure first promulgated in 1922-23, the need arose for new All-Union Codes. The attempt to draft them ended disastrously because of the political conditions of the time. The main author of the new draft Criminal Code for the USSR was E. B. Pashukanis, then Deputy People's Commissar for Justice. Pashukanis was in 1936 head of the legal section of the Communist Academy, and easily the most outstanding and the most influential Soviet legal theorist. Like many of the Marxist intellectuals of the Communist Academy, notably of course Bukharin, he had welcomed the new Constitution as a harbinger of a return to normality and general reconciliation, after the stress of the terrible years of the First Five Year Plan and its concomitant collectivisation. (Bukharin and a number of other prominent oppositionists were members of the commission for drafting the constitution.) Stalin's answer to this mood of hope among the so called right-wing intellectuals was the Ezhov purge of 1936-1938, and one of his main instruments in putting it through was Vyshinsky.

Early in 1937 Pashukanis fell, ostensibly for his views on the withering away of the state (which he had long recanted) and was presumably executed. The real reason seems to have been rather different. At a meeting of the legal section of the Communist Academy held early in 1937 he was attacked for the excessively mild and humane provisions of his draft of a new criminal code (the draft itself was never published). At this meeting a number of legal luminaries, including some of those who are today the most vocal in urging reform of the criminal law, were given the opportunity of denouncing Pashukanis with various degrees of servility.[1] The Communist Academy, and many of its more prominent members, were soon after liquidated. As head of the new legal institute of the Academy of Sciences Vyshinsky now became the official exponent of all legal theory.

THIS background, and the bitter and humiliating memories left by it, must be borne in mind if the subsequent history of criminal law reform is to be understood. No progress was made until Stalin's death—though some efforts were made, without success, to draft a new code in 1938, and at the Nineteenth Party Congress in September 1952 Poskrebyshev was still berating the lawyers for having failed to draft new codes. Some cautious discussion of the need for reform continued, however, in the legal periodicals throughout all these years. Stalin's death immediately changed the picture. The Amnesty of 27 March 1953 promised new and milder codes of criminal law and procedure and, presumably with more regard for propaganda than for practical possibilities, instructed the Ministry of Justice to prepare drafts for the consideration of the Council of Ministers within the space of one month. This was not, of course, done, but discussion of law reform in the legal periodicals now went ahead with more freedom and frankness than had been known for years. The opportune death of Vyshinsky, who had continued to dominate legal science, and the rehabilitation of Pashukanis's character, but not

[1] See *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost*, 1937, No. 10-11, pp. 10-17.

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of his views, at the end of 1956, no doubt helped to stimulate freer discussion of legal questions, which, unlike other spheres of intellectual activity, does not seem to have been very much inhibited by the events in Hungary. It is probably true, as repeatedly stated by legal officials, that drafts of new All-Union codes of Criminal Law and Procedure were ready for publication by the time of the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956. They were not, however, published because they had meanwhile been overtaken by a new trend in Soviet policy—the extension of the powers of the republics. In the legal sphere this extension included the abolition of the All-Union Ministry of Justice and the transfer of its functions to the Republican ministries (in May 1956) and (in February 1957) some limitation of the powers of the All-Union Supreme Court, with consequent extension of the powers of the republican Supreme Courts; and also an amendment of Article 14 of the Constitution in such a way as to give the Union Republics the right to promulgate their own codes of both criminal and civil law and procedure, while reserving to the Union only the right to lay down general principles for the guidance of the Republics.

Preparations for new drafts which took account of these constitutional changes now went ahead. In June 1958 two draft laws were published in the legal journals for discussion, as a preliminary to submitting them to the Legislative Commission of the Supreme Soviet for putting into final shape: The Basic Principles of Criminal Legislation in the USSR and the Union Republics; and Bases of Criminal Procedure in the USSR and the Union Republics. Other drafts were also presumably prepared at the same time, although they were not published, notably a draft of a Law on Crimes Aganist the State—apparently, although this did not figure in the amendment of the Constitution adopted in February 1957,[2] the Union had still retained sole jurisdiction over the more serious political offences. After some fairly vigorous discussion in the legal periodicals, the drafts were reworked in the Legislative Commission, and on Christmas Day 1958 eight laws were passed by the Supreme Soviet. In the analysis which follows we are concerned with only four of them, entitled: Bases of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and of the Union Republics; Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Against the State; Bases of Legislation on the Structure of the Courts of the USSR and of the Union and Autonomous Republics; and Bases of Criminal Procedure in the USSR and the Union Republics.[3] It should be noted that, apart from the Law on Crimes Against the State, this legislation only lays down basic principles which must be followed and implemented by the Union Republics in their own codes of criminal law and procedure which are still (July 1959) in active preparation. However, some of the more important provisions of the new All-Union legislation have already been made obligatory for the Republics, even pending the completion of their new codes, by a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 14 February 1959.

THE changes enacted by the new laws can be divided into substantive and procedural —and the latter are the more important. The substantive changes are mainly five. First, the minimum age of criminal responsibility has been raised from 14 to 16, except in the case of the gravest crimes, where it has been raised from 12 to 14. Secondly, except where the death penalty is prescribed (i.e., as hitherto for treason, terrorism, and banditry), the maximum sentence of imprisonment has been reduced from 25 to 15 years. Thirdly, loss of franchise and expulsion from the USSR are no longer among the penalties prescribed for certain crimes. Fourthly, the nature of an accomplice and of an accessory before or after the fact is defined with greater precision than hitherto. (This probably reflects a revulsion against the abuse of the application of the

[2] For the text of this and other amendments adopted at the same time see *Istoriya sovetskoi konstitutsii* (Moscow, 1957), pp. 505 ff.

[3] For the text of the new laws, eight in all, see *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost*, 1959, No. 1, pp. 99-157. The speeches in the Supreme Soviet explaining them and commenting upon them are also reprinted.

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conception of accessory in order to implicate as wide a range of persons as possible, which was much practised for terrorisation purposes by Vyshinsky.) Finally, serious political crimes, hitherto covered by the almost unlimited omnibus Article 58 of the RSFSR Criminal Code (originally drafted by Lenin), have been defined with some attempt at precision.

Most important, perhaps, is the introduction of the term 'intentionally' into the definition of treason—thus excluding from this definition the numerous cases of mere negligence or offences without any political content which had hitherto often been prosecuted under Article 58. However, the new law is in other respects little less severe than the old. For example, anti-Soviet propaganda, which includes spreading 'slanderous inventions' intended to weaken Soviet power by 'denigrating' the Soviet system, or preparing or harbouring literature of such content, can incur a sentence of seven years' imprisonment (ten for a second offence). (In Soviet practice this definition could include possession of a copy of the *Times*, or *Survey*.) Refusal by a Soviet citizen to return to the USSR from abroad is included in the definition of treason, and carries the death penalty. On the other hand, no penalties are any longer prescribed against members of the family of a citizen who flees abroad if they were not aware of his intention. Hitherto they were liable to penalties even if quite unaware of the intended flight.

The procedural changes reflect, much more than the substantive changes, the great battle which has been fought in the course of discussions extending over the past five years. It is plain that a number of lawyers have been deeply concerned over the widespread flouting of the law which has occurred in the past, and have tried to provide real safeguards against this ever happening again. Of course the fundamental difficulty, which from the earliest period of the Soviet State has made the development of a real universally applicable legal order virtually impossible, has been the position of privilege above the law which the party has arrogated to itself. The law and the courts are, even in theory, executants of general policy, which is determined by the party, and the idea that the courts could operate to safeguard the individual against arbitrary action approved of by the party is one which plays no part whatever in Soviet legal theory, and it is never even raised in this form in discussion. According to a recent quite authoritative work, the independence of judges and their subordination only to the law, which is proclaimed in the constitution (and re-enacted in the recent laws) 'does not mean their independence from the state or from the policy of the party and the government, since the court is an organ of power, and its activity is one of the aspects of state government'.[4] Party policy is in theory a kind of general will, and the idea that an individual could require protection against this will of which he is theoretically a part is as inadmissible in Soviet theoretical discussion as it once appeared absurd to Rousseau. In spite of this difficulty, a number of the more enlightened lawyers have tried to propose safeguards which might go some way to hamper arbitrary action against the courts in the future, as it has been frequently applied in the past. For example one writer, D. Rakhunov, proposed that the lay People's Assessors who sit jointly with the judge, should be increased in number from two to six, should deliberate separately and become the sole judges of fact—in other words, he was advocating a jury system.[5] Others, including Professor M. M. Strogovich, have urged that the victim of illegal actions of officials should have the right to claim damages in a civil action. (Both these safeguards have played a very big part in English legal history in protecting the freedom of the subject from arbitrary action by the executive.) Neither of these provisions finds any place in the new Soviet laws.

ONE group of the new procedural changes contained in the new laws reflects something in the nature of a compromise, evidently designed to go some way to meet the apprehensions of the more enlightened lawyers. For

[4] See M. V. Kozhevnikov, *Istoriya sovetskovo suda 1917-1956 gody*, second edition (Moscow 1957), p. 277.

[5] *Izvestiya*, 27 March, 1957.

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example, the extraction of confession has been much abused in the past ('The Queen of evidence' Vyshinsky once described confession), and some writers, including again Professor Strogovich, wanted to see a rule enacted that confessions should not be admissible unless corroborated by other evidence. This has not been provided for, but the 'Queen' has nevertheless been dethroned: the new law provides that no particular form of evidence should have any greater weight than any other. Again, no doubt mindful of the way in which the preliminary examinations of accused have been conducted in the past, a number of writers urged that counsel for the defence should in future be allowed to participate in the preliminary examination of the accused. In Soviet practice (as in many continental systems, and in pre-revolutionary Russia) this private examination precedes the indictment and the trial, and takes the place of the open presentation of the case against an accused, who cannot be compelled against his will to say anything, which is the practice in England. The new law has gone some way to meet the views expressed in discussion. Defence counsel can now be present at the preliminary examination of a juvenile, and apparently also in the case of adults (the law is not clear on this point) with the permission of the examining officer.[6]

Another reflection in the new laws of compromise with the views of the more enlightened legal writers is the provision that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies upon the prosecution. A number of writers have urged that the new law should in terms enact the 'presumption of innocence,' but this has not been done. So far as court procedure is concerned, the enactment requiring the prosecution to discharge the burden of proof amounts to much the same thing—that is what the presumption of innocence in practice means. But the insistence by some writers on the enactment of the presumption of innocence in the form of a solemn declaration was probably dictated by the desire not only to reform actual procedure in court, but to introduce better standards of public behaviour—to put a stop, for example, to the practice whereby the moment a man is arrested in the Soviet Union, his guilt is frequently assumed in the press, or he is even expelled from the party if a member—all before any hearing before the court has taken place, or the accused has had a chance of defending himself. (The same fate, of course, is usual in the case of politicians who fall into disfavour.) The practice of organizing mass resolutions demanding extreme penalties for 'traitors' long before the trial has even begun, which was so distasteful a feature in the thirties, may also have been in the minds of the advocates of a clear declaration of the 'presumption of innocence'.

THE second group of procedural enactments in the new legislation consists of a series of provisions designed to safeguard the accused during the preliminary stage of examination, before the indictment is framed, or the decision taken to drop the prosecution, if the evidence should prove insufficient. On paper, these safeguards are stringent. Powers to detain a suspect and to keep him under arrest are limited; no threats of any kind may be employed in order to force a confession; correspondence may be intercepted only in strictly prescribed circumstances; and the accused is given extensive rights of lodging complaints. The general responsibility for ensuring that these provisions are complied with is placed upon the procurators, who are the watchdogs of the observance of the law as well as the prosecutors of crime, and who are supposed to safeguard the accused as well as to ensure that criminals should not go unpunished.

But none of these safeguards is new in substance: although the details are new, the actual provisions are already contained in the republican codes of criminal procedure, of which the principal one, that of the RSFSR, dates from

[6] The wording suggests that the advocate can only be present, with the permission of the investigator, at certain specified interrogation sessions, but the speeches in the Supreme Soviet assumed that the intention was that he could be present throughout the preliminary examination. This, incidentally, revives the procedure which was laid down by section 22 of the Act of 30 November 1918 on the People's Courts, whereby the advocate had the right to be present at the preliminary examination, but could be excluded if his presence might hinder the disclosure of the true facts.

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1923. The general duty of ensuring that preliminary investigations of crimes, both by the regular investigators and by the officers of the security service, should be conducted with due observance of legality, was imposed on the procurators in 1922. None of this prevented flagrant violations of the law over many years of Soviet history, when the policy of the party required it. As against this, the Statute on the functions of the procurators enacted on 24 May 1955 defines their duty of supervision with much greater detail than before, and such indications as there are suggest that the procurators are now often among the most zealous advocates of greater legality. Provided that the party does not attempt to override them, it is possible that they will in future endeavour to ensure that the provisions of the law do not once again become a dead letter.

The third group of procedural provisions consists of enactments which are really new, and therefore deserve closer attention. The much criticised principle of 'analogy' has been abolished. This was the rule which enabled the court, in cases where a 'socially dangerous' act had been committed which was not covered by existing legislation, to convict the accused of the offence under the criminal code which most closely resembled the act committed. For some years past the rule of analogy, which offended against the principle of natural justice usually summed up in the maxim *nulla poena sine crimine*, had been repeatedly criticised by legal writers, and was in any case not, so far as is known, very frequently applied in practice.

The preliminary examinations of accused conducted by the investigators *(sledovateli)* of the security organs, the KGB, will no longer, as hitherto, be subject to special, and unpublished, regulations which apparently conferred very wide powers upon them. The KGB investigators will still deal with the preliminary examination of offences against the state, but will in conducting their examination be as much subject to the supervision of the procurators as other investigators, and will be similarly limited in their powers by the published rules relating to investigations. Such, at any rate, is the position which appears from the new laws. Indeed, the KGB investigators were already placed under the procurators' supervision by the terms of the statute on the procurators of 24 May 1955, but it would seem that the KGB still retained its own, unpublished, special powers, at any rate as late as December 1957.[7] If the terms of the new law are strictly applied, it would seem that the KGB investigators will at most be able to appeal from the order of one procurator to the one next higher in the hierarchy, but that the final decision on the conduct of the preliminary examination will rest with the procurator. If the procurators are fearless enough, or are left enough liberty of action by the party, this could become a procedural change of considerable importance.

THE rights of defence counsel have been substantially extended. He is 'obliged to utilise all means prescribed by the law and all methods of defence' in order to assist his client, and he is entitled to such necessary facilities as interviewing his client, taking part in the trial, and making protests against the conduct of the preliminary examination. He cannot refuse to act when once he has accepted a case. The importance of these provisions will depend on how far advocates are in practice allowed to implement them. The tradition of free and fearless defence by counsel is weak in the Soviet Union. At the meeting of the Supreme Soviet in February 1957, the Minister of Education of the RSFSR complained that the standards of defending counsel and their place in society were not high when compared with the distinguished position which they occupied before the revolution. 'There is still sometimes a strange suspicion that advocates exist only to hamper the course of justice. There are also some advocates who hesitate to stand up on matters of principle against the state prosecutor.' Since advocates, even if not party members, are dependent for their livelihood on the collegium to which they are attached, and which is under complete party

[7] The official text of and commentary on the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure published in December 1957 still referred to the special, unpublished regulations governing examinations conducted by officers of the KGB.

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control, the Minister's criticism is easy to understand. Advocates are also very ill paid. For example, according to the latest figures available, of the 8,000 advocates in the RSFSR nearly 85 per cent earned between 680 and 1,500 rubles a month, and none earned more than 2,000.[8] (For comparison the monthly wage of the lowest full-time official of the party apparatus, the secretary of a party cell, is 1,400 rubles.) There are, however, some signs that the status of advocates may improve. Steps have been taken to increase their earnings. In one instance, at any rate (though it was severely criticised in the legal press) the RSFSR Ministry of Justice reinstated an advocate no less than five times after his repeated expulsion by his collegium.[9] This suggests that the professional legal bureaucrats of the Ministry do not always see eye to eye with the party zealots in the collegium.

Two further changes should also be noted. The courts have now been given the power to award less than the minimum sentence prescribed for a particular offence in appropriate cases, thus increasing their discretionary power to be lenient; and there are certain other new rules in the direction of greater leniency, e.g., on such matters as confiscation of property, or the consequences of a conviction. In contrast, the rules for the remission of sentences have been tightened up. Apparently the authorities have been worried over the excessive leniency shown in remitting sentences by those in charge of the penal labour colonies (as the former camps have now mostly been renamed). Remission of sentences can now only take place by an order of the court, and then only subject to certain limitations. A new decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (which has not hitherto been published) has also tightened up the general disciplinary administration of the penal colonies.[10]

THERE are thus many positive features about the new legislation to encourage those who hope to see the rule of law strengthened in the Soviet Union. The new law is still harsh in many of its provisions, but there has been some movement in the direction of leniency. Some anomalies have been removed, and rules have been devised to safeguard the accused from some of the worst injustices to which he has been subject in the past. There are some signs that the influence of the more enlightened Soviet lawyers—and there are many such—has to some slight extent asserted itself after many years of enforced silence, or understandable caution. The presence on the newly constituted editorial board of *Soviet State and Law*, the organ of the Legal Institute of the Academy of Sciences, of Professor M. M. Strogovich, for example, to some extent counterbalances the fact that several other liberal-minded scholars have been ousted in favour of reliable party nominess like Golunsky or Romashkin. If the procurators and advocates are given the opportunity, or have the courage to assert in practice the rights which have been conferred upon them on paper, there is a possibility that in time a greater habit of observance of the law will begin to evolve. For legal order is essentially a matter of daily national habit, and cannot be created merely by legal enactments.

In the last resort, therefore, the development of some kind of legal order will depend on the attitude which the party adopts towards the whole question. Here the omens are not all favourable. To take the most striking instance: the new legislation squarely asserts that a 'criminal penalty' can only be imposed by order of a court, and only where the accused has committed an offence foreseen by the criminal law. This provision is clearly aimed against the revival of the extraordinary powers of life and death, quite irrespective of the criminal law, which were wielded by the security authorities, until these special powers were repealed, reportedly in September 1953.[11] Yet in some respects (as only one quite humble Soviet critic has hitherto had the courage to point out), actual Soviet practice is already,

[8] *Sovetskaya yustitsiya*, 1957, No. 7, p. 27.
[9] *Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost*, 1959, No. 3, pp. 52-3.
[10] *ibid*, 1959, No. 1, p. 179.
[11] The decree of repeal has not been published, but the fact of repeal has several times been referred to—see e.g., *Partijnaya Zhizn*, 1957, No. 4, p. 68.

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even since the coming into force of the new laws, in glaring contradiction with this principle that only a court can award a penalty—whether a penalty is 'criminal' or not, in terms of legal technicality, incidentally makes very little difference to the victim. There are, for example, innumerable provisions in Soviet law for the levying of small fines by purely administrative decision, and all these provisions remain in force. More serious is the existence in a number of republics of the so-called 'anti-parasite' laws. These laws enable a general assembly of the inhabitants of a district, consisting of not fewer than a hundred people, to banish for a period of two to five years, with the addition of enforced work, persons and their families who live a 'parasitical' life and do not engage in work of value to the community. There is no appeal from this decision, and a person who returns without permission from his banishment commits a criminal offence. Since in practice the mustering of the necessary number of obedient citizens for these acts of 'folk justice' can easily be ensured by the local party organs, it is plain that these laws with their wide discretionary character (the nature of 'parasitism' is not defined) have in effect conferred upon the party the power of inflicting administrative exile upon anyone whom it regards as undesirable. It is, however, of interest, and may well be a sign of resistance to this legislation, that while drafts of the 'anti-parasite' laws were published in all republics, they have so far been passed into law only in eight republics—the last being Kirgizia, on 15 January 1959, that is to say after the coming into force of the new basic principles. In particular, neither the RSFSR nor the Ukraine has as yet adopted the law.

Present indications suggest that the party authorities lay great stress on this kind of extra-legal activity, ostensibly as an effective method of dealing with crime. At the Twenty-First Party Congress recently, Khrushchev was emphatic that this type of 'communal' action, both for the prevention of crime and for its punishment, must gradually take the place of the regular courts and of the police organs. This development, according to him, was an example of the 'withering away of the state' which would take place as the advent of communism approached. It is plain that in Soviet conditions 'communal' action can only mean party action. As Khrushchev himself has pointed out on another occasion, the withering away of the state under communism does not imply the withering away of the party, and indeed the party as the embodiment of the national will, has never in theory been regarded as identical with the state. In the same speech to the Congress Khrushchev claimed that there was no one under sentence at present for a political crime. But the conception of a political crime is a pretty wide one, and it will be little consolation for critics of the regime who are exiled or pilloried under party-dominated folk assemblies to reflect that they have been technically dealt with not under the criminal law, but administratively as 'parasites' or 'hooligans'. The party is no doubt well aware that strengthening of legal order must hamper the kind of administrative licence which it has hitherto always relied on for putting through its policy. This latest, somewhat novel, form of the 'withering way of the state' may well be designed to counter the new trend towards law and order, which has undoubtedly come about as the result of strong pressure in many sections of society. It remains to be seen whether the lawyers will be strong enough and courageous enough to resist this erosion of their sphere of competence.

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No Road to the Komuna

DECENTRALISATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Derek Scott

A FEW days after the 21st congress of the Soviet Communist Party, *Izvestiya* (12 February 1959) replied to an allegation in the Belgrade *Ekonomska Politika* that in their measures for decentralisation of the economy the Russians had been guided by Yugoslav conceptions. Certainly there is something in the character of Soviet affairs since the twentieth congress to induce such a belief. Realisation of the inadequacy of Stalinism has produced there a phase of institutional fluidity markedly in contrast with the Soviet Union's former massive immobility, and reminiscent of the successive waves of inspiration, precipitate implementation, and piecemeal revision which, from the failure at the end of 1949 of the attempt to outbid Stalin in the practice of Stalinism, has brought Yugoslavia through Mr Kardelj's re-discovery early in 1954 of the self-governing commune of Marx's vision, to relative stability at last.

Examination of the practical reforms affords little reason to rebut the reiterated assertions of Soviet authority that Russia is still untempted by the ways of Titoism. 'Elimination of the excessive centralisation in planning'—such as had sent some districts tractors unsuited to their soil and sought to arrange over 98 per cent. of the country's railway goods traffic from the centre—has been repeatedly mentioned as a principal motive, though not the only one, for the 'reorganisation of the management of industry and agriculture' in the Soviet Union, but 'decentralisation' has been specifically rejected as a term for the process, and 'localism' rapidly became one of the worst of crimes. The road to communism, which has been placed in the centre of the prospect officially offered with the seven-year plan, is not to lead by way of the early withering-away of the state—the doctrine which the Titoists have made peculiarly their own. Communist society itself 'will be a highly organised and co-ordinated association of people of toil. In order to manage the machines everyone will have to carry out his labour functions and social obligations at a determined time and in an established order.' Thus Khrushchev at the 21st congress.

It would be surprising if it were otherwise. As, in elements of its standard of living, the Soviet Union comes within a plan's length of the leading societies of the West, and as in some of its more specialised technical advances it even forges ahead of them, the contest with America which has obsessed at least the leaders since the revolution begins to seem more actual. Specifically, the Soviet authorities have realised that the rate of growth of their economy, unapproached by any modern industrial society, is a source of serious—if not entirely rational—concern to their Western rivals, and of admiration to the underdeveloped countries, an invaluable propaganda counter as well as a source of strength for the conduct of international politics by whatever means.[1] To use its advantages to the full the Soviet Union needs, now as much as ever, the fullest exploitation of all the impressive resources at its disposal. It cannot in reason hand them over to local interests—popular or official—to gamble with, and its language indicates that it does not intend to do so.

For this reason the Soviet Union has nothing to learn from the rival communism of Yugoslavia, where a large measure of effective decentralisation has in fact been achieved, presenting the world with the strange spectacle of competition between enterprises—in a more conventional sense than the Soviet contests for red banners of 'socialist emulation'—and diversity between regions in a publicly owned economy. The

[1] *Cf. Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1958, 7, Supplement.

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Yugoslav leaders know that they must above all avoid extreme internal discontent if they are to escape external danger; they have to deal with a people which knows well how non-communist Europe lives; they have to deal with a number of fairly distinct and reasonably evenly balanced national communities with a live tradition of mutual antagonism and external alliance; above all they are out of the prestige contests of the great powers. For the Soviet Union these circumstances do not exist. Its people can live by glory and hope. It can, and believes it must, go flat out.

So the changes of organisation of the last two years have done little to make the local soviets, or their executive committees into the 'foundation' of the state which the constitution declares them to be. In the middle of 1958 it was stated that three-quarters of the total volume of industrial production, including all the main branches of heavy industry, came from enterprises under *sovnarkhoz* direction.[2] Whatever the position of enterprises still under the control of higher authority, this left a small share for the several levels of soviet executive committees. In agriculture the decision to dispense with the machine-tractor stations has restored some power of oversight to the *raion* executive committees in the form of the re-establishment in them of inspector groups to take over the MTS function of keeping watch on the collective farms. These are apparently already kept busy, if not always in such ways as authority desires. The attachment to the same bodies of agricultural experts for the direction of land improvement work has also been mentioned. Soviet executive committees at all levels, but especially those of urban units, are also very much involved in authority's current campaigns for the rapid development of housing, of public catering and other amenities, and of boarding schools and other means to implement its plans for general educational reform. In consequence they are also charged with substantial responsibility for the expansion of the local supply of building materials. Republican ministries for such works and for local industries have, in some republics at least, been abolished, and so, in principle, has the direct intervention of republican authorities in these tasks, even if this is not entirely eliminated in practice. Responsibility, in these as in other matters, means responsibility to higher authority for the discharge of a share of a common task, not responsiveness to local ideas of relative priorities. It clearly does not imply any degree of exemption from detailed supervision, except presumably such as may result from higher authority having its hands full of a great variety of things. Nor has anything apparently been done or proposed to allow the soviet executive committees greater financial scope for action. The means at their disposal are limited to those permitted by higher authority, with reservation to the local level only of the power of granting exemption from certain of the minor imposts in a narrowly prescribed range of cases.

AN indication of the weak position of the soviet structure as a focus for local civic pride and energies is the constant, and latterly accelerated, creation and abolition of the local administrative units in which it operates. These are established and expanded as the economic pattern changes, as the new factory builds up around itself a settlement, and is joined by yet newer factories, or as the empty lands fill up with new state farms. They disappear as collective farms are amalgamated, as old mine workings fall into disuse or as the builders' camp completes its task and moves on and as the growing town swallows up its neighbours. They wax and wane without fuss or prior campaigning, as when by an edict of June 1958 the Ukrainian town of Kahovka was demoted from *oblast* to *raion* subordination, and the town of Novaya Kahovka took its place in the higher category. The process is unresisted by any claim of tradition or weight of citizens' pressure. As the areas change the party committees to control them, the soviets, and the rest of the administrative apparatus come into being or are snuffed out. The drastic amalgamation of village soviets of recent years to accord with the new organisation of collective farming is apparently not yet at an end.[3]. It has latterly, as the continuation of the

[2] *Partiinaya Zhizn, 1958*, 14, p. 4.

[3] *Cf.* the speech by Polyanski at the 21st CPSU congress on 28 January 1959.

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process absorbs many of the machine-tractor stations in the farms, been followed by intensified amalgamation at *raion* level. On the other hand the lowest category of urban units, the settlements having their own soviets (workers' settlements, settlements of urban type, etc.) increased in the same period, as did the higher category of towns. These latter developments reflect the rapid and widespread urbanisation of the Soviet Union. But that the status even of towns is not secure is suggested by the abolition at the same time of two towns, and the administrative surbordination of two more to other towns, as well as the reduction of twelve from republican to *oblast* subordination and of others from *oblast* to *raion* subordination.

Though the *sovnarkhozy* have a much larger command than have the soviets—or, to compare like with administrative like, than executive committees—for the corresponding areas in the fields of activity to which the Soviet regime has always attached the greatest importance, they are given no more encouragement to grow into autonomous corporations. There is as yet no indication that they will not show the same impermanence in face of changing views of economic necessity; of the seventy set up in the RSFSR in May 1957, two, together with the *oblasti* over which they held economic sway, apparently lasted only until the following October. The discretion granted them has so far been severely limited, as in other fields of Soviet administrative experimentation. Complaints have been expressed that in the first months of their existence at least they have been hampered by the failure of the planning machinery to adjust itself to the new territorial principle of economic organisation—in particular the retention by the planning commission of the RSFSR of the old form or organisation by industries rather than by areas, and extreme dilatoriness in considering plans and requests for supplies submitted to it. Early in 1958 it was complained that the commission was severely restricting the scope of the *sovnarkhozy* by continuing to assign tasks in detail directly to the several factories. The excuse given in reply was that under the old order it had had relatively little to do, and since the transfer of powers from the federal planning committee it had had little guidance from that body.[4] The planning bodies had been strengthened to take over some of the functions of the dissolved ministries, and served to give some unity to an industry after the disappearance of its former head.

Moreover, it was not long after the establishment of the *sovnarkhozy* that it began to be forcibly asserted that 'localism, the forgetting of statewide interests, is an evil which must be decisively fought',[5] and G. A. Vedenyapin, chairman of the Gorki *sovnarkhoz*, received a reprimand from the Central Committee of the Party for having allowed preference to be given to local needs at the cost of the oil and chemical industries of the country as a whole. Other items in the press indicate that he was by no means alone. An edict of the Supreme Soviet presidium of April 1958 attached criminal penalties to failure to fulfil prescribed inter-republican deliveries, and the press has stressed that the obligation obtains even when the production plan has not been fulfilled.[6] It has not been indicated what happens when, as another article instanced, the delivery assignment is well beyond an enterprise's capacity to produce.

WHETHER locally recruited, like Mr Vedenyapin, or drafted in from some abolished central post, the officers of the *sovnarkhozy* all arrived in their posts by a single clearly perceptible route and under conditions which resemble closely those familiar from the careers of their equivalents in the executive committee of the *oblast* soviet, though probably they rank above the latter. For some time about the turn of the year 1957-58 the press carried a considerable number of articles by *oblast* party first secretaries to the effect that 'Taking account of the complexity and wide extent of the work lying before the *sovnarkhoz*, the *obkom* (*oblast* committee) of the CPSU strengthened it with trained and experienced leading cadres. Thither were directed a group of party workers with good experience of the economy. At the head of some of the functional departments and administrations were placed managers from leading

[4] *Cf.* Frolov in *Kommunist*, 1958, 2, and Naimanov in *Pravda*, 6 February 1958.

[5] Smelyakov in *Kommunist*, 1958, 15.

[6] *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1958, 14, p. 13.

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industrial enterprises.'[7] If the chairman himself did not owe his office to the *oblast* party committee it could only be because that office was in the gift of a higher party level—as the practice observed in filling comparable posts suggests was probably the case. Certainly there is no concealment of his relations with the party committee and its first secretary after appointment.

If, therefore, the changes work to the advantage of any particular interest, it is that of the professional party officials, most obviously those at *oblast* level. They soon showed their satisfaction at the development. F. E. Titov, first secretary of the party in Ivanovo *oblast*, recalled in an article published early in 1958[8] that while the party organisations had always investigated, and offered advice on, matters affecting the economy of their areas, including the plans, they had often met with opposition from the ministries; once those bodies and the State Planning Committee at the centre had come to a decision it was not likely to be found administratively possible to make any change. But 'In future many, many questions of development in the economic field can be settled directly on the spot by the town, *raion*, and *oblast* committees of the CPSU or placed in good time before the *sovnarkhoz*,' and both the writer and many of his colleagues emphasised that the *oblast* party committee had had a large part in the organisation of the *sovnarkhoz* and expected to continue to guide its activities.

Highest authority, however, while fully endorsing the principle of local party control, has sought to make it clear that it is an obligation rather than a right. 'The re-organisation of the management of the economy on the territorial principle,' it was explained at the outset, 'will increase immeasurably the responsibility of the party agencies in the republics, territories, and regions, of all party organisations, for the development of production and the state of construction in each economic-administrative district, and it confronts the party organisation with the need to study more thoroughly the economics of industry and building, to guide efficiently and concretely industrial enterprises and construction projects, to increase their organisational work among the masses.'[9] In fact it has later been flatly ruled that 'The broadening of the rights of union republics and local organs does not mean the weakening of the centralised direction of the economy, but envisages the utilisation in full measure of the levers of state-wide centralised direction, and above all the strengthening, development and further perfecting of the single economic planning . . . Centralised direction of the economy must be effected also through the financial system, state-wide statistics, the planning of material-technical supply of the economy, and through correct organisation of inter-republican deliveries of raw materials, supplies, fuel, equipment, electric power and consumer goods.'[10]

BUT the party officials are not as a profession likely to be given to localism. The party secretary is not, unless by chance, a local man. Transfers between Union Republics seem now much less common than they were. But movement between the administrative units of a single republic, including the autonomous republics and *oblasti*, are still part of the routine of official life. A considerable number of *sovnarkhoz* chairmen seem to be local men in the sense that they have come from some other post in the same area. Yet in general the reorganisation of industrial management has probably worked against strong local attachments. Staff, of all ranks up to that of federal minister and in large numbers, have had to follow their jobs further into the provinces than they wished or expected. In some form this trend has been running for a number of years. Well before the administrative-economic districts were, between December 1956 and February 1957, found to be the answer to the problem posed by the remoteness of the ministries from the affairs which they were supposed to control, there were reports of attempts —some of them successful—to get those departments of the ministries of the Union Republics which were responsible for the more narrowly localised forms of economic activity, and sometimes whole ministries, to move out to them.

[7] *Kommunist*, 1958, 1, p. 60.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Pravda*, 30 March 1957.

[10] *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1957, 7, p. 3.

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But this was a relatively thin end of a very substantial wedge. Though some central bodies expanded at the time of the dissolution of the ministries, they can hardly have saved many of the displaced officials from provincial travel. Although the State Planning Committee has been brought into a new prominence as the central ministry, in so far as one is needed, for all forms of economic activity which have no such ministry of their own, it was claimed in April 1958 that its staff was now 1,000 less than that of the former State Planning Commission and the abolished State Economic Commission combined. It seems probable, however, that during the period of the division of economic planning at federal level between these two bodies, from May 1955 to May 1957, there had been a considerable inflation of staff. It is also probable that the reduction in the federal planning machinery would not look very impressive against the expansion of the RSFSR planning commission, which is also in Moscow, and the two *sovnarkhozy*—one for the *oblast* and, uniquely, one for the city—established there.

At the same time the number of people on the spot with whom authority discusses some part of its business has increased. For the local elections of March 1959 new ranges of size were fixed for soviets at all levels, that for village soviets being raised from 13-35 to 25-50, and others apparently roughly in proportion,[11] so that in spite of the reduction in the number of village soviets the total membership elected has been greatly increased. Some increase in the number of participants in the standing commissions of the village soviets—the consultative bodies and mobilisers of public action for their several functions—who are now said to number some 2½ million persons for the country as a whole, various consultative bodies organised in the factories under the direction of the revivified trade unions, the technical-economic councils attached to the *sovnarkhozy*, and the proposed production-technical councils to be attached to *raion* soviet executive committees as a replacement for the councils of the machine-tractor stations—all these are further manifestations of the wave of talk which in recent months has broken over the Soviet Union, quite apart from the special mass consultation campaigns organised in connection with the reform of the system of industrial management, the dissolution of the machine-tractor stations, and the changes in the educational system. In addition the local soviets have been encouraged, and allegedly with some success, to resume the practice of varying the place of their meetings for the sake of wider publicity.

JUST because of its scale, centralised management, and attempted uniformity, the Soviet Union has particular need of systematic organisation of consultation. Not recognising the private right of organisation for the promotion of sectional interests, the centre cannot rely on the spontaneous reporting of possibly obstructive discontents, inefficiency or malpractice, of available remedies, or of any constructive ideas for change—technical, procedural or personal—which might possibly incur the displeasure of interested persons entrenched in positions of minor or intermediate power. The police may suffice for preventive intelligence, but it is unlikely to stimulate initiative or frankness. Organised discussion on a wide scale may do so and at the same time operate in the other direction, enabling authority to explain its purposes and its present scale of priorities and to educate citizens in approved ways of thinking. By arousing fears of disclosures it may also serve to keep officials on edge and ensure their diligence and loyalty.

In this sense there has been an apparent decentralisation of a sort. Authority seems to have been prepared to look wider for advice on more matters than formerly. A conference of members of the higher local managerial corps—officials of the party, the *sovnarkhozy*, and the executive committees of *oblast* soviets, as well as representatives of technical bodies—was held at Irkutsk in August 1958 under the sponsorship of the State Planning Committee and other organisations in Moscow, to discuss the co-ordination of economic activity in Eastern Siberia. It was declared to have operated on the basis of the previous deliberations of conferences called in the several *oblasti* and equivalent units, and itself to have provided a basis for the provisional assignments included in the draft outline of the

[11] *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1959, 2, p. 9.

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seven-year plan.[12] This provides some sort of ground for the claim that the schemes of specialisation and co-operation, even though assigned from above, are in origin spontaneous. It can, however, be assumed that if the offers from below should be found not to knit up into the required pattern they will be re-knitted at a higher level.

The advice given is by no means always taken. *Pravda* complained in February 1958 that the RSFSR State Planning Commission had taken virtually no action on the criticisms expressed at a conference of heads of planning departments of the *sovnarkhozy*, and other reports in the press give those bodies a record for consultation of the enterprises under their control which is little better.

The official exposition of recent developments suggests a greatly increased reliance on the larger and more purely consultative organs attached to the various units of the management system—the soviets to the executive committees, the technical-economic councils to the *sovnarkhozy*, and the party committees to the bureaux. Even the village soviets have been brought into some prominence of late, although in the present state of the economy they seem to have a rather narrow scope for useful activity and for recruitment. What accounts we have of proceedings—mainly for the high authorities in the system—still present, however, an unimpressive picture of the soviets as decision-taking bodies. Deputies request additional amenities for the areas which they represent, call attention to inadequacies in industrial organisation, to shortages of materials or of trained staff, and bring to public notice the achievements of the enterprises with which they are connected, and at that they leave the matter. There is little to suggest that the party fraction in the soviets and in their executive committees have much trouble with difficult non-party members.

All these bodies remain very large for the work which they do, and indeed the newest, the technical-economic councils of the *sovnarkhozy*, are the largest of all at the local level. The *sovnarkhoz* itself, like the soviet executive committee for the *oblast* over which it presides, has some dozen members, but its consultative body, like the scientific and technical councils of the ministries, may apparently number as many as 500, as against 150 or so for the soviets. Although the technical-economic council is composed with more regard for specialist qualifications than is the soviet, it is no huddle of experts in a back room but, like the other consultative organs, a listening post set up in a public place where, above the hubbub of irrelevant conversation, something of value to the higher management may be heard.

Moreover, the forms of mass consultation attached to such bodies can in respect of size go well beyond the hundreds of the standing commissions of a large soviet. The committees of a general conference called by the Moscow *oblast sovnarkhoz* in the middle of 1958 are stated to have involved 3,500 persons. But such bodies are kept well under control. One of the questions which, according to the principal journal of party practice, the party fraction in a soviet is to fix in advance is who is to be chairman of which standing commission.[13] We may be sure, also, that anything said on such an occasion will be influential only if higher authority so wishes.

Wherever the authorities may choose to place their managerial staff, and whatever demands they may see fit to make on the time of citizens sufficiently responsible to be included in the consultative bodies, there is little reason to doubt that the Soviet Union is still to be one firm, and the element of competition to remain intercontinental rather than inter-regional or between corporate enterprises after the Yugoslav pattern.

[12] *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1958, 11, p. 9.

[13] *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1958, 3, p. 74.

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THE SOVIET CINEMA

I. Decline and Recovery

Zeev ben Shlomo

THE history of Soviet film-making, more than any other branch of Soviet creative art, has been marked by a never-ending struggle: the standard of the Soviet cinema never failed to improve with the relaxation of political and ideological supervision, while its quality rapidly declined—and its quantitative output also—with each intensification of control. The more comprehensively one studies the Soviet cinema and its related literature, the more clearly one can discern the same conflict at the heart of any new development of importance.

In 1952, the number of feature films produced in the Soviet Union had declined to five;[1] that is, slightly more than 1 per cent of the previous year's output in the United States (432 pictures); approximately 2 per cent of the Indian (260) and the Japanese (215) output; 5 per cent of Mexico's (102); and 8 per cent of Egypt's (70). This unparalleled decline, which touched bottom in 1952, had begun six years earlier. During the war years Soviet studios turned out an average of 25 films a year in spite of war-time austerities and the retreat towards the East. But in 1946 output dropped to 20 films, and in 1949 to nine.

In the course of these six years ending with 1952, official Soviet propaganda had no complaints to make about this decline of the film industry:

> In the 1946-1950 five-year plan, the industry set itself a new task . . . to further the struggle in the interests of peace and Socialism. Films must be permeated with "*ideinost*". They must represent the historical sense of the victories achieved, and the pathos of labour in the battle for a new life. Emphasis must be placed primarily on ideological content. . . . The investment of 500 million roubles in cinematograph organisation and financing during the years 1946-50 should provide a much broadened basis for the Soviet motion-picture art.[2]

In spite of this half-a-milliard allocated for its expansion, the industry's output failed to increase in these years prior to the death of Stalin. In fact, it did not even attain the level of the war years but retrogressed steadily until it plumbed the depths in 1952. The strings attached to the aid it enjoyed were evident from the 'Zhdanov' type of film criticism that ruled the period. This began abruptly on 4 September, 1946, when the Central Committee of the CPSU published its remarks 'On the motion-picture *The Great Life*', including the following:

> The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party notes that the motion-picture *Bolshaya Zhizn* (2nd part, Director L. Lukov, author of scenario P. Nilin), prepared by the Ministry of Cinematography, is ideologically and politically vicious and extremely weak from an artistic point of view. . . . The film presents only one episode and an insignificant one at that, in the first stage of the restoration of the Don Basin. . . .

The statement went on to a detailed condemnation of the entire production. Its portrayal of relations between the workers and the state organisations was 'thoroughly false and mistaken'; the Secretary of the Party organisation in a restored mine was shown in a 'deliberately ridiculous position'; workers and engineers were

[1] *Sovetskaya Kultura,* 13 February, 1955. *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* 23 December, 1954. Soviet sources nowadays fail to mention precise production figures for those years. *SSSR Kak On Est* (Moscow, 1959), p. 339, says only that 'in 1957 fifteen times as many films were produced as in 1951'.

[2] *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia,* Volume USSR, 1948, columns 1621-1622.

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shown as 'backward and semi-cultured' people 'of extremely low moral quality', mostly 'loafing, engaged in empty chatter and drinking'.

Other complaints were of 'a heartlessly contemptuous attitude towards young women workers', and that the artistic level was 'beneath all criticism'. . . . Vulgar ballads, amorous adventures and nocturnal chattering in bed were alleged, and condemned as 'sordid devices calculated to appeal to the most diverse tastes, especially those of backward people. . . '

Still worse was to come: the Central Committee of the Party extended its strictures to 'a number of other unsuccessful and faulty films' prepared by the Ministry of Cinematography (under Comrade Bolshakov), naming particularly Eisenstein's *Ivan the Terrible* (part two), Pudovkin's *Admiral Nakhimov*, and *Simple People* of which G. Kozintsev and L. Trauberg were co-directors. Finally the Committee recorded this formidable double-barrelled resolution:

> (1) In view of the above, to prohibit the release for public showing of the second part of the film *Bolshaya Zhizn*.
>
> (2) To propose to the Ministry of Cinematography of the USSR and its Council on Art, that it take note of this decision and draw the appropriate lessons and conclusions . . . and that it so organise the work of artistic cinematography that in future there will be no possibility of the release of similar films.[3]

There was indeed no further possibility. The short-lived revival of the war-time Soviet cinema, stimulated by relaxation of some of the restrictions of the 1930's, expired to the strains of a parrot chorus:

> This film does an injustice to Soviet reality . . . it is accompanied by songs of bad taste stamped with the melancholy of the cabaret. . . .[4]
>
> The Director, Lukov, has introduced scenes permeated with pessimism and melancholy foreign to Soviet citizens. . . .[5]
>
> The film introduces trivial romances and songs stamped with the pessimism and melancholy of the cabaret, foreign to our Soviet public. . . .[6]
>
> The songs of the composer Bogoslovsky introduced into the film are stamped with the melancholy of the cabaret, and their inspiration is foreign to the citizens of the Soviet Union. . . .[7]

Events followed the time-honoured sequence. Meetings were held; resolutions read out; in the succeeding weeks, authors and playwrights committees were convened in every centre of the Union: and finally, in the winter of 1946, a conference of the All-Union Cinema Workers Union was called in Moscow to set its seal on the edict.

This conference indited a letter to Stalin—a procedure then much in vogue at all kinds of professional meetings—and the missive contains almost Dostoevskian passages of self-laceration. It says that the workers in Soviet Cinematography

> are mindful of the attention and concern which the Central Committee of our Party and you personally, Comrade Stalin, have always shown towards our work. We are mindful of the fact that you have always helped and instructed us. This makes it all the harder for us to bear the mistakes we have allowed to occur. . . .
>
> With firm confidence in the correctness of the paths to the further development of Soviet cinematography pointed out to us by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and by you personally, we are re-starting our work in a new way.[8]

This letter was preceded by the order forbidding a film producer or director to represent life 'as he sees it'[9]—a crime of which the standard example was Pavel Nilin's and Lukov's *The Great Life*. Nilin confessed his transgression in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. Pudovkin revised his film *Admiral Nakhimov*

[3] *Partiinaya Zhizn*, 1946, No. 1, p. 69.
[4] *Pravda*, 11 September, 1946.
[5] *Izvestiya*, 13 September, 1946.
[6] *Trud*, 18 September, 1946.
[7] *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 18 September, 1946.
[8] *Iskusstvo Kino*, January, 1947.
[9] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 7 September, 1946, reporting a speech by Nikolai Tikhonov of the Soviet Writers Union.

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to such a degree that a viewer receives the impression that the Russians won the Crimean War.

BUT the best known of all these penitential manifestations is that of Sergei Eisenstein, which has been much quoted in the West. It deserves recall now, however, since its abject conformity to the contemporary self-condemnation, seen in the perspective of thirteen years, rouses a suspicion of ironical absurditity:

> The stern and timely warning of the Central Committee stops us, Soviet artists, from moving further along the dangerous and fatal path which leads towards empty and non-ideological 'art for art's sake', towards creative degeneration. . . . In the second part of *Ivan the Terrible,* we allowed a distortion of historical facts which made the film ideologically worthless and vicious. . . . Must not Ivan the builder hold the centre of attention, Ivan the creator of a new, mighty Russian power, Ivan *the inexorable destroyer of everything opposed to his progressive actions*? . . .
>
> My sense of historical truth betrayed me . . . the Central Committee justly accuse me of distorting historical truth. . . . This charge is entirely just and well-founded. . . . We must master the Lenin-Stalin method of perceiving reality and history so completely and profoundly that we shall be able to overcome all remnants and survivals of former ideas which, though long banished from consciousness, strive stubbornly and cunningly to steal into our works whenever our creative vigilance relaxes for a single moment.
>
> This we guarantee . . . that in the immediate future, our cinematography will again begin to create pictures of high quality, ideologically and artistically worthy of the Stalinist era. . . .[10]

Can we wonder that Dwight Macdonald asked, 'Is all this irony?' and suspected that Eisenstein, carrying the Stalin-Zhdanov line to such extremity, was expressing his own despair and uttering a warning to the outer world? Even the first part of *Ivan the Terrible,* which was not banned, has a sinister neurotic atmosphere, discordant with its superficial political moral. And what can Eisenstein mean by 'former ideas' which, though sternly repressed, 'cunningly steal into our works when our creative vigilance relaxes for a single moment'? What could they be but the artist's vision and energy which . . . persist in shattering the crude, wooden formulæ of socialist realism'?[11]

Now that *Bolshaya Zhizn,* Part II, and the unfinished second part of *Ivan the Terrible* have been released for showing in Russia (though we cannot tell how much of the original versions has been cut or altered) we may be better able to estimate Eisenstein's predicament as an artist. Eisenstein was a loyal disciple of the revolution and at the same time an artist of his age, modern in every sense of the word, and not only in his feeling for pictorial form and cinematic innovations. There was a deep affinity between Eisenstein and James Joyce, whom he had known in London in the 1930's. But for his personal relationship with Joyce and his familiarity with 'decadent' modern art, Eisenstein would never have suggested to Joyce that he might film his *Ulysses*—which, like all Joyce's works, is banned in Russia to this day. That offer is pointedly ignored in all Russian publications on Eisenstein.

The 'microscopic approach' to contemporary themes that distinguished Eisenstein's work (until he gave in and began to turn out historical epics in a style alien to his own genius) was the cinematic parallel to the literature of Joyce and his followers. The 'stream of consciousness' method fascinated Eisenstein, and 'when Karl Radek banned the Russian translation of Joyce in 1934, Eisenstein was deeply angered. He regarded the suppression of Joyce as a thrust at his own theories'.[12] And later, his reaction to the instructions he had to accept

[10] *Kultura I Zhizn,* 20 October, 1946.

[11] Dwight Macdonald, *The Soviet Cinema* (1938). See also Marie Seton's *Sergei M. Eisenstein, a Biography* (London, 1952).

[12] Friedrich Luft, 'Genie und Film', in *Der Monat,* June, 1953, p. 304.

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when forced to bow down to he new Caesar, is visible in his work. He sank something of his disappointment into his interpretation of the paranoiac figure of *Ivan the Terrible,* turning him into an incarnation of despotism, instead of into the image of a beneficent strong ruler required for popularisation of the Stalin régime.

For this reading of Eisenstein's history as a creative genius we have evidence in a fact wholly unknown in the West, and known in the Soviet Union to only a small group of directors —that, to his last day, *he hoped to be able to make a film of the life of Nero.* All that ever came of this fantasy were a few sketches of scenes and costumes and some notes, never published in Russia to the present writer's knowledge. It was V. Kotanian as director, and R. Yurenev—a noted film critic—as scenario writer, in a documentary (which the present writer has seen) on the life and work of Eisenstein from the Central Documentary Film Studio, Moscow, 1958—who dared to recall this unfulfilled desire of the last fifteen tragic and mysterious years of the great director's life.

The results of his 'repentance' were to be seen in the award of a Stalin Prize for a film 'worthy of the Stalinist era', *The Vow (Kliatva),* made by Pavlenko and Chiaureli, which dealt with the famous oath sworn by Stalin at Lenin's funeral. And this brings us to the general consideration of the character of the films produced during the 'frozen' period of six years prior to Stalin's death.

A REPRESENTATIVE example is *The Saga of the Siberian Land.* Though officially regarded as a comedy, this is really a sentimental melodrama of the same pattern as other pictures by the same director Pyrev (*Six o'clock after the War,* etc.). Its main characteristics are those of what may be called the 'socio-realistic melodrama' of the Stalinist era as opposed to Hollywood melodrama. It is much less *kitsch* than a comparable run-of-the-mill Hollywood work; on the other hand, it could give even Hollywood points for the contrivance of unreal and far-fetched coincidences. It exemplifies the ludicrous triumph of 'Zhdanovite puritanism': while it is ostensibly a love story, and love is the prime mover in the plot, hero and heroine are allowed only one kiss—at the top of an unfinished tower which, incidentally, symbolises 'the building-up of socialism'.

The Saga of the Siberian Land enjoyed an enormous success in Soviet Russia and if its artistic quality is dubious, its politico-social message is unmistakable. Completed in 1948, it embodies the cultural policy which came to predominance in the following year and ruled supreme till the death of Stalin.

The melodrama of the plot is naïve; the photography, in agreeably natural colour, is good and so is the acting. It has all the attributes of a perfect escapist film for the average Soviet citizen. On the other hand, it faithfully plugs the party line, especially in its glorification of the theme of Russian colonisation from the Urals to the Pacific. Its positive hero, the pianist Andrey, after losing the use of one hand in the war and losing his lover to a rival —and inferior—pianist, goes off to live in distant Siberia, where he composes an oratorio about The Land. Artistic success thus returns to him and he again finds a purpose in life—to create 'art for the people's sake'. The film ends on a patriotic note in the 'late Stalinist' style, a paean to the glory of the Russian people and the Tsarist conquests. There are theatrical flashbacks to the subjection of Siberia by Yermak, as the finale approaches its climax amid the strains of Andrey's oratorio—which is a mediocre composition, less suited to the atmosphere of the film than the rest of its musical accompaniment. The conquerors arrive at the Far East as the narrator proclaims 'Eastward they journey, ever eastward, to where Greater Russia meets the Great Ocean!'—and the Pacific appears in soft tints of Soviet Technicolor. Such is 'socialist realism' on the screen in the vintage year of 1948.

WITH the year 1949 there came the general distrust of 'cosmopolitanism' and, in the cinema, a total rejection of foreign influences. Favourable revaluation of the achievements of Tsarist Russia, and Russian superiority over the West, became compulsory thematic material

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for the films. At the end of February *Pravda* attacked 'unpatriotic theatre critics'. The *Literaturnaya Gazeta* followed suit against 'inimical critics of the drama who, themselves lacking a fatherland, preach cosmopolitan sermons. . . '. The campaign reached the movie industry a month later with a concerted broadside from all official organs. The signal was given by the Minister of Cinematography, Ivan Bolshakov,[13] who attacked Leonid Trauberg, a capable and experienced director from Leningrad, as 'ringleader of the cosmopolitans in the cinema'. Trauberg, it seems, had said that the Soviet industry 'owed a considerable debt to American, French, and German actors and directors'; he had been 'contaminated by anti-national ideas foreign to the great culture of Russia'. Next, the Minister assailed M. Bleiman the screen writer for having 'grovelled before the bourgeois cinema', and denounced other 'stateless cosmopolitans who had adopted the view that art and literature are a-national', among whom he named the film critics Otten, Volkenstein, Tarbukhin and Saturin.

The xenophobic movement in the cinema was given added impetus by the Deputy Minister of Cinematography, V. Shcherbina, and went to great lengths. Further study of Shcherbina's speeches and articles reveals that the views attributed to Trauberg and Bleiman were in fact shared by a number of artists. Bleiman was the first to complain of the lack of entertainment value in Soviet films; and both he and Trauberg had lent aid to 'the myth' that the Soviet cinema at that time had lost its poetic power and was in decline. Bleiman was singled out for doubting that 'the Soviet film industry is ideologically and artistically the greatest in the world' and for his public appreciation of Charlie Chaplin. As for Trauberg, who, in association with Gregory Kozintsev, had produced the trilogy of films on *The Life of Maxim Gorky* which is still officially regarded as a great achievement—his unforgivable crime was to have supported the anti-Soviet and incorrect idea that David Wark Griffith was 'the father of cinematic art'.

[13] *Pravda,* 4 March, 1949.

IN 1948, Soviet film critics announced the birth of a new breed of motion pictures—the 'documentary feature film'. Western observers tended to regard these works merely as panegyrics to Stalin; and by 1956, in Khrushchev's Russia, most of them were given the new name of 'cult-of-the-individual' films. Such films predominated during the last five years of Stalin's lifetime and set the pace for the film industry as a whole.

The pioneer of the new style, which fathered the generic term for it, was *The Third Attack* (Perventsev and Savchenko), describing the Russian offensive in the Crimea in 1944. The new genre differed from the true documentary. It did not use authentic photographic records of events; historical events were staged and enacted by professional actors upon principles of 'artistic selection' which gave the party bosses a wide field for the 're-writing of history' according to official Soviet views.

The *Battle for Stalingrad*[14] was one of the most important films of this type because of the interest it aroused in the West, and it was technically the best. The scenario was published in book form in 1947 and promptly acclaimed as one of the great literary events of the year.[15] Whether the battle was in fact won—as the film suggests—by Stalin's decision in favour of the strategy of one of his generals and against that of another, is a moot point; N. S. Khrushchev in his 'secret' speech at the 20th Congress made considerable alterations in Virta's account of the battle. However, Virta himself seems to have recovered from the shocks he suffered at the thaw, although his book has been hopelessly discredited.

It must have been difficult for the actor A. Diki, who took the part of Stalin, to live up to Virta's lyrical description: 'He is seen wearing his customary grey tunic, grey trousers stuffed into soft boots. The colour of his hair matches his clothing—not a mere grey, but that noble shade known as steel-grey'. Among the personalities portrayed on the screen are

[14] Directed by V. Petrov; scenario by Nikolai Virta. Mosfilm, 1949.

[15] See A. M. Yegolin, *Thirty Years of Soviet Literature* (Moscow, 1948), p. 29.

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Malenkov, Molotov, Beria, Zhdanov, Voroshilov, and other notables including Khrushchev in only a minor part; Zhukov, who was actually in command at Stalingrad, is conspicuously absent. It is clear enough how politically unsuitable this film would be for presentation today.

As already noted, this film set the tone for Soviet motion pictures for several years. The cinematic legacy it left to its successors was its pompous, monumental approach and its total disregard of the simple man. Statesmen and generals have all the star parts and the common soldier is almost ignored. The crowd scenes, particularly the crossing of the Volga by Rodintsev's division, are contrived with considerable skill, but close-ups of the men behind the guns are almost wholly lacking.

It was in reaction against the previous fear of every foreign influence, and in spontaneous response to the Italian and French films, that some of the younger film directors developed a style that could justly be called 'neo-socialist realist'. Though it was immediately attacked, this has endowed the Soviet cinema with some qualities it never showed during the Zhdanov period. And this ferment subsists, in spite of repressions.

(The second part of this article will be published in a later issue.)

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THE POLISH CINEMA

I. From Convention to Experiment

Z. Broncel

UP to a little over three years ago, Polish films made no contribution to the development of the art of the cinema in Europe; nowadays, there is a 'Polish school' of film and its metaphorical and poetical style receives as high praise as the Italian neo-realistic films of the early post-war years. But from 1949 to 1956, neither European nor American audiences had much knowledge of Polish films.

Now, however, the first screenings of such films as 'Kanal' or 'Ashes and Diamond' take place in leading cinemas of West European capitals. Full-length feature films and short experimental or documentary films have been winning awards on both sides of the political dividing line—in Venice, Cannes, Brussels and San Sebastian, as well as in Moscow and Karlove Vary.

These are nearly all the work of the younger generation, and the interest they arouse is in part political, and in part is simply a natural response to a fresh artistic phenomenon emerging from a country which hitherto had almost nothing to say in this field of art. Any evidence or sign of a return to creative freedom in the socialist states also provokes a rapid response in the West, and thus nearly all Polish films are greeted as an indication that such trends are taking over in intellectual life as a whole. These films are also held to show that the state, which could easily interfere by pressure and censorship, nevertheless permits the expression of ideas which would earlier have been equivalent to political crimes. They reflect an altered attitude towards non-Party members, express the demand for justice, and admit that those groups which are critical of the methods used by the authorities, or those which refuse to accept the Marxist philosophy, do support socialism or at least the rebuilding of their own country. Other films reveal a revised attitude towards the Warsaw insurrection of 1944 in representing as heroes those whom the earlier 'Party line' saw as reactionaries or at least unconscious victims of their reactionary political leaders. Satire has also reappeared, making merciless fun of the police, the administration, the chaos of everyday life, the contrast between promise and reality, the absurdities perpetrated by bureaucrats, the stupidity of dealing with trivial matters as though they were affairs of state.

These close-ups of life under a 'socialist' system, of the communist experiment in a country with an ancient European cultural background, were in strong contrast to Soviet films, which had long since lost the appearance of verisimilitude. What was most striking in the Polish films was precisely their tone of passionate sincerity. Even though this was not invariably complete and at times it was felt that certain matters had been passed over in silence, yet it was clear that there was a real tendency to free and unbiassed utterance.

This newly-aroused passion for the truth, this desire to get at the facts and to rub off the prettifications of reality, influenced the formal aspect of the films. Their realism was of a totally fresh character; frigid observation was replaced by a documentary excitement stimulated by the urge to cleanse social themes from falsity. Sincerity amounting to brutality, directness in reaching the facts and real causes became a political and artistic programme for a wide circle of intellectuals. Of course there was some opposition, though this lacked talent and could not hope for any response from the public as a whole. And because the older, official machinery for film production, run on the Soviet model, was tottering, several film producers were able to make their declarations before external circumstances and Party interference checked the current. In this way, the drama of post-war Europe found an unexpected voice in the Polish film.

AMONG shorter films, a series of documentaries was made which came to be called the 'dark series'—a name reminiscent of the term 'dark literature.' These dealt with a

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number of social ills allegedly already abolished in socialist countries, such as prostitution, hooliganism, the poverty of the old, rural ignorance, the shortcomings of reforms carried out in the medical services and education.

Terse experimental films adopted methods of contemporary poetic expression. They presented situations full of allusions, made use of abstraction, and invented episodes which, however, gave precise illustration to a specific viewpoint, or created certain well-defined moods. What appeared to be nonsense would suddenly illuminate definite problems, as do the works of Kafka and Dürenmatt. Whereas the documentary film showed the truth by means of ruthless realism, the poetic film revealed it by metaphors which encompassed the whole image. Accents of cruelty appeared in feature films, sometimes reminiscent of the Japanese film. That a love scene in 'Kanal' was played by people besmeared with excrement flowing in a city's sewers does not indicate any natural tendency to make powerful and sensational effects nor the acceptance of brutality, but is simply the reproduction of an actual situation: during the Warsaw insurrection, love was linked with death, and the triumph of human emotions with national defeat.

The impact on Western audiences and critics was powerful; rarely had films been so closely and intricately mingled with life itself. Their artistic genesis in bitterness and failure, in the consciousness of injustice and injured national pride, of error and crime, gave them a new and remarkable intensity.

There were other changes too. Personal matters had long been thrust into the background, lyricism despised. The reaction to this was an extreme individualisation, humanisation of the films made in 1957 and 1958, i.e., until film-making was once again made subordinate to the general Party line. During those years, a simple love scene or even a friendly conversation between a man and woman was brought to the screen as some forgotten treasure that had been unearthed; Hollywood's most hackneyed subject had a touch of the avantgarde. Feelings and themes which European films had long since rendered conventional took on a dramatic freshness.

BEFORE 1939, Polish films were of no artistic importance. They were hampered by the demands of the market, consisting in the main of small provincial towns and provincial audiences, and by inadequate financial means. After World War II, the Polish cinema found a patron in the State and, up to 1948, had not been reduced to the monotony prevailing in countries with a single party in power.

The difficulties were different from those of the pre-war period. Everything had to be improvised. Technical equipment was lacking, there was even a shortage of actors as a result of Nazi massacres of Polish intellectuals. Producers had to be found among pre-war personnel, accustomed to turning out routine work and to compromise.

In 1948, Mme. Jakubowska's 'The Last Stage' and Ford's 'Graniczna street' appeared. Both won international awards, and stirred up sympathy for Poland as the country which had suffered most during the war. The first screening of 'The Last Stage' in Paris was an event, mainly because the theme was familiar to all those nations which had undergone German occupation (it was less well-known to British audiences). Although the Oswiecim concentration camp was on Polish territory, its inmates came from many countries. It is perhaps understandable that characters in such a film should become symbols of different kinds of human fate and different moral attitudes, and though relevant to all mankind, the film lacked individualisation and any deep psychological insight. It was more of a guidebook to Hell than an attempt to reach the consciousness of people cast into that Hell. With this reservation, 'The Last Stage' came nearest of all films to the actual atmosphere of concentration camps, though it failed to convey the everyday awareness of danger. It was criticised as brutal, although its treatment of the facts was controlled by the desire to spare the sensibilities of the audience.

'Graniczna Street' dealt with the Warsaw Ghetto and the suicidal Jewish uprising against the Germans: it contained a number of power-

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ful scenes, in particular a sequence showing the houses of the entire Jewish sector on fire. This, too, was more of a document than an original work of art.

The following year, 1949, marked the appearance of J. Zarzycki's 'Warsaw, the Unconquered City.' This was the third version of a film revised several times on the instructions of the official agency which financed the production. Its starting-point is interesting. Warsaw, at one time a city of a million inhabitants, is here the background of a struggle for survival by the most contemporary of all Robinson Crusoes. An elderly man holds on alone in the stony desert, after the collapse of the insurrection and the deportation of the population by the Germans. He is lost in a no-man's-land between two huge armies. Because the insurrection was still very much alive in people's minds, and the shots of the shattered city reminded audiences that the capital might have been saved had Russian help been forthcoming, the film was bound to be painful and unseasonable.

Later, Polish films disappeared from cinemas throughout the world as suddenly as they had appeared. A few comedies, possessing a certain unpretentious humour and little moralising, were attacked for dealing with matters of secondary importance, even though 'The Treasure,' for instance, concerned itself with the adventures of a young couple in the hopeless search for even half of a room to live in. The possibilities inherent in films were choked by propaganda and by the crude division of characters into 'good' and 'bad', with the formula of the cowboy film used to tell the story of a strike or portray the fate of the unemployed.

It was not easy for film-makers to escape a schematic basis constructed of the following elements: a positive hero, usually a Party member, a wooden figure of an irreproachable and puritanical communist who 'neither eats nor drinks, but lives only for the Party', secondly, the theme of imperialist conspiracy, of sabotage or hostile activity by the political underground, paralleled by the productivity theme, showing industrial successes, all of it coloured by an unjustified optimism, filmed—as was said in Poland—'alongside reality,' but avoiding any truthful representation of it. In a word, this was merely the repetition of the Soviet recipe.

Nevertheless, Polish films preserved many individual traits, such as a concern for expressiveness, for obtaining the most interesting composition possible within the framework of the screen, and an interpretation of roles that saved them from the hackneyed by means of a certain eccentricity. Sometimes, the skilful choice of subject would permit a producer to get away from tedious banality, as in Aleksander Ford's 'Youth of Chopin,' though even here it is easy enough to find similarities to the huge Soviet historical panoramas.

Ford's next film, 'The Five from Barska Street,' was a collection of implausibilities. It is the remarkably ridiculous story of a conspiracy by local reactionaries to blow up the main street in Warsaw during its ceremonial opening, which would have resulted in thousands of victims. Yet even here there were vivid characterisations of young people which foreshadowed Wajda's later film, 'The Generation.' There is also an evident change in the attitude towards the 1944 insurrection. It was not totally condemned. The time had come for an indirect reappraisal: the young people who took part were noble and fought valiantly for patriotic reasons, but were deceived by the Fascist leaders to whom the real enemy was the Red Army, not the Germans. The film was an attempt to win over young people from the influence of underground organisations, a struggle for the soul of the younger generation fought between a communist foreman and the demoniac leader of an underground diversionary group.

'The Five from Barska Street' unexpectedly met with much favourable comment at the Edinburgh Festival. The reason was simple enough: a number of details were altered in the English sub-titles and the dialogue was touched up. No mention was made of the fact that the likeable and competent workman who looked after the young people was a communist, and the translation of the dialogue altered the emphasis on diversionary activities

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and in particular on the foreign funds (in dollars) for counter-revolutionary activities.

IN September 1954, a suggestion was made at a meeting of the actors' professional organisation for reorganising film production, replacing the central leadership by separate and independent companies which, once they had been granted funds, would take full responsibility for their films. Voices were heard at this conference criticising the naivety and flatness of Polish films. T. Konwicki, the author of a 'correct' novel entitled *The Authority*, who was later to make a complete about-face —in the way typical of the Polish communists— and to write and produce the avantgarde 'Last Day of Summer,' said at that time that 'even a film about ghosts can be of service to People's Poland'. Scibor-Rylski, best known for a novel about productivity methods, who took socialist realism so seriously that he worked in a coalmine to obtain material (only to realise that there could be no question of writing about what he had really seen there), demanded 'full-blooded' art, with no improvements for the benefit of the timid.' After October 1956, he wrote a startling short story on the methods used by the political police in Poland in carrying out their investigations.

It was not until 1956 that the recommendations of this conference were put into practice. Companies were formed, consisting mainly of a script-writer, producer, cameraman and scene designer, and each company had an artistic individuality of its own. The best-known was the 'Kadr' company, with J. Stawinski, a popular novelist, as scenario-writer, and Andrzej Wajda as producer.

The first film produced by a separate company was 'The Shadow' (producer J. Kawalerowicz, scenario Scibor-Rylski, photography Lipman), made in 1956 and later shown at the Edinburgh Festival. It presaged the rebirth of creative film work.

Essentially, 'The Shadow' was a breakaway from the schematic use hitherto made of spying and sabotage. Previously, an 'exciting' film could only be used for political attack; a spy or agent always came from the same side, and was wretched, foolish, and easily trapped. Even the most talented film director found it difficult to make anything exciting or mysterious of this formula. But Kawalerowicz created something not like a latter-day Dr. Mabuse; his reaction against the banality and obviousness of Polish 'thrillers' produced a figure so mysterious and isolated from the political background that it became unreal. Here everything is make-believe, but make-believe that is interesting. Outside Poland, this film may appear unimportant, but in the conditions prevailing there, the rejection of even one formula opened the way to further change.

Kawalerowicz's next film, 'The Real End of the Great War' (1957), is based on a tale by Jerzy Zawieyski, a Catholic author who was unable to publish his work before October 1956, and who later became a Member of the State Council. The film deals with a woman trying to rebuild her private life after the upheavals of the war, whose husband unexpectedly returns from a concentration camp in a state bordering on insanity. Anything he associates with the whirling dance with which he was forced to divert the SS-men brings on a paroxysm which ends in loss of consciousness and a relapse into insanity. The film is average enough in its representation of Warsaw being rebuilt and in the movement of the story, but it has memorable scenes of the recurring vision of the concentration camp; the use of the 'subjective camera' is not unlike the device used later in the well-known Soviet film 'The Cranes are Flying.'

IN May 1957, Andrzej Wajda's film 'Kanal' gained the jury's special award at Cannes, and from then on Wajda became a name symbolising the 'Polish school', with an internationally recognised existence and individuality of its own.

Wajda's triumph had been prepared for abroad by his earlier film 'The Generation' (1954), which had revealed the producer's originality and indicated the central theme of his later work. It was based on a story by Bohdan Czeszko, a talented young writer, who used the propaganda formula of socialist realism and presented two groups of the underground resistance movement: the Home Army,

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linked with the Polish Government in London and with the historical traditions of the Polish State, and the People's Army, linked with communist organisations and the extreme left. The relative power and importance of the two groups is tilted in favour of the left-wing, and people sympathising with the Home Army are shown as being on the verge of collaborating with the Germans. The Home Army attracts the wealthy bourgeois, ex-officers, the ruling circles, while the poor and the workers go to the People's Army. The People's Army was in fact a small group, bewildered by the varying tactics of the Soviet Union. German-Soviet collaboration at the beginning of the war had shattered confidence in the few 'People's Units.'

The bias of this film was therefore political and left-wing, but the reality shone through the conventionalised situations. The hero, a young man seeking any kind of job and any kind of moral support during the hopeless period of German occupation and terrorism, involuntarily became a mirror for patriotic feelings. The political and class features grafted on to his character proved false, for psychologically the youth was driven by the desire for revenge on those who persecuted him. In one way, Wajda's film expressed the inveterate hostility between the right-wing patriotic camp and the communists; in another, it gave a psychologically true portrait of the younger generation which had grown up during the war. For the first time, too, it created a convincing portrait of a young communist woman who believes in the justice of her cause and carries out her duties as organiser of a resistance group with calm and simple heroism. The true mood of this period, when not doctrine but the struggle for bread and revenge brought people closest together, gained the upper hand over political theories. 'The Generation' struck a new note: it infused the conspiratorial past, often so difficult, bitter, and dangerous, with lyricism and the recollected emotions of youth. Throughout the film we are aware of allusions, only to be discovered by a silent understanding between the producer and his audience, that in those years, marked by a blow in the face from Germans and the death by shooting of one's friends, there was something extraordinarily pure in comparison with what was to happen later. Death made all equal—Home Army soldiers and communists; we cannot tell whether, had she survived, the communist messenger-girl who gave her life for her ideals, for her own vision of Poland, would not have become one of those who sent her fellow-countrymen to death on false charges.

FORMALLY, there is only a short step between 'The Generation' and the better-known 'Kanal,' made in 1957, which was suddenly to remind Europe of the drama of the Warsaw insurrection. 'Kanal' gained many awards: it was the first Polish film to reach the cinemas of London, Paris, and Rome. It was based on a story by J. Stawinski, which attracted attention as soon as it was published in the literary monthly *Tworczosc*, in March 1956. This was a new version of the insurrection theme, giving the truth, at least in part, about its political and moral setting. Yet even before Wajda's film appeared, its interpretation of Stawinski's story was outdated, since it was already possible to tell more of the truth. Previously the mere fact of having taken part in the insurrection, if it did not mean a free ticket into Siberia, closed all opportunities for advancement. But in 1956 All Souls Day in the Warsaw cemetery became a national demonstration in honour of the young soldiers who died during the insurrection. 'Kanal,' as a story about insurgents and civilians finding their way through the city's sewers from Mokotow, a suburb on the outskirts, to the centre of Warsaw which was still in insurgent hands, proved an inadequate rehabilitation of this extraordinary battle. The Polish public expected the glorification of the capital's resistance to the Germans in 1944, while Wajda followed Stawinski and gave only the drama of the fight itself, starting with faith in victory and dying away in the realisation that the soldiers had been deserted and betrayed.

'Kanal' was not, nor was it intended to be, a documentary account of this battle which, as time passed, was to be increasingly decisive

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in the spiritual development of an entire generation of young Poles. 'Kanal' was a vision, a personal conception of the drama, an attempt to synthesise it. Wajda's synthesis consisted primarily of elements of defeat, showing soldiers smeared with excrement, blinded by darkness, and drowning in stinking mud, reduced to the level of wild animals at bay. The film resounds with hymns for the dead. But the insurrection, which brought to an end an entire period of Polish political thought, was a monument of heroism, a revelation of the supreme national and human values. There is nothing of this in 'Kanal,' nor any mention of what everyone was talking about at that time —the chances of assistance from the Soviet army on the far side of the Vistula, on the outskirts of the fighting and burning city.

This silence is both negative and positive. It reflects and defines the whole situation of Poland during the period when 'Kanal' was being made. Previously, feature films dealing with the Polish underground movement had included—with unconscious irony—the traditional 'happy ending,' with shots of Red Army units entering the ruined capital, the sound of the triumphantly resounding artillery fire from the far side of the Vistula, renewed after the collapse of the insurrection. Wajda's picture omits this aspect of the insurrection entirely. His are sins by omission, not by deliberate falsification. 'Kanal' is a controlled and calm picture of danger. It is restrained in its representation of suffering and joy, cruelty and sacrifice, struggle and death. Horror is accepted as a natural component part of an everyday picture of the insurrection, and is the more telling for this.

As in all Wajda's films, the political drama is overshadowed by the drama of the war-time generation. These young people are all certain of soon finding themselves 'six feet underground' and despise death from the very threshold of their lives. The hypnotic effect of fighting, the desire for revenge, stifles other emotions, drowns even any questioning as to the meaning behind this additional Polish hecatomb. The rhythm of the film corresponds to this peculiar attitude of 'cynical resignation'; with the calm of total despair it moves smoothly from episode to episode; there are no dramatic effects—the facts themselves are sufficiently expressive. There are no close-ups or contrasted shots, no building up of tension by means of dramatic montage. The secret of Wajda's work lies in associating an illusion of truth, caught as it flies, with moments of vision poetically expressed, as in the scene of the soldier dying at the iron grating which bars the way out of the sewer; the girl who loves him assures this blinded man that there are no bars and that beyond the turn in the passage lies freedom.

The dramatic individuality of this film comes from something more than the artistry of its producer. It is after all a document of Hell created by a man whom Hell no longer surprises. He is not surprised even by an urchin guarding the last barricade and pulling on his shoes as he awaits the approach of a German tank.

'Kanal' was much criticised in Poland and disliked by a section of the audiences. Greater attention was paid to it only after its success abroad, where its artistic qualities were more easily perceived because of the jury's lack of understanding of the subtleties of Polish political and moral attitudes. For Wajda not only indicates the hopelessness of the situation, but also attacks the men and women taking part in the insurrection. A leader who has not ensured his lines of communication has not carried out his duties properly. The return into the mouth of the sewers is no more than an empty and heroic gesture, a useless act of sacrifice and redemption. It is, after all, too late: the soldiers lost in the maze of sewers have died through lack of air and exhaustion. The chief woman's part in the film, that of the messenger-girl known by the pseudonym 'Stokrotka,' also proves to be a negative figure when subjected to close analysis: she puts the protection of her lover above her duties towards the unit as a whole. Consequently, what was a step forward in relation to the insurrection as a whole, was widely regarded by Polish audiences as a new and more subtle form of slander on the heroic fight of the soldiers and citizens for a position lost by politicians before the fight had even begun. In this respect,

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Wajda here continues the line of 'The Generation,' though much more delicately: behind the script of this film is an attack on Polish intellectuals. The leaders of the insurrection come from this group, and they bear the responsibility for enrolling volunteers condemned in advance to destruction.

A YEAR later, Wajda made his best film, which is a version of a celebrated novel of the post-war years, Andrzejewski's *Ashes and Diamond*. This is the story of two people brought together in the chaos of post-war Poland, torn by inner dissension. The underground movement which became active after the collapse of the insurrection, is carrying out attacks on the communist leaders and representatives of the new authorities, seeing them primarily as agents of a foreign state enforcing a new social system and a new political role upon Poland. The underground has forgotten that the social revolution claims the loyalty of large sections of Polish left-wing opinion, while those who represent the revolution forget that not all the opposition is hoping for the return of the earlier system, or for Western intervention, and that the fight for democracy is not equivalent to defence of the past. The film simplifies the conflict—which was also simplified by the Poles themselves—by dramatising the internal dissensions of the country in the person of two characters—young Maciek, who stayed in the underground after the insurrection, and the old communist fighter, now secretary of the local Party organisation.

The latter dies at the hands of the young conspirator, who acts from patriotic motives and blindly carries out the orders of his fanatical superiors. Maciek in turn dies from the bullets of a military patrol as he needlessly flees from soldiers who do not suspect him. Both perish as victims of misunderstanding, of absurdity and accident, and thus become symbols of the situation in which the nation as a whole was involved. Just before dying, the Party secretary is painfully disillusioned when he learns that his own son has been arrested by Security Police during the liquidation of a partisan unit of the patriotic conspiracy. Maciek on the other hand has experienced a short-lived and passionate love-affair: the attack he planned was to have been his last, for he dreamed of returning to a normal life and leaving the conspiracy. Instead, he dies on a rubbish-heap, shot down like an animal, amidst cast-off rags, heaps of refuse and waste-paper. The allusion here to the rubbish-heap of history is clear, just as the shots of fireworks exploding in the sky, meant to provide evidence of general rejoicing while people die in a fratricidal fight, are ironic. The prologue to life in the new Poland is provided by political murders.

'Ashes and Diamond' includes many powerful scenes, inconceivable in earlier Polish films. There is for instance an interrogation scene, during which an officer of the political police strikes an ex-soldier of the Home Army across the face: there is a love episode, reminiscent of similar scenes in the well-known French production 'Les Amants.' The film ends with a half tragic and half grotesque polonaise, danced by tipsy guests at a banquet which has lasted till dawn, given in celebration of the victory over the Germans. The orchestra has forgotten the solemn melody of Oginski's polonaise, prohibited during the occupation, and plays wrong notes: the tipsy guests take wrong steps. Nevertheless, they go on dancing as if under a spell, full of the conviction that they are doing something essentially Polish. A newly-appointed Minister takes part in this nightmare of a dance along with members of the old aristocracy who are preparing to escape abroad: there is a careerist, seeking what advantage he can from swiftly changing his beliefs: there is a genuine communist: and a girl who has just said goodbye to her lover as he goes off to commit a murder, and a woman who refuses to let a father see his son, since the father has just returned from Moscow. These contrasts would never have occurred in a sober state, but alcohol has released hidden emotions, the national tune unites them all, and, beyond the threat of the present, there arises a sort of intangible dreamy Polish-ness common to them all.

Wajda's film provoked a violent reaction in Poland. Many saw it as a slander on the Home Army and the heroic young people who fought

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in it and were morally set on the wrong track by tragic political developments. On the other hand, the complaint was made that the communist leader was not convincing, that he was not backed up by anyone, that no one helped him in his isolation. Despite his sincere gestures he gives the impression of a stranger from some foreign world. How could people like this attempt to rule a country? Short scenes introduced into the action and showing Russian tanks moving along a street and the march-past of Polish units formed in Russia from Poles deported in 1940 and 1941 provide an indirect but sufficiently expressive answer.

At first sight, it looks as though both heroes of Wajda's film are victims of historical necessity; neither is in a position to turn back from the road he has chosen, nor can his personal good intentions stop the storm which has broken out. Historically, both deaths are unnecessary and even ridiculous, since both are men who might have come to an understanding with each other. Maciek shudders to think of going on with underground activities, while the communist Szczuka explains to his comrades that what is needed is the ability to convince others, and that it is better not to become an expert in the 'exercise of authority.'

But the anonymity of history is easily penetrated; the tragedy was simply the outcome of refusing to give aid to Warsaw, of the arrest of those who led the Polish democratic underground movement and were lured to Moscow for talks, of the undermining of any belief in the sincerity and integrity of Soviet policy towards genuinely democratic Poland. These were the most important reasons why the conspiracies continued and why the attacks took place. The film simplifies this painful conflict into mere resistance to radical social change. But the real fight was not between the Radicals and the feudal Conservatives; it was between a democratic and a totalitarian idea of social reconstruction. Apart from this unconvincing transfer of the ideological conflict to a field of secondary importance, the film was made with excitement, with verve, and with skill. Most striking is the concentration on the problems of the young post-war generation, which makes 'Ashes and Diamond' thematically a continuation of Wajda's two earlier works. Although this is a historical film, Maciek and the girl wear contemporary clothes; the rejection of 'dressing-up' is clear and deliberate, so that in the final analysis Wajda's film brings out the enduring element in the conflicts which took place in Poland fourteen years ago. In a way, little has changed: although Maciek and Szczuka died, both figures survive as typical of Polish life.

(This article will be concluded in a subsequent issue.)

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Reflections of a Sociologist

THE PROSPECTS FOR INTELLECTUALS

Edward A. Shils

THE modern outlook—active, critical curiosity, openness to experience, disciplined inquiry and analysis, reasoned judgment and the appreciation of originality—has now made its appearance among the modern intellectuals of all countries. It grew up with the development of modern European civilisation. From Europe, it has spread in nearly every direction —into Russia, into the Americas, to Africa, to South Asia and around Asia to all the countries of South-east Asia, and to China and Japan.

The modern outlook grew up under special European conditions. A stable but loosening Christian conception of the world was one; another was an approximate unity of the intellectual classes within each national society given by their common association with Church and State, and by sharing in a cultural tradition formed around a classical humanism in a Christian re-interpretation. Still another condition was the high status of intellectual activity, enhanced by its association with Church and State and the auxiliary and interconnected institutions of universities, aristocracy, gentry, and landownership.

Modern intellectual life was born in the polity of absolutism, in societies which were markedly hierarchical in structure. Most were peasant societies, feudal or bureaucratic in their government. It thrived in these as it did in mercantile patrician republics and in constitutional monarchies. In its early centuries it was the achievement mainly of amateurs. It was a passion, a hobby, an avocation for most of the great creators of modern intellectual traditions. It was not a profession, and there was relatively little institutional provision for creative intellectual exertion.

The new conditions in which modern intellectual work must be carried on arise from changes within the pattern of intellectual life itself, and from changes in its political, economic, organisational, and cultural environment. Some of these changes have taken place within the societies in which intellectual life has already reached a high level of creativity. Others arise in the course of its extension into areas of the world to which it is new, in which it has not emerged from the internal evolution of indigenous intellectual traditions.

WITHIN the continuous flow of the tradition of modern intellectual activity, there has been a pronounced expansion of scientific research and humanistic scholarship which grow through systematic accumulation and articulation. A larger proportion of a tremendously enlarged intellectual class is now engaged in these forms of intellectual production which require a deliberate and specific articulation of the task at hand with what has just preceded. The point has long since been passed when a single person in the course of his lifetime could know the best works of the past and present in every field. We are already at the point where the individual can scarcely read all that is relevant to his field of interest within his own discipline. If he also wishes at the same time to maintain contact with the highest points of intellectual production of the past as well, he must be very selective. These necessities restrict the range of the intellectual's attention, narrow his interests, and loosen his attachment to the larger intellectual community and its traditions. Only the arts and literature have retained the loose unity they always possessed.

IN the pluralistic countries of the West, as in the most advanced totalitarian countries, the traditional patterns of intellectual life and the modern intellectual outlook confront a disproportionate growth of the technological sector of the intellectual classes. These technological intellectuals are character-

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ised by highly specialised training and professional activities, and a very attenuated reception of the available traditions of humanistic and scientific thought. In advanced pluralistic as well as totalitarian societies, the organisation of intellectual life has also been changing, not as a result of ideological considerations which are important forces in their own right in all totalitarian countries, but because of the increased military and industrial importance of science, new techniques of enquiry, and the emergence of new forms of financial support.

In the advanced societies, furthermore, the tradition of intellectual life coexists alongside of what is called 'mass' culture, a vast body of mediocre and brutal culture of a type which has always existed but which is now greater in volume and immensely more visible and audible, as a result of the development of films, radio, and television, than it ever was in the past. This phenomenon of 'mass culture' is more pronounced in the advanced pluralistic countries of the West and in Japan where the level of economic development and the political regime allow it an ampler and freer expression. In the more advanced totalitarian countries, and in the most urbanised sectors of the under-developed countries, the same sort of mass culture is stirring. But because of their relative poverty, and the centralised control of the culture of the totalitarian countries, mass culture carries on an existence which is more muted in the former and more harried in the latter.

IN all modern and modernising societies, intellectual activity has acquired a practical importance which it did not possess in earlier centuries in the West. In all countries, advanced and under-developed, which seek to live at the height of modernity, intellectuals have had thrust upon them tasks and responsibilities which they have been unable to refuse. The state, the economy, and society have needed them and will continue to need them even more in the future. Where these powers could not obtain the co-operation of all of the older generation, which might have held back because of their dislike for the particular form of the modernising regime, or the distastefulness of such activities as have come to be required of them, or where the existing corps of intellectuals were insufficient in number, new strata of intellectuals have been created to perform the desired functions.

A modern state needs an elaborate system of higher education to create these new 'functional' intellectuals—civil servants, applied scientists, engineers, accountants, educators—that whole range of the professional middle class occupations which are integral to a modern economy, indispensable to a modern military establishment, and essential to the functioning of state and society.

In the advanced societies, institutions for the production of intellectual personnel already exist. There, the problem has been the adaptation of the institutions to the production of larger numbers and of new kinds of specialists. In the under-developed countries, the institutions through which these intellectuals are to be produced must either be created or built up from a very rudimentary state. There, even more than in the more advanced countries, the recruitment of teaching staffs sufficiently in contact with the great intellectual traditions which nourish their subjects is a major problem.

The supply of highly endowed and qualified persons is bound to be relatively small in any society, and the world-wide increase in demand accentuates the difficulty. The lowering of the standards of staff recruitment, as well as the standards of admission and graduation of students, is a constant threat.

In under-developed countries, the older generation of the trained modern intellectuals is bound to be very small. The extension of the range of recruitment means that new strata, who have had little contact, prior to their formal training, with the modern intellectual tradition, are now drawn into the corps of intellectuals. In the more advanced countries, which have already a large intellectual class, its further extension means that lower average capacity must necessarily be drawn upon.

Everywhere, by decree and by financial assistance, the state presses for this numerical extention in the output of persons with the required qualifications. Large numbers and 'forced marches' are repugnant to the effective trans-

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mission of the traditions of intellectual life, which is brought about through identification with a closely observed and experienced model, and by an intimate experience of creative intellectual work. The creative impulsion of intellectual life, passed on by an osmotic process in a personal relationship between teacher and pupil, between master and apprentice, is antithetical to this pressure of numbers which overwhelm such personal relationships.

The high degree of specialisation which is demanded in the practice of these professions, and the repercussions of this demand on the courses of study, exercise a similar influence. Receptivity to intellectual traditions depends on a prior intimacy, such as is communicated in the atmosphere of an educated family, on personal qualities of sensibility and curiosity, and on the breadth of the formal training received. The extension in numbers and in the social range of recruitment places a heavier burden on the breadth of formal training, and where it is compressed and specialised, as national necessity and the internal development of many subjects require, the result is a specialist whose outlook is not embraced in a broader matrix of feeling for the imponderable elements of the modern intellectual tradition.

The proportion of the educated classes with a general cultural blindness is increasing in all countries. In England, the prestige of Oxford and Cambridge, and the aristocratic-gentry ideal of the cultured gentleman, offset this to some extent. In France the humanistic component in educated public opinion, as well as the stiffly classical element in the syllabus of the secondary schools, also tend to offset to some extent this tendency towards a 'deeper illiteracy' among the technological intelligentsia. None the less the movement goes on, and will probably become even more marked in most under-developed countries, totalitarian and pluralistic, than in those which already have a considerable intelligentsia firmly attached to intellectual traditions.

ALONGSIDE this practical need for intellectuals, the elites of totalitarian states believe they must intervene in the process of the formation of intellectuals and in their subsequent productive activities in order to affirm their political ideology. This often involves intrusion into the heart of the process of intellectual production as well, or at least as close to its heart as an intellectually uncreative and external authority can ever come. Communist totalitarianism, perhaps even more comprehensively than National Socialist totalitarianism, because of the greater elaborateness of its doctrine, has attempted to dominate intellectual activity to make the results correspond with its ideology. It has not just been a matter of assuring that intellectuals observe their civil obligations and avoid subversive actions and proposals, or that they produce works which will be useful to the state. It has rather been an effort to make intellectuals create in such a way that what they create will exemplify and affirm the ruling ideology.

To achieve this end, totalitarian elites have established a comprehensive system of control. They have attempted to organise intellectual life far beyond what is required either by the inner nature of intellectual activity or by the functional tasks which the state, the economy, and society place before it. In many fields, this political machinery prescribes a degree of uniformity which is incompatible with the indeterminateness inherent in any creative undertaking. Through the control of appointments and promotions, of funds, of publishing and distributive facilities, totalitarian elites have tried to pre-determine the content of the output of their intellectuals, particularly in those spheres which touch most closely on the sacred ideology or on politically sensitive questions.

This has frequently entailed the intrusion of standards which are inherently foreign to the creative elaboration of intellectual traditions. In pluratistic societies, both advanced and under-developed, intellectual achievements are judged preponderantly by intellectual standards, which also, in the main, determine promotions and appointments—although occasionally political, religious, communal, and personal considerations do count. In totalitarian societies, the political elite tries to impose its own standards on certain sections of the intellectual community, but it is by no means always successful.

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This imposition can be carried out—to the extent that it is carried out—only through the creation of a bureaucracy to supervise intellectual work and to check on its conformity with official expectations. Naturally, this bureaucracy attracts, on the whole, persons who have little sense of what is involved in intellectual creation.[1] This reduces their capacity to supervise effectively—which is in any case an impossible task—and generates a certain degree of tension between those creative intellectuals who are loyal to the regime and their supervisors.

THE functional utility of intellectually qualified persons in modern and modernising societies has bound much of modern intellectual life to an organisational machine, largely because of the dependence of intellectual institutions and even individual, uninstitutionalised intellectual activity, on the financial support of the state.

There has been an immense increase in such expenditure in the budgets of practically all modern and modernising states. Universities in nearly all countries are now dependent on their Governments for financial support. In England, where the two older universities were almost entirely self-supporting financially forty years ago, and where the modern universities received only a fraction of their funds from the state, the situation has changed profoundly. In the United States, the improved position of the State universities and the increased share of Federal funds in the budget of the great private universities, is accompanied, as it is in England, by a comparable increase in the volume of scientific research by the civilian and military branches of the government. Parallel developments may be seen in all other countries, such as India, Japan, Soviet Russia, which operate modern university systems, and which seek to accelerate scientific and technological research.

The fiscal policies of modern states have contributed to the destruction of the classical type of Maecenas; in India the Maharajahs no longer perform the functions of patronage which was one of their redeeming features. In England, death duties have eroded the great fortunes. Only in the United States does private patronage still occupy a prominent position in the support of intellectual work. There, an older form of patronage, the foundation, has been adapted to modern intellectual life. It has been organised, freed of the element of personal clientage which was present in the classical patron-client relationship, and extended into every sphere of intellectual creation.

Changes in the nature of scientific research in many fields have promoted organisation. The large scale of many contemporary scientific and scholarly enquiries has enforced the need for collaboration and administration in spheres where they were practically absent in earlier centuries of the modern age.[2] This change in modes of intellectual procedure has in its turn added to the financial dependence of intellectual work on extra-intellectual institutions. Not only do more research projects now require larger staffs than were conventionally required in the 19th century, but scientific research has become prodigiously more expensive simply because it requires vastly more complicated apparatus. The scientist and scholar cannot now, as easily as he did a century or a half-century ago, decide to follow a certain line of interest and then set about it forthwith, without consulting anyone else or seeking financial aid. Now he must apply for a grant from a government department, an academy, a foundation or his own university, which must itself then turn to the government or a foundation. This process is most advanced in the United States, but it has also made great strides in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, and India. For these same reasons, and additional reasons as well, it is perhaps more pervasive and dominant in the Soviet Union.

[1] The censors of intellectual works have always been mean spirited idiots or unlettered boors. They seem little different in the Soviet Union and other totalitarian countries.

[2] Not that there were no large scale 'projects' before the present century. The great encyclopedias were works of immense collaborative effort; the monumental undertakings in the publication of historical and literary source materials entailed a great deal of collaboration over long periods of time. Nonetheless, the intellectual administrative bureaucracies of past times seem to have been smaller, looser, and less specialised than their contemporary counterparts.

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These changes have given rise to a large bureaucracy which now administers the financing and conduct of intellectual life. By its nature, it exercises a considerable influence on the choice of problems and even of persons, on the procedures of and approaches to intellectual work, even where the officials consciously try to divest themselves of any power over the content of what is done. It is therefore something of a restriction on the autonomy of intellectual activity. It presents a constant possibility of becoming a real danger, which, if not as great in pluralistic societies, where the bureaucracy tries to avoid introducing explicit political considerations, as it is in the totalitarian countries, remains none the less an always open opportunity for the introduction of an extra-intellectual component into intellectual decisions.

The private scholar and the independent author, independent of the control of writers' unions, and with free access to a variety of separate publishers, still exists in Western countries and in the pluralistic states of Asia and Africa. In the former, greater literacy and ample purchasing power still provide a large enough market to support many independent authors. In poorer and less literate countries, however, entirely independent or self-sustaining authors are relatively rare. The markets are too small and ill-organised to sustain them. Intellectuals employed in universities, schools, colleges, newspapers and periodicals, broadcasting systems, in governmental and private administrative or research posts, form the vast majority.

In totalitarian countries, the stratum of corporately-employed intellectuals has also multiplied, as it must in all countries advancing in industrialisation and granting great powers to the state. In these countries, rentier intellectuals cannot exist, but literary men and artists who are self-supporting through their writings certainly do exist and many flourish. They do not, however, enjoy the same independence as writers in pluralistic countries, because their membership in the politically-required writers' association and their conformity with its demands govern their access to the public.. Exhortation, praise and censure are officially allocated according to a more or less uniform policy, and decisions to publish or to withhold from publication are made in the same way.

THE modern elites of the under-developed countries of Asia and Africa have come to the aspiration for modernity in a situation in which their own countries have been largely devoid of any institutional framework for the conduct of modern intellectual life. Their outlook and skills were acquired at universities in the centres of Western civilisation or institutions in their own countries founded by foreign missionaries and administrators.

In these countries, except for India, the modern intellectual elite has been very small; its field of operation has been confined in the main to Government service, college teaching, politics, journalism (often political) and the practice of law (also often a platform for political activity); there have been few opportunities for scholarly or scientific research, and literature has had too small a market for many to practise it professionally.

Except for a few centres, in particular subjects, in India and China, there have been no possibilities for advanced research and teaching in modern subjects throughout those areas of the world. The scientific services of the government during the colonial period were staffed mainly by foreigners. Posts for highly trained persons in industry were very few because industrial employment as such in under-developed countries was scant, and such industry as there was had not yet taken to the employment of scientists, qualified engineers, and other types of intellectuals. Such posts as there were went to foreigners.

To cross the threshold of modernisation, it is necessary to create a corps of intellectuals—especially since it has not been felt that the entrepreneur class could be entrusted with the responsibility for economic development. This has demanded the creation of a system of institutions where previously there had been only rudiments and fragments.

In striving to rectify these deficiencies, Governments have had almost a monopoly of initiative, as well as a near monopoly of financial resources for taking such initiative. For

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these reasons, the tendency towards the corporate organisation of intellectual activity is even more marked in under-developed countries than in the advanced pluralistic countries. Even in the promotion of an artistic and literary intelligentsia, Governments in under-developed countries have felt called upon to show interest and to act through financial provision and institutional establishment. Governments cannot write books or paint pictures, and where they do not wish to control content but to aid creation, they have sought to contribute to the improvement of the conditions under which writing and painting could be done. This has also required organisation to consider applications, administer grants, award prizes, facilitate publication, bring writers into contact with each other, stimulate booksellers, etc.

If left to the initiative of those hitherto in charge of them, and if nothing much were added to its resources, the existing institutional apparatus of intellectual life in the under-developed countries would remain in a state of elementary disaggregation. Although governmental action and finance are indispensable if anything at all is to be done, they bring the dangers of pressures for output (of personnel and publications), of political interference in appointment policy and in the determination of teaching and research programmes. Much more important, however, is the question they raise as to whether institutional establishment and development, however generous, can successfully implant the modern traditions of creative intellectual life.

DESPITE the nearly universal diffusion of the modern intellectual outlook, its Western origin remains a fact of more than historical importance.

In every country to which it came, there was an indigenous culture which dominated the lives of the vast majority of the inhabitants. In Asia these indigenous cultures had a continuous history of long duration and great achievements; they were cultures of great intrinsic intellectual, moral, and aesthetic value; they were elaborate, coherent, and comprehensive. They had in the priesthood, in the monastic orders, and in the traditional teaching profession, intellectuals of their own.

The modern intellectual outlook, and the traditions in which it grew, were foreign to this indigenous culture, a foreignness underscored by their association with foreign conquerors who imposed their rule, supplanting or dominating the traditional political elite. Nevertheless they exercised an irresistible fascination on certain strata of the societies outside the European centre, and the situation was not made any easier to bear by the often explicit derogation of their own culture and society which its admirers encountered among their foreign rulers and even in the works and attitudes of intellectuals of the foreign culture to which they were attracted.

This feeling of intellectual inferiority *vis-à-vis* the West still exists in the under-developed countries, and indeed in almost all areas of the world outside the European centre. It survives in the Soviet Union, it was common in the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and is not yet entirely dead there. Among the more backward totalitarian countries[3] and among the intellectuals of the pluralistic under-developed countries of Asia and Africa, it is very strong. The fascination by the Western intellectual outlook has, in the main, been strongest in those sections of the population which also have become fervently nationalistic. (These two conflicting attachments are very closely connected with each other.) For political purposes as well as out of deeply rooted sentiments, the political-intellectual elites of these countries assert the greater appropriateness of their own indigenous cultural tradition to their national life.

At the same time they seek to remodel their own societies to conform more closely with the Western tradition. Because of this, the traditional elites direct a continuous attack against them for their betrayal of their indigenous

[3] The feeling of provinciality in these countries acquires an additional complication through the establishment of the Soviet Union as a cultural metropolis from which to draw guidance. It is at least the intention of the Communist elite in these countries to replace the West by the Soviet Union as their cultural metropolis. The effort has, however, been unsuccessful.

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tradition[4] and their pursuit of foreign gods. The modern intellectual tradition is thus subject to a two-sided attack from its own proponents and from those who are more wholeheartedly opposed to it.

The counter-pressure against the modern intellectual tradition in the advanced pluralistic societies, above all, in the United States, and to a lesser extent, Great Britain, France, and Germany is the more or less indigenous 'mass-culture'. (It has also begun to emerge in distorted form as a pre-occupation of Communist ideologists in the more advanced totalitarian countries.)

In all advanced industrial countries a higher standard of living and more leisure have released desires for simple, crude, and exhilarating pleasures in sections of the population formerly bound down by fatigue, tradition, and necessity. The result has been a consumption of 'popular culture'. In the larger cities of India and other underdeveloped countries, its first tinkles and rumbles can be heard. In the economically advanced totalitarian countries, the same tastes and aspirations exist but they are repressed by the Communist elite. A puritanical ideology and resentment against the indulgence of their 'masses' and their 'youth' in pleasures imported from the West and not provided for by Marxism, account for the refusal of the Communist elite to acknowledge the legitimacy of these strata of culture.

Many intellectuals in the Western countries look upon popular culture as a challenge and a threat to creative intellectual life. In its aspiration for an expanded audience it does compete with works which stand in the superior intellectual tradition. Through the attractiveness of its monetary rewards it draws personnel from the circles which have been brought into contact with the great traditions, and concentrate their energy on the production of mediocre culture for reproduction on the 'mass media'. In doing this it also accentuates the powerful contemporary tendency towards the organisation of intellectuals into corporate and collaborative forms of intellectual activity. Finally, and perhaps most important, by its visible and audible presence and its obvious popularity and capacity to give pleasure, it affronts the claims of creative culture to universal validity and universal acceptance.

THE traditions of modern intellectual life have shown a high degree of adaptability, of ability to withstand entanglement in corporate forms. Indeed, certain parts of the intellectual tradition have never flowered as they have within the structure of the universities, which have stood up to their dependence on the State for financial support and their occasional surveillance by the State. The great achievements of the French and German universities since the State became their chief patron are ample testimony to the capacity to adapt themselves to new circumstances.

Nor has political tyranny, such as the totalitarian states have exercised, shown itself able to destroy the tradition of modern intellectual life. The impressive achievements of Soviet physics and chemistry, and the great vitality and curiosity which many observers have noted among the younger generation of Soviet academic intellectuals, are evidence that political supervision and far-reaching demands for ideological conformity cannot be truly successful in their efforts to permeate and dominate fields of intellectual life in which a great tradition has been alive and which still attract creative talents of a high order. As long as some measure of autonomy is left to the acknowledged superiors in a given sphere of intellectual work to choose and train their closest collaborators and apprentices, and to control what is published in their journals, the tradition can live on, despite temporary appearances of submergence. Even where, as in the field of literature, those who are made the custodians of the publishing houses and the critical reviews are conforming political place-holders and flatterers of the mighty, the extinguishing of a great literary

[4] The Communist elite in the Soviet Union tries to resolve this source of opposition by extirpating or suppressing the traditional intellectual elite in its ethnically distinctive and economically under-developed areas, and promoting only those members of the indigenous society who appear to be free from all attachment to their traditional culture. This path is not open to the modern elites of the pluralistic under-developed societies in Asia and Africa, since it is contrary to their principles and to their commitment to the values of their own traditional culture.

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tradition does not lie within the powers of the tyrants and their agents.

Nor does it seem that mass culture seriously threatens superior cultural activities. The vigour of contemporary Western science, scholarship, literature, and painting belies the accusations of those who see in mass culture the source of an attrition of the great intellectual traditions.

Within the advanced pluralistic societies, specialisation constitutes a greater impediment to the survival of the modern intellectual tradition than most of the external distractions. Specialisation postulates the unquestioning acceptance of an inherited framework of analysis and it often proceeds to forget it. Traditions grow not merely from the elaboration of the inherited framework but from its transformation and deepening. It is not that specialisation renders this type of growth impossible; it does render it more difficult. Particularly as specialisation becomes a common characteristic of the world of learning, mutual awareness and criticism across the boundaries of specialisation are constricted. It is just at the boundaries that much growth occurs.

It is unnecessary to stress the injury which extreme specialisation does to the transmission of the intellectual tradition in its broader reaches. Not only is the substantive content, the particular works of that tradition, forgotten, but the sensitisation of the mind to wider possibilities of thought is diminished by the loss of contact.

If specialisation continues unchecked and if institutional means are not discovered which can retain its intellectual advantages and eliminate some of its harmful repercussions, there will be little hope of continuing creativity at deeper levels. The great intellectual tradition will be transmitted haltingly and discontinuously. It will have to be recurrently rediscovered by minds which by their sheer intellectual power break out of the restraints which specialisation imposes.

The constraint of tyranny, the tribulations of excessive administration, the dilutions and distractions of mass culture, the restrictions of specialisation are all, in a sense, barbarians at the border of intellectual life. Its capacity to resist their invasion comes down in the last analysis to the strength of the tradition itself. This is not merely a tautology.

If the intellectuals of a given country feel themselves attached to the great models of intellectual work, if they have incorporated the standards implicit in that work into their own outlook, and have confidence in their own capacity to bring them actively into contact with the universe, then we may say that the intellectual traditions are strong, and they will be able to forestall the invasion. If, on the contrary, the intellectuals of a country—for whatever reason—are indifferent or unobservant about the great works and personalities of their own intellectual history (and not just the intellectual history of their own nation), if they do not observe the standards implicit in these works and feel no identity with the past or present of their subject of ostensible concern, if they feel little confidence in their own capacity, we may say that the intellectual traditions are feeble.

The superimposition of a bureaucratic administration, the organisation of an elaborate system of financial provision, and other distractions and temptations might draw the weaker away from intellectual work or cause them to temper their sails to the winds of grants, official favour, promotion, and the pleasures of ordering other people about. They do not break down the attachments of the firmly attached. They cannot enter into the intimate relationship between colleagues equally devoted to their tradition or between master-investigators and their apprentices. Tyranny may crush men physically; it can thrust them into the outer darkness, silence them, corrupt them; it can rule its society with the aid of the scum of the earth, but it cannot destroy the intellectual tradition except insofar as it annihilates those who bear it, or prevents them physically from carrying on their work. Modern tyrannies have not succeeded wholly in doing this—even though they have exiled many and sent others to concentration camps.

As long as totalitarian regimes allow creative personalities who have had contact with the great intellectual traditions to work in libraries and laboratories, to have pupils, and to be in

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touch with each other through their published writings and through conversation, the continuity and growth of intellectual traditions are not seriously in danger. Somehow the mind finds its way and the stream flows onward.

This assumes, however, that the modern intellectual tradition is already there and that there are strong personalities open to its radiation. The situation of the underdeveloped countries is not like this. There, the tradition has not yet taken root, and the major problem is its implantation. It can be implanted in countries where the traditional culture is alien to it, but this requires some release of the creative potential, its emancipation, at least partially, from the discipline of its own indigenous tradition. It requires the congeniality of an atmosphere emanating from strong and like-minded persons, free to go their own ways. It requires a self-confidence which is genuine. In the underdeveloped countries the modern intellectual atmosphere is attenuated, self-confidence is thinner, and the chances of the modern intellectual tradition igniting are correspondingly smaller. But they exist.

In such countries, bureaucratisation and tyranny, the counter-pressures of specialisation and of the indigenous culture are greater dangers than they are in the advanced countries, but they are not inevitably victorious. The success of the Japanese in assimilating and going forward with the modern intellectual tradition and the appearance of scattered geniuses in India in the present century are evidence that the essential ingredients exist. It is the task of statesmen-intellectuals to allow the sparks to turn into flames, and to avoid the temptation to smother them in elaborate and expensive administration and incessant demands for immediate and useful results.

ULTIMATELY man is an incorrigibly wayward and wilful creature. The 'Old Adam' cannot be expunged from the species. Neither can the active, curious, pushing, questioning, self-disciplining mind. Unlike the old Adam who needs no tradition, the active mind does need its own traditions. Once such minds are enabled to find contact with those traditions which will guide and form them, and are allowed freedom of play and movement, we may look with assurance on the chances of the modern intellectual tradition to move ahead, to transform itself, and to continue to be what it has been. And all this in very different circumstances from those which presided over its birth and early years.

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INTELLIGENTSIA AND REVOLUTION

An historical analysis

Hugh Seton-Watson

'INTELLIGENTSIA' is a Russian word. According to the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*, it was first used in the 1860's in the writings of one P. D. Boborykin. The phenomenon is however older than this, dating at least from the 1820's. There can be no exact and satisfactory definition of it, even in the 19th-century Russian context, still less for wider purposes. Essentially, however, the intelligentsia in Russia consisted of that portion of the modern intellectual elite, possessing an education equivalent to that of contemporary Western Europe, which had no part in the government apparatus. At first the intelligentsia consisted of the intellectuals in the narrowest sense—writers in poetry or prose and critics of literature or the arts. But as modern professions developed on a considerable scale in Russia after the Reforms of the 1860's—teaching, the law, medicine, science, and engineering—the word was extended to cover the much wider categories which in the West have long been known as 'the free professions'. These included many who received their salaries from the government (most school-teachers and doctors were on the payroll of local government (*zemstvo*) or central ministries), but there was a generally understood distinction between government employees and government officials. A senior bureaucrat would probably be a well-educated man, but he would not be regarded as a member of the intelligentsia: the word implied an unofficial status, and usually an attitude of political opposition. Clearly the borderline between unofficial and official status, between intelligentsia and bureaucracy, was a little blurred, but the overlapping zone was not a wide one.

If the intelligentsia was divided from the bureaucracy by a vertical boundary, it was divided by a horizontal boundary from a more numerous and less definable group which can only be called the 'semi-intelligentsia'. Here the border zone was much wider. The 'semi-intelligentsia' consisted of members of the lower middle classes (extremely amorphous in Imperial Russia), who had intellectual aspirations or intellectual pretensions. If the criterion for separating intelligentsia from bureaucracy was occupational (was one a government official or not?), the distinction between intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia was cultural (how good an education had one?). In neither case are economic categories relevant. It is worth noting that the semi-intelligentsia is a category existing in societies more advanced (in terms of industrialisation and urbanisation) than Imperial Russia. Lenin was certainly a member of the intelligentsia before he became a professional revolutionary; Stalin was certainly a member of the semi-intelligentsia. To this latter category belonged also the unsuccessful painter Adolf Hitler and the frustrated schoolmaster Benito Mussolini. The determination of all three men to get themselves recognised as original thinkers by men of unquestionable intellectual distinction had a good deal to do with their subsequent careers, and with their attitude to intellectual liberties. In general it may be said that the semi-intelligentsia as a social group has been even more neglected than has the intelligentsia, and deserves even more attention from sociologists.

Social groups equivalent to the Russian intelligentsia of course existed in Western Europe, and had indeed formed the model for the Russian intelligentsia. But though the West had its intellectual elite, which derived only remotely from that of classical Greece and directly from the secularisation of culture that followed the Reformation, nevertheless this elite was not an intelligentsia. The Russian intelligentsia was a distinct group, clearly separated from the other middle classes, but the Western intellectual elite was not. In the West

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the intellectual elite grew in response to the complex influences and needs of post-Reformation Europe: in the underdeveloped societies of the last two centuries it has been created by the action of rulers determined to modernise their societies in order to establish state machines and economies capable of standing up to Western pressure. The clearest cases are of course Peter the Great in Russia and the reformers of the Meiji Era in Japan. Elsewhere the rulers were more reluctant and less efficient. But modernisation is not possible without an intellectual elite, and in the early stages it is inevitable that this elite, small in numbers, should be divided by a great gulf from the rest of the nation.

IT is possible to distinguish between two types of situation in this respect, though they cannot be exactly or rigidly demarcated from each other. In the first type of situation the elite and the masses belong to the same culture, but there are enormous differences within it: in the second type of situation the elite and the masses belong to quite different cultures. Eighteenth-century France was an example of the first type, nineteenth-century Russia of the second. Voltaire had not much in common with an illiterate French farm labourer. But the culture of which Voltaire was an eminent exponent was derived from French society and French history, in which the ancestors of the farm labourer had had their part. Chernyshevsky was the son of a humble Russian priest, and had boundless compassion for the Russian *muzhik*, but the culture whose values he professed was one with no roots in Russia, one with which he had become familiar through an education which had been introduced ready-made into Russia. Admittedly, through its church traditions and through its long struggle with Poland, Russia had always had some tenuous contact with the culture of the West. Even this was lacking in the case of the Asian and African nations among whom intelligentsias have arisen in the last hundred years as a result of the Western economic, cultural and military impacts. The first type of contrast has existed in the Kingdom of Naples (the relationship of Croce or Labriola to a Sicilian peasant may be compared with that of Voltaire to the French farm labourer), Spain, Poland, and Hungary, in all of which the elite had always belonged to Western culture, however deep the physical and mental squalor in which the masses lived. The Orthodox countries of the Balkans in the late nineteenth century rather resembled the Russian situation.

In the West the post-Reformation secular intellectual elite grey up together with the two other middle classes—businessmen and government servants. These three middle classes were increasingly linked by a common outlook, what may be called the bourgeois ethos. There were of course great differences between individual Western countries, and the relative social prestige of capitalists, bureaucrats, and intellectuals was different, for example, in England, France, and Prussia. Nevertheless the tendency of the middle classes to become *embourgeoisées*, and to push the former upper classes into the background, in fact to cease to be middle classes and to become themselves the dominant class, was everywhere unmistakable. As for the nature of the bourgeois ethos itself, all that need be said here, by way of contrast with non-Western societies, is that it had an irreducible core of two principles—the supremacy of civilian values over military, and the supremacy of individual judgment, whether in matters of religious belief or commercial decision or political opinion. In Russia, and in the underdeveloped societies which underwent westernisation at a later date, neither of these things was true. Middle classes existed; there were merchants and officials and intellectuals of some sort in almost all societies, but they were not bound to each other by a common ethos, and such values as they had were neither civilian nor individualist. In Russia they were separated from each other into vertical compartments: there was in fact no Russian bourgeoisie. Only in the last ten years before 1917 was something beginning to appear to which this name could justifiably be attached.

It is worth noting that Marx himself was infected, by the milieu in which he lived during his most creative years, by a Victorian English isolationism that was taken over by Marxists of such different societies as Russia. Marx

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tended to identify liberalism with the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie with the capitalists. His pupils, lacking the subtlety of mind which usually saved the master from the crudest dogmatism, oversimplified still more. The famous phrase of the Minsk Manifesto of the RSDRP of 1898—'The further to the east one goes in Europe, the weaker in politics, the more cowardly and the meaner becomes the bourgeoisie, the greater are the cultural and political tasks that fall to the proletariat'—excellently expresses this misunderstanding. In fact there was no bourgeoisie in Russia in 1898; the capitalists (whom the author of the Manifesto, P. B. Struve, later a leading liberal politician of the right, had in mind) were not particularly cowardly, but simply indifferent to politics; and the class to whom the tasks fell was not the proletariat but the intelligentsia. In Western Europe the politically active social group, the force behind the great political changes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had indeed been the bourgeoisie. But in Russia, and later in the under-developed societies of Asia and Africa, this force was the intelligentsia.

That the intelligentsia belonged to a different culture from the rest of the people, was unpleasant for the intelligentsia and dangerous for the society. It was and is, however, inevitable in any under-developed society in the early stages of its modernisation. This dangerous condition can only be removed in one way: by raising the cultural level of the masses, by bringing them nearer to the elite. Whether an under-developed society can modernise itself without bloody revolutionary convulsions must largely depend on the speed with which this process of narrowing the gap between elite and masses is conducted. Here there are two most illuminating historical examples — Imperial Russia and Imperial Japan. In the first case, after a brief initial period of energy under Peter and a second attempt at introducing a nation-wide system of education under Alexander I (which had to be abandoned as a result of the need to devote all resources to foreign policy and war in the age of Napoleon), the Russian Ministry of Education settled down to a policy of denying education to the masses. University education was developed, since a modern elite, to be formed as far as possible from the nobility, was necessary in the interests of the state. But primary education was deliberately neglected, for it was considered undesirable that the heads of peasant and lower middle class children should be filled with unnecessary knowledge which might put undesirable ideas into them. Thus the gap between elite and masses was artificially perpetuated for a whole century. In Japan, however, the reformers of the 1870's believed that the state would be stronger, and national unity and patriotism intensified, if the whole nation were educated. They set to work efficiently, and within thirty years of the Meiji Restoration virtually all boys and girls were attending several years of primary school. The result was that the gap was narrowed, and the Japanese soon became again one nation. This does not of course mean that westernisation and modernisation did not, and does not still, impose terrible emotional and intellectual strains on the Japanese intellectuals; still less that the political system which brought Japan to Pearl Harbour and Hiroshima was without faults. But the achievement of Japanese education in the last decades of the nineteenth century is unique, and deserves far more attention both from Europeans and from Asians than it has received in recent years.

THE intelligentsia is of course the social group which first becomes acquainted with modern political ideas—liberalism, nationalism, socialism, Leninism, fascism. These ideas are normally opposed by the traditional ruling classes, including the rulers who for reasons of state interest have decided to introduce modern education in order to create the needed modern elite. The members of the intelligentsia in nineteenth-century Russia had to choose between entering the government machine and making it a career at the cost of forswearing the political principles which they had acquired through their education, or maintaining their principles at the cost of abandoning the hope of a career. A similar choice has faced the intelligentsia of many other under-developed societies in more recent times. Those who chose their principles not only missed careers but also missed that practical experience of the

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business of government which inevitably leads to modifications in radical theory. They were thus enabled to preserve the purity of their revolutionary doctrine. As has already been said, the word 'intelligentsia' in the Russian context came to imply an oppositional attitude, even a complete doctrinaire rejection of the whole political and social systems as they were. In such a climate revolutionary ideas were *de rigueur*. But the persistence of the autocratic system of government, which tolerated no public expression or organisation of opposed political opinion, had a further effect. If revolutionaries were not only to talk but to act, they could organise only by conspiratorial means. It is the combination of a general mental climate favourable to radical ideas with ruthless police repression that produces the modern phenomenon of the professional revolutionary, proposed as a fantasy by Bakunin but carried into reality by Lenin. The programme of action laid down in Lenin's *What is to be done?* of course became a model for communist parties after 1917. But the need for conspiratorial organisation was clear to non-communist revolutionaries of various sorts in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, and China. In Asiatic or African colonies of European Powers—or at least of Britain and France—the need was not so obvious, as considerable freedom of opinion and organisation was permitted —even if it fell short of the liberties assured in the metropolitan countries. But if Negro subjects of Britain and France suffered less from police repression than citizens of independent Imperial Russia or Turkey or China, they suffered from various forms of racial discrimination which citizens of sovereign states were spared. The arrogance of the conqueror took different forms in different empires. There is no exact parallel in French colonies to the social colour bar of Nairobi or Salisbury, but this does not necessarily mean that the bad manners of the *petits blancs* of Saigon or Dakar were less resented by the autochthonous people.

In some under-developed societies the intelligentsia, as a social group and a political factor, has included many army officers. The first modern skill needed, by rulers of states of under-developed society which have remained independent, has been military skill. Thus young officers, trained abroad or under the instruction of foreign experts, have been among the first to learn foreign political ideas. The classic example are of course the Russian Decembrists of 1825. The important thing about the Decembrists is not that they were children of the nobility (this is of course true), but that they were intelligentsia in uniform. After 1825 the Tsars took great care to insulate army officers against subversive ideas, and there was virtually no more political trouble in the army until 1917—mutinies by other ranks in 1905 are a different phenomenon. The Russian revolutionary intelligentsia of 1861-1917 was civilian. But in the Ottoman Empire, and in its Arab successor states, army officers have been prominent in the politically-minded intelligentsia—the Young Turks of 1908, Kemal Ataturk, the young Nuri es-Said, Abd el-Nasser, and even Abd el-Karim Kassem leap to mind. In most European colonies, however, the intelligentsia was civilian, since the job of defence was carried out by the colonial Power. A partial exception were the Moslems in India, who showed greater aptitude under British rule for military careers than for civil professions, in which the Hindus excelled. But these Indian Moslem soldiers tended to be 'straight' soldiers rather than intelligentsia in uniform. The role of British-trained army officers in Pakistan has rather resembled the traditional role of soldiers in disturbed political periods in Europe. General Ayub Khan seems akin rather to General Cavaignac and Prince Schwarzenberg than to Kemal Ataturk or Colonel Nasser: he appears rather an order-restorer than a military revolutionary. The case of General Ne Win of Burma is less clear.

A significant group are the revolutionaries who, starting as civilian intellectuals, acquired military experience in resistance movements, and then made military careers in their liberated homelands. Though details greatly vary, we may place in this general category Pilsudski and his legionaries (first civilian revolutionary conspirators under the Russian rule, then soldiers collaborating with the Austrians against Russia, and then colonels or generals or marshals of the Polish Army); many of the generals

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of Tito's army (first civilian revolutionaries, then soldiers in Spain, then guerrilla leaders in Yugoslavia, then army commanders in liberated Yugoslavia); and many of the officers of South-East Asian armies (the Burmese careers being more similar to those of Pilsudski, the Vietnamese to those of the Yugoslavs). Pilsudski of course became an order-restorer of the most reactionary type, and the colonels who succeeded him showed no less reactionary zeal but much less political ability. The future of Ayub Khan, Ne Win, Nasution, and the Sudanese officers is far from clear. But no Western observers will be able to understand future developments unless they are aware of the two distinct types of the order-restorers and the intelligentsia-in-uniform.

The intelligentsia of under-developed societies are small in numbers, and do not at first sight impress the representatives of the established order (whether Imperial Russian provincial governors or British colonial District Commissioners). But though they do not possess the traditional external marks of authority, they are a formidable social force. It is said that a Prime Minister of Austria shortly before the First World War, when told by a friend who had recently visited Russia of the signs of revolution in that country, replied, 'But who is going to overthrow so strong a monarch as the Tsar? You surely don't mean Herr Bronstein who sits plotting across the street there in the Café Central?' A few years later Herr Bronstein became known to a wider public under the name of Trotsky. In 1917 Lenin argued that if 160,000 landowners could rule the Russian Empire, the same number of Bolsheviks could do so: the fact that other parties had much larger memberships need not mean that they would win the revolutionary struggle. As Mr Laqueur has well argued in these columns, the same argument can be applied to the revolutionary intelligentsia of the Middle East to-day. In most parts of the British Commonwealth and French Union in 1959 the legend of the sound loyal bedouin in the desert or the unspoiled savage in the bush has been abandoned. The young intellectual in the towns is recognised as a more important figure. It is understood in the British Colonial Office that, in a competition for the loyalty of the bedouin or the savage between the benevolent European administrator and the fanatical native intelligentsia, it is the latter who has won, again and again in the last twenty years, and is likely to win in the future too. Only Sir Roy Welensky seems unable to appreciate this, and to think that economic improvements can be a substitute for political programmes. It might indeed be better for Africans as well as Europeans if this were so, but it is not so. It is curious that the last remaining champions of 'vulgar Marxism' are to be found among the extreme Right in Salisbury and Algiers.

TO recognise the importance of the intelligentsia is of course only the beginning of wisdom: precise political decisions still have to be taken, and there is no ready-made formula that will guarantee success. Nor does the problem of the intelligentsia solve itself when national independence is won. When Bulgaria became independent in 1878, some of the revolutionary intellectuals who had led the national struggle became reactionary politicians, while others were bitterly disillusioned. In the next generation much more revolutionary doctrines took possession of the minds of the intellectual youth. The gap between elite and masses still remained wide, and political repression did not diminish. Broadly the same was true of the other independent Balkan states in the century between 1848 and 1945. This Balkan experience should be studied in India, South-East Asia, and the new African states. In India the cultural gap yawns hideously wide, but there is freedom of opinion, and Nehru combines authoritarian leadership with new-statesmanlike rhetoric in such a way as to minimise the hostility of the intelligentsia to the regime. The ability of his successors to play this game, and the willingness of still younger generations to be patient, must remain in doubt. It should not be forgotten that in the first years after 1927 the Kuomintang too enjoyed a reputation, both at home and abroad, for progressive intentions.

The fate of the intelligentsia in Russia since the triumph of the revolution is another important chapter of twentieth-century history.

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Though the Bolshevik leaders came from the intelligentsia, they represented only minority trends within it. Once in power they were understandably distrustful of all intellectuals who were not in their party. They preferred to rule through more docile elements, through the less mentally agile sections of the working class. They used members of the old intelligentsia where their skills were indispensable, and meanwhile created a new intelligentsia, largely though not wholly of worker or peasant origin, through their own schools, in which the attempt was made to combine factual instruction with ideological indoctrination. After the Great Purge of 1937-9 this new intelligentsia took over the jobs of the old, swept away by the brooms of Yezhov. But now the word 'intelligentsia' was used to describe something different. It described not only the intellectual professions but the whole upper stratum of Soviet society. Some word had to be found for this stratum, which included not only intellectuals and bureaucrats but the whole army of industrial managers created by the process of state-initiated industrialisation in the Five Year Plans. 'Bureaucracy', 'state capitalists', or 'state bourgeois' were obviously unacceptable terms. The only word which still (owing to the history of the revolutionary movement since the 1860's) had a 'progressive' flavour, and so was respectable in Soviet society, was 'intelligentsia'.

This new social group deserves more careful study by sociologists. But as a whole it may be said that the cultural gap has been narrowed, that the differences between intellectual elite and masses in the Soviet Union are now differences within one culture, not differences between two cultures. It may also be said that the division of the non-manual classes into vertical compartments is largely a thing of the past. Soviet bureaucrats, managers, and intellectuals in 1959, like Western government servants, businessmen, and intellectuals in the nineteenth century, are united by a common ethos, produced by more than three decades of Soviet schools and composed of a minimum of Marxist-Leninist ideology, Russian chauvinism, and Victorianism in moral and aesthetic judgments—a mixture of the doctrines of Lenin, Pobedonostsev, and Samuel Smiles. It may indeed be argued that this Soviet upper stratum, more homogeneous than any that has existed in Russia since Peter the Great, is a sort of bourgeoisie, a state bourgeoisie rather than a private bourgeoisie. If the essence of the ethos of the private bourgeois in the West was liberalism, this curious ideological amalgam may be regarded as the ethos of the state bourgeoisie of the Soviet Union. Whether something similar will emerge in the East European popular democracies and China, it is too early to say, though the signs of such development are clearly there.

THE appeal of communism to the intelligentsia of the under-developed societies of Asia and Africa to-day is twofold. On the one hand is what may be called the Populist appeal. The communist parties, heirs of the Russian Revolution, with their long story, part true and part mythical, of city barricades and mountain guerrilla, with their proud lists of martyrs to police tyranny and leaders of victorious armies of workers and peasants, are a model to those who wish to serve the people, to raise it up out of ignorance and poverty and oppression. At the same time the picture they have of the Soviet Union to-day, in which the intelligentsia rules, intellectual merit is rewarded as it should be, and society is organised on scientific principles, appeals to their ambition. The Asian and African intelligensia may become communists in order to serve the people or in order to obtain power over the people, or indeed (and this is perhaps most usual) from both motives at once. If one compares the Arab or African intelligentsias of to-day with the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia of the 1870's, one has the impression that the former run much smaller risks, and are much more concerned with feathering their own nests, than were the latter. But it is possible that future historians, with more knowledge of the personalities of the revolutionaries of the 1950's and a greater detachment than contemporary Western observers can hope to attain, will see things in a different perspective.

To-day in Western societies the intelligentsia is a rather unimportant subdivision of the bour-

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geoisie; in the Soviet Union it is a subdivision of the new upper stratum (whch it may or may not be permissible to call a state bourgeoisie); but in the under-developed societies it is a distinct social force, operating independently and possessed of explosive powers.

The most urgent task before the under-developed societies is the narrowing of the cultural gap between the intellectual elite and the masses. This task is closely linked with, but is distinct from, that of industrialising economies that are still overwhelmingly agrarian. While the cultural gap remains wide, the societies will be especially vulnerable to revolution. If they can withstand the revolutionary forces, and narrow the gap as rapidly as Japan narrowed it in the Meiji Era, they may grow into modern and free societies, though no doubt their institutions and their new culture will differ very greatly from those of Western Europe and North America. If they succumb to the forces of revolution, they are likely to end as totalitarian societies, whether through rapid conquest by communist parties or a communist Great Power, or through a period of military dictatorship ending in communist seizure of power, or through the emergence of some non-communist totalitarian regime.

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Fathers and Sons

THE RUSSIAN RADICAL TRADITION

Victor Frank

LOOKING back to the classic era of the Russian intelligentsia—let us say, to the Chekhovian nineties—one cannot but marvel at the strength of one unconscious assumption which underlay all its thoughts, emotions, and actions: that of the stability of the established way of life. For all his talk about revolution, the average *intelligent* (with a hard 'g') viewed the craggy, moss-grown rock of autocracy as a perennial evil, as part and parcel of the social cosmos, so that his opposition to it became a mere virtuous aspiration after an unattainable ideal. Only a minority—those endowed with an abnormal dose of sensitivity or fanaticism—sensed or knew that the end was coming, and that, once it came, it would destroy not only the hated autocracy, but also the world in which the intelligentsia thrived.

But it was not only his lack of foresight which made the educated Russian stick to the illusion of the permanence of the world around him. (And who are we, with our strontium-infested bones, to reproach him with levity?) There was also a curious paralysis of the historical sense which, added to the dogmatic 19th-century belief in progress, made for unbounded optimism. The origins of his social group, so recent, so fortuitous; its existence, so isolated, so precarious; the lack of any common economic and social basis—all these ominous factors were ignored, and an ephemeral phase in the nation's history mistaken for an enduring state of affairs.

After all, it was only in the second half of the century that this curious social phenomenon, the Russian intelligentsia, had come into being and had taken over the functions of the vehicle of culture from the old leading class, the gentry. The Petrine reforms the century before had succeeded in fertilising only the remnants of the old aristocracy and the numerically stronger class of the petty landed gentry. The emancipation of the gentry from all compulsory State service under Peter the Great's grandson in 1762 provided it with enough leisure to cultivate the arts and to think. The seeds implanted by Peter the Great in that soil took about a century to germinate. And then (as Alexander Herzen put it) Russia responded to Peter's challenge by producing Pushkin. It was not accidental that Pushkin, that most European and, at the same time, most Russian of all Russians, was descended from an old aristocratic family. It was in his lifetime, roughly in the first third of the century, that the landed gentry came of age—culturally and intellectually. Their mansions—apart from churches and barracks, the only stone buildings in a countryside of timber huts—became the nurseries of civilisation. These stuccoed pseudo-classical edifices, surrounded by neglected parks and weed-grown ponds, became to Russia what the cities were to ancient Greece, the monasteries to medieval Europe, the manses to Scotland, the *Pfarrhaeuser* to Protestant Germany.

But hardly had this class matured and become aware of its resources and responsibilities, than its decline, social, political, and economic, set in, until the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 cut the ground from under its feet altogether. Already in the 1830's Pushkin had to spend the last years of his life fighting a losing battle against social upstarts gate-crashing the literary *salons* of St Petersburg and Moscow. These new men were no gentlemen of leisure. They were plebeians, *raznochintsy* —literally and metaphorically *other ranks*, children of poor country priests, petty officials, bearded horse-dealers, shop-keepers, artisans, even servants. *Kukharkiny deti* (cook's children)[1] was one of the cruel nicknames they had

[1] Occasionally the resident cook in a genteel household would be allowed to have her children visit her, and the encounter between the well-groomed, politely voiced children of the family and the tough little plebeians with their hoarse voices, running noses, and mops of hair brushed down with linseed-oil, was embarrassing enough to be remembered by both sides with distaste in adult life.

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to contend with. These men were animated by a very different social ardour. Whereas the best of their patrician predecessors had been aware of their responsibilities, the *raznochintsy*, true plebeians that they were, were talking of their rights.

THE intelligentsia was in the first place an amalgam of these two very different traditions. Later a third element was added—the Jewry. Russian society had, of course, absorbed many other hetero-national elements before, and the intelligentsia in particular could boast of a great many distinguished members of non-Russian origin, especially Germans and Poles. But neither group was strong enough to alter substantially the chemical composition of the *milieu* which it joined. The Jews were. They had no pull towards another strong secular culture, like the Poles; no divided loyalty like the Balts and the Russianised Germans. Nominally Russian subjects since the partitions of Poland in the late 18th century, the Jews had continued to lead their segregated lives, cut off both from their immediate Polish and Baltic surroundings, and from the Russian civilisation, until the liberal policy of Alexander II and the Polish rebellion of 1863 enabled or forced them (there were stiff property and educational tests) to move to Russia proper. And since educated Jews were hardly ever accepted as equals either in the upper layers of society or among the masses below, the only spiritual home they could find in Russia was the intelligentsia. The marriage between the learned Jewish and the liberal Russian traditions proved to be astonishingly smooth and natural.

These three elements—the dispossessed gentry, the 'cook's children' and the Jews—made each its own distinct contribution to the mental make-up of the Russian intelligentsia. The gentry infused the new educated elite with its ancient ideal of dedicated service. Of course, it was no longer service to the Tsar and the State that inspired the *déclassé* gentlemen as it had inspired their ancestors and still inspired their 'reactionary' army and civil service cousins. The State appeared to them composed of obtuse, corrupt, and culturally inferior bureaucrats. Yet the old liturgical notion of public service as the proper end of man's life survived and became the guiding star of the intelligentsia's social ethics. The object of service, however, was no longer the State, but the people, the *narod*.

The *raznochintsy* contributed a sharper awareness of the crying social injustices in Russian society and a more ardent desire to remedy them. Their mixed origin was also one of the reasons why the intelligentsia shed all class, estate, and national prejudices, and why it became one of the freest human groups in the history of modern Europe. It was free, that is, in the sense in which a monastic order is free: a man was accepted as an equal, whatever his social background and his racial origin, provided that he attained a certain cultural level and subscribed to the tenets of the faith.

It is odd that the Russian language has failed to evolve another term for the concept of the people, the concept which became an object of worship to several generations of educated Russians. For the word *narod* (like the Latin *proles*, hence *proletarian*) means etymologically nothing else than *offspring* or, still cruder, the *spawn*, the *mass of those born*. In pre-Petrine Russia, *narod* was a technical term to denote the lower classes. In the second half of the 19th century the word became incongruously infused with a *mystique* that obliterated the originally unpleasant, biological meaning.

However, there it was, that mystical body which, in the mind of the educated Russian agnostic, filled the vacuum formed by his defection from the Church or the Synagogue. To serve the people, to serve it selflessly, and, if necessary, to lay down its life for it, became the first commandment of the secular creed of the intelligentsia. It was an anti-etatistic and anti-historical creed. The *narod* (as distinct from the semantically germane Western concept of the 'nation') most certainly excluded the political element of the State. The field of foreign policy, for instance, was consistently ignored by liberal historians. By the same token, whenever the *narod* clashed with authority—as it did, for instance, in the 17th century

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rebellion of Stenka Razin or in the 18th century rebellion of Pugachev—there could not be any doubt on whose side the intelligentsia's retrospective sympathies were. Any fight by the people, whatever its cruelties and abominations, was a righteous fight. Any suppression of rebellion by the forces of the State was *a priori* an act of evil. The people, by definition, could not be wrong.

But—and herein lay the tragedy of the intelligentsia—the ardent love it had for the people was love unrequited. The peasants in particular—and to the non-Marxist intellectual the peasants *were* the people—in so far as they took notice of the intelligentsia at all, viewed its activities with incomprehension and hostility. They did not wish to be adulated. Nor did the mass of them wish to be educated. What they wanted was more land and more bread. The aristocratic contempt for worldly goods displayed by the intellectuals, and their disinterested yearning to serve the 'minor brethren', were viewed by the peasants with a sullen suspicion. Thousands of young lives were lost in the unbridgeable abyss between the intelligentsia and the people, between the lover and the loved. Young girls who went out to the villages to teach or to nurse, rotted away in the atmosphere of contempt and indifference; young men burning with missionary zeal who wandered through the countryside to 'enlighten' the peasants, were beaten up or turned over to the police—human sacrifices, one and all, offered by the intelligentsia in expiation of the sins of the upper classes.

AN equally wide gulf yawned between the intelligentsia and the bureaucrats. The *chinovniki* (officials) had indeed preserved the old notion of service, but, as time went on, this service was conceived and discharged in an increasingly crude, venal, and mechanical way. To most of them service was a way of earning a living, with no idealistic nonsense about it. They also had a natural vested interest in the perpetuation of the autocratic form of Government and viewed the democratic or anarchistic tendencies of the intelligentsia with understandable suspicion.

Such then was the tragic isolation of the intelligentsia. It was suspended in mid-air, and, what is more, its very existence was, in a way, a sociological absurdity, since it lacked any common economic or social roots.

After all, it was neither a class nor an estate. A man did not qualify as an intellectual by performing certain duties or earning his living in a particular way. It was entirely a matter of the attitude of mind. Of course, most people fancying themselves intellectuals, tended towards the liberal professions—the schools, the arts, the law, medicine. But a man might well be a small land-owner and still considered an intellectual, provided he shared the Idea. Some of the members of the professions were in fact State employees (that applied primarily to teachers); others, like the lawyers, were free. Some were well-to-do; others eked out a precarious existence by odd literary jobs. It did not matter what a man did, or what his standard of living was, so long as he believed in the right things.

This lack of common economic interests had two consequences. Objectively speaking, it made the intelligentsia incapable of acting as an effective pressure group in the pursuit of its own economic interests. Psychologically, it made for moral idealism. The intelligentsia scorned all purely material considerations. To a Russian *intelligent*, activities aiming at material gain as such were beneath the dignity of a man inspired by an 'idea'—a truly aristocratic snobbery that![2] This attitude of mind went further: since it was the idea that counted—the body, the outward form and conventions did not. Hence the characteristic contempt for physical fitness, for outward comfort, for beauty, for form, for *matter* in general. Here we come across something resembling the intellectual snobbery of the ghetto: a man may live in abject poverty and yet be superior to a well-to-do honest shopkeeper because he is a scholar.

A hostile cartoonist would then present the

[2] Russian doctors, for instance, never discussed the question of fees. People knew by hearsay how much a practitioner charged for a visit, and the notes were pressed into his hand in a dark corner and with an embarrassed smile. After all, it wouldn't do to *buy* a doctor's humane activities. It certainly was hypocrisy, but touching, too.

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intelligent as a myopic, hollow-chested, untidy humbug, given to interminable, windy discussions on abstract issues, impractical and inefficient in his personal life, living in the clouds —and very often at somebody else's expense; in short, as a *lishny chelovek,* a superfluous, expendable, futile weakling.

On the other hand, a sympathetic portrait would discover in him the Christ-like features of Prince Myshkin; would see him as a man of great moral beauty, full of charity and compassion, contemptuous of material goods, delicate and chaste in his personal relations, burning with desire to lay down his life for his brethren—a fool, perhaps, but a saintly fool.

Both images would be essentially correct, for the net was cast wide, and all sorts of queer fish were rubbing flanks in it.

The conventional jargon of the intelligentsia reflected its scale of moral values. *Grazhdanskaya skorb* (melancholy on the civic level) was an obligatory emotion. Without it one could not qualify as a *chestny chelovek* (a decent person, that is, a man 'against the Government'); an *ideiny chelovek* (a man dedicated to an idea); a *goryashchy chelovek* (a man burning with zeal) or a *svetlaya lichnost* (a shining personality—shining, that is, in obscurantist surroundings). At the lower end of the scale were the *bezideiny chelovek* (a man not inspired by any 'ideas') and, of course, a *reaktsioner* and a *mrakobes* (an active obscurantist, very often just an ordinary practising Christian). Among the despicable moral qualities the worst were *poshlost* (a universal concept embracing aggressive vulgarity, pettiness, interest in the pleasures of the flesh and banality) and *meshchanstvo* (originally a technical term for the class of small urban tradespeople and later a synonym for *poshlost*—another purely aristocratic piece of snobbery).

It is easy to laugh at all this. But with all its faults, with all its political *naïveté,* with all its silliness, the pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia was one of the most humane, one of the morally purest heresies of our times. In a one-sided, neurotic sort of way it was the conscience of its nation. Though mostly agnostic or atheistic, it had all the faults and virtues of a militant monastic order. It had the same disciplined group reflexes, the same contemptuous intolerance towards unbelievers, the same charity towards its flock; it was animated by an ardent missionary zeal; it professed and very often practised the ideals of poverty, chastity, and obedience to the self-imposed rules.

When the great trials came, many of its members were to win the martyr's crown.

THE bald truth is that the intelligentsia, such as it existed before the revolution, has been destroyed since, socially, ideologically, and physically.

True, we find proud references in Soviet media to something called the Soviet intelligentsia. Two points must be made with reference to this term, one doctrinal, the other semantic.

To the Marxists a social group acquires the properties of a class by virtue of a specific relationship to the means of production. There has never been any such relationship in the case of the intelligentsia. The qualities which made it what it was, belonged to the moral and intellectual order. Therefore it did not qualify as a class. On the other hand, its existence—quite distinct from both the old 'exploiting' classes, and from the 'revolutionary' classes—could not be ignored. Hence the uncertainty of the place allocated to the intelligentsia in the official doctrine; hence also the vacillations of Party policy towards it. Thus, on the same page of *The History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks): A Short Course,*[3] we find two contradictory statements. On the one hand we read:

> According to the new Constitution, Soviet society consists of two friendly classes—the workers and peasants. . . . The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a Socialist state of workers and peasants.

The intelligentsia is nowhere. And yet, on the same page, we find a fairly explicit definition of this non-existent social group:

> The intelligentsia in the USSR has also undergone a change. It has for the most part become an entirely new intelligentsia. The majority of its members come from

[3] English edition (Moscow, 1941), p. 344.

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> the ranks of workers and peasants. It no longer serves capitalism, as the old intelligentsia did; it serves Socialism. It has become an equal member of the Socialist society.

A numerically strong social group which, according to pronouncement No. 1, is not a composite element of the State, is, according to pronouncement No. 2, 'an equal member' of society.

To gloss over this ambiguity, Soviet theoreticians have coined a meaningless term, meaningless, that is, from the point of view of Marxist doctrine; the term *prosloika,* an 'intermediate layer', a word derived from geology and/or gastronomy. However, since in future, under communism, manual and intellectual labour will be merging in any case, the theoreticians may be forgiven for sticking a nonsensical label on this particular bottle: in no time at all, they might have argued, the contents of the bottle are going to be poured into the big pot, anyway.

The second point is purely semantic. The Soviet concept of intelligentsia is far more comprehensive than the pre-revolutionary usage. As the *Big Soviet Encyclopedia* explains, it is applied to:

> the social intermediate layer (*prosloika*) consisting of men and women engaged professionally in intellectual labour (scientists, engineers, teachers, writers, artists, doctors, agronomists, the greater part of employees, etc.).

In another context the list is given as follows:

> scientists, engineers, writers, teachers, doctors, agronomists, state and party officials, heads of industrial enterprises, of machine-and-tractor stations, collective farms and state farms, officers and generals, staff members of cultural and educational establishments, artists, etc.

In other words, in Soviet parlance intelligentsia includes, in addition to professional men, all white-collar workers. It would therefore be pointless and misleading to analyse the attitudes of this 'intermediate layer' in relation to the group which bore the same name before the revolution. It is more pertinent to start the enquiry at the other end: what happened to the old intelligentsia? In particular, have its characteristics been inherited by some other group?

The first fact that must be placed on record is the massive physical destruction of the members of the old intelligentsia since 1917. The successive open seasons have been the Civil War (1918-1921); the opening years of collectivisation and industrialisation (1929-1932); the great purges (1936-1938); the war (1939-1945), and the Zhdanov and post-Zhdanov period (1946-1953). In addition to those executed or banished to camps, tens of thousands were driven into emigration.

Under the Tsars, the intelligentsia was able to lead an independent corporate existence, to maintain a distinctive *esprit de corps,* to cultivate its own attitudes of mind which had nothing in common with those desired by the authorities.

But as soon as the rock of autocracy crumbled, as soon as the short-lived February Republic of the intellectuals had given place to the Bolshevik regime, the intelligentsia as such ceased to exist. The new power aimed at the elimination of every independent social or professional group. This policy brought about the death of the intelligentsia as a corporate entity. The surviving individual members had the choice between emigration (internal or external) and enlistment in the service of the new State.

Thus the social group which, for several generations, had known but one aim—the Revolution; which had imagined that the Revolution would help the people to triumph over its age-old opponent, the State, saw that same Revolution do the exact opposite: arm the State with unprecedented powers and deprive the people of all those rights which the intelligentsia had wrested from the Tsarist regime. The intelligentsia as a militant monastic order, had died a spiritual death long before the great purges.

AND yet, the old intelligentsia was no Inca priesthood and the Bolsheviks no *conquistadores.* After all, the Bolshevik leaders themselves—at least, their first generation—were blood of the blood and flesh of the flesh

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of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia. Men like Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Lunacharsky, Kamenev, Krasin and many others were linked to the intelligentsia by close ties of kinship and friendship.[4]

The old civilisation did not perish without a trace; once again, as a century earlier, there began a fusion between the old *Kulturträger* group (or, rather, its depleted remnants) and the new recruits, men 'from the plough' and 'from the bench', as the Russians say. This process started in the twenties and is still going on. In the thirties it was already well under way. Stalin assessed the proportion of 'people from the working class, from the peasantry and from other strata of the working population' among the Soviet intelligentsia (in the new, comprehensive sense of this term) at 80-90 per cent.[5] That suggests that 10 to 20 per cent of all Soviet 'intellectuals' were at that time members of the pre-revolutionary intellectual elite or their physical descendants. And in the upper echelons—which mattered far more—the proportion of old and new blood must have been somewhere in the neighbourhood of fifty-fifty.

Although the old intelligentsia had had the heart beaten out of it, although, having achieved its aim, it had lost its *raison d'être*, it had retained its attitudes, its mode of life, its easy, civilised manners. The survivors were a living reminder of that *douceur* which, despite everything, had marked the life of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia. The newcomers from the urban slums and the village huts were absorbing from their predecessors the gentle Chekhovian art of living—sometimes unwillingly, but ineluctably. But the old intelligentsia was incapable of passing on the other part of its inheritance—the art of independent thought and action. It was incapable of doing so because thought and action had become the monopoly of another social body, organised on military lines and wielding supreme power over life and death—the Party. The Party claimed that it, and it alone, possessed the keys to all the wisdom, all the maps of the roads ahead, all the titles to act as the nation's conscience. What the Party needed was not another sect, but obedient and skilful acolytes and lay brothers.

The limits set to the activities of the new intellectuals are not only much narrower than before the revolution; they have been drawn in completely different territory. The intellectuals are paid servants of the State. They are paid well, and as time goes on, they are entrusted with an increasing measure of responsibility within the areas of their various skills. They have responded well. Work, generously paid and lavishly endowed, is a perfect form of escape, an opium for the select. It is an ideal way to forget those things around you which you know to be wrong, to still your conscience. The *sputniks* and other achievements of Soviet science bear witness not only to the Party's enlightened interest in scientific matters, not only to the high intellectual standards of the individual scientists. They also suggest that science now serves as an ivory tower.

There are, it seems to me, two elements in the present condition of Soviet society which allow for cautious optimism. The first is the gradual withering away of fear which is particularly evident among the younger representatives of the intelligentsia, more especially among those who were not old enough to be traumatically affected by the Stalin purges of the 1930's and by their revival under Zhdanov. The second element is the growing difference in intellectual and cultural standards between the Party bureaucrats and the top layer of the intelligentsia. In the 19th century, the monarchy, once the enlightened patron of art and intellect in Russia, became increasingly divorced from the mainstream of Russian culture, until, under Alexander III and Nicholas II, it found itself in the backwaters of national life, despised, isolated, and ultimately powerless to stop the rot.

[4] Stalin no longer was. Neither is Khrushchev and the bureaucrats around him.

[5] In his speech on 25 November 1936, on the draft constitution of the USSR.

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THE NEW SOVIET INTELLIGENTSIA

I. Origins and Recruitment

Leopold Labedz

WHEN Engels was describing the origins of socialism in the nineteenth century (in that part of *Anti-Duehring* which was later published separately as *From Utopian to scientific socialism)* he put his finger on one particularly relevant spot: the disillusionment with the results of the French revolution among the Western intelligentsia. What they expected, he said, was the rule of *liberté, egalité, fraternité,* the kingdom of reason, and what they got was a bourgeois-dominated society. To the disenchantment with the old slogans they reacted by producing the new ideological blueprints of utopian socialism. But these were useless. Only by transforming socialist theory by putting it on a 'scientific' basis, could socialist society be created.

How far the theory of 'scientific socialism,' constructed in the nineteenth century from the materials of German classical philosophy, English political economy, and the French revolutionary tradition, resulted in a jump from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom can be seen now, when Khrushchev is proclaming that the stage of transition to full communism has been reached. This, on any possible interpretation of the canonical texts (including the official interpretation), must be accompanied by the disappearance of the distinction between mental and manual work. In other words, it logically implies the disappearance of the 'new Soviet intelligentsia' as a separate social category.

Apart from being the officially proclaimed 'guide to action,' the original Marxist doctrine is also a constant source of embarrassment, as it invites comparison between the doctrinal indications about the classless society (scanty as they are in Marx) and actual Soviet social developments. The new social structure, gradually emerging, offers few indications that it is approaching the prescribed target. Social planning is even more difficult than economic planning, and the social consequences of revolutionary upheavals rarely correspond to the hopes of the revolutionaries (or, for that matter, to the expectations of the counter-revolutionaries).

At first, doctrinally at least, the situation was not too complex. True, the revolution had occurred in a country where the production forces required to construct a socialist society still had to be built. The destruction of the old order was accompanied by the annihilation of landowners and capitalists, and the Decree of 10 November 1919 proclaimed that 'all classes and class divisions of citizens, all class privileges and disabilities, as well as all civil ranks, are abolished . . . .'. After the introduction of NEP Lenin described the new Soviet social order as consisting of workers, peasants, and the 'new bourgeoisie'. This new bourgeosie, *kulaks* in the country and *nepmen* in the town, was eliminated with the end of NEP and the collectivisation of the countryside.

There was, however, another probem in the twenties, that of the 'bourgeois *spets*', i.e., of all those highly qualified specialists who were needed to run society, the economy, and the state. Trotsky's use of Tsarist officers in the Red Army was, of course, the first instance of the dilemma. The old specialists were regarded as being essentially hostile; but their services were needed for the time being, although they were to be dispensed with as soon as the new technical cadres were educated. The old specialists, according to the Leninist analysis, belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia, a category eventually as much condemned to extinction as the bourgeoisie itself.

The pre-revolutionary intelligentsia in Russia was the nursery of revolutionary ideas, but its character and composition had been changing. Before the revolution its features already differed from those when the *raznochintsy*

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largely determined its dominant traits. With the progress of industrialisation it was becoming less *freischwebende*, and professional people were becoming more numerous. However, it was still the vehicle of the Russian revolutionary tradition.

Engels' remark that the working class, by taking power, abolishes itself as a class, is more appropriate to the revolutionary intelligentsia. The Bolshevik revolution signified its end, as it did the end of the entire pre-revolutionary intelligentsia. Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* is a poignant illustration of this process.

ACCORDING to the *Political Dictionary* (Moscow, 1958, p. 211) 'The intelligentsia is a social stratum consisting of people who are professionally occupied with mental labour . . . . It is not a separate class as it does not occupy an independent position in the system of social production . . . . Under capitalism the majority of the intelligentsia serves the possessing classes; bourgeois scientists and teachers elaborate and spread the ruling capitalist ideology, infuse bourgeois morality into the consciousness of the masses, and attempt to justify the rule of the bourgeoisie . . . . After the October revolution the communist party successfully solved the task of re-educating part of the old intelligentsia in a socialist spirit and created the new Soviet intelligentsia.'

In the early thirties, after the beginning of the Plan era, policy towards the intelligentsia seemed to have changed in many respects. *Uravnilovka* became a petty bourgeois sin, discrimination on the basis of social origin was somewhat attenuated, Stalin decided that *kadry reshayut vse*.[1] In 1934 he announced the arrival of socialism, the first stage on the road to classless society. As a corollary to this (after some vacillations) the Stalinist theory of Soviet society was made part of the official orthodoxy. Soviet society was now said to consist of two friendly classes, workers and peasants, and of a stratum, 'the new Soviet intelligentsia.' Long-term orthodoxy remained unchanged. *The Big Soviet Encyclopedia* (Vol. 27, 1937, p. 608) declared: 'When full Communism is achieved . . . . there will be no intelligentsia as a separate social stratum.'

The *Yezhovshchina* hit the intelligentsia harder than any other category, particularly the remaining members of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia. But the 'new Soviet intelligentsia' continued to increase numerically with the progress of industrialisation. The orthodox class analysis could not easily account for this. According to its criteria, a class was determined by its relation to the means of production. But this criterion could not account for the existence and expansion of a separate social category whose relation to the means of production was exactly the same as that of the workers, while its social characteristics were basically different. Its inclusion in the Stalinist theory of the Soviet social structure acknowledged the reality, but it resulted in an internally inconsistent and embarrassing definition. The more the Soviet economy progressed along the road of industrialisation, the more difficult did it become to square the facts of (social) life with the requirements of orthodoxy. A modification of the original articles of faith was called for. The new edition of the *Encyclopedia* (Vol. 18, 1953, p. 270) registered the supplementary qualification with an adjective: 'The work of I. V. Stalin, *The Economic Problems of Socialism* . . . . has shown the way to liquidate the essential *(sushchestvennoe)* difference between mental and manual labour in Soviet society.'

Da liegt der Hund begraben. The adjective 'essential' opens a way out for the utopian element in the doctrine. No wonder that it has been incorporated in the official orthodox formulas and has remained there ever since.

The Khrushchev era has not yet provided many instances of the 'creative development of Marxism,' the official euphemism for the modification of orthodox tenets which can no longer be held against the intractable reality. The original formula about the disappearance of the difference between intellectual and physical labour has been maintained, now qualified by 'essential,' but the announcement that the second, full stage of communism is approach-

[1] The Webbs attributed a completely wrong significance to the new line in their monument of pedantic obtuseness, *Soviet Communism, a New Civilization?*

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ing, makes it necessary for the formula to be related more specifically to the impending realisation of the prophecy.

The Soviet ideological functionaries are therefore trying hard to find a satisfactory way of handling this delicate problem. The current treatment is reflected in two authoritative pronouncements made at the special session of the department of social sciences of the Academy of Sciences, by Ostrovitianov and Fedoseev.[2] Ostrovitianov said:

> In order to build communism it is necessary to overcome the essential difference between mental and physical work, to raise the cultural-technical level of all toilers to the level of engineer-technicians and agronomists. As is known, the social and class content of the opposition between mental and physical work has already been eliminated in our country. However, there remain fairly substantial differences in the character of the work of the two major groups of the population: one which is predominantly occupied with mental labour, and the other predominantly occupied with physical labour.

Fedoseev repeated the perennial thesis that 'in the socialist society intellectual and manual workers are drawing together at an accelerated pace.' This is due to 'the reduction in the number of unskilled workers. With the development of mechanisation and automation, physical labour becomes lighter and, with socialist relations of production, its character draws closer to that of engineer-technical labour. On the other hand, the preparation of highly qualified specialists must proceed on the basis of a harmonious conjunction of mental and physical labour.' Polytechnisation and Khrushchev's educational reform are said to be accomplishing this process of social symbiosis among the more intellectual occupations. The distinction between the two kinds of labour is neatly defined in another recent Soviet book devoted to the subject: M. Danielyan, *On the opposition between mental and physical labour* (Erevan, 1957). According to this work, physical labour consists of work 'expended on the direct production of material goods,' while intellectual labour is 'expended on organisation, leadership, supervision, performance of various social and state functions on a social scale as well as on the level of a single enterprise' (p. 6).

HOW all this can be logically sorted out is, of course, a mystery. When physical labour is mechanised under capitalism, the worker becomes an automaton, a man-machine, exclaims *Voprosy Filosofii* (1958, 4, p. 150). But under communism it leads to the disappearance of the difference between mental and physical labour. Obviously conveyer belts have vastly more enlightening possibilities in the land of socialism.

As to intellectual labour which, according to the above definition, is concerned with 'organisation, leadership and supervision,' it is difficult to see how it can merge with work concerned with 'the direct production of material goods' without abandoning these three functions, on which productivity in modern industry rests.

So, however grim the prospects of the Soviet intelligentsia may be according to the theory, which logically demands its disappearance, in practice, of course, there is no question of the theory being implemented, for this would involve the dismantling of the state organisation, Party leadership, and supervision of the economy.

The doctrinal blueprint is obviously an ideological myth, and one which is becoming less and less consistent. What are the hard facts which can be discerned behind it? What are the characteristic features of the 'new Soviet intelligentsia' in terms of its origins and recruitment, income and status differentiation, its group consciousness and homogeneity? Or is it merely a blanket term to designate various social categories having little in common? If there are common characteristics, what relevance have they to the distribution of power in the Soviet system? What light can the answers to such questions shed on the prospects of further social change in the Soviet Union? Or is 'intelligentsia' an ideological term legitimised because of its historical connotations,

[2] *Voprosy Stroitelstva Kommunizma v SSSR* (Moscow, 1959), p. 29 and p. 86.

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but really helping to camouflage and confuse the real lines of social divisions?

It is enough to put these questions to see that even though the evidence is thin and inconclusive, it is better to ask them than to use the term 'intelligentsia' as a ragbag concept, much as the word 'bureaucracy' was used by the revolutionary romantics.

There is little point in starting with a definition. Most analysts of the phenomenon of the 'old' intelligentsia agree that it was not to be defined as a class or an estate, that it had a certain level of education and an 'active' attitude towards general ideas, that it was socially heterogeneous and relatively unattached. But whether one takes as a starting point Lenin or Miliukov, Mannheim or Alfred Weber, Arnost Blaha or Chalasinski, all of whom devoted special studies to the problem, it is clear that their definitions do not fit the new intelligentsia, that this is a genuinely different phenomenon, and that its analysis can only result in confusion if it leans too heavily on semantics and the assumption of continuity. The question to be asked now is not only how much continuity can be discerned between the old and the new intelligentsia, but also which sub-groups of the new intelligentsia display the traditional characteristics of the old intelligentsia and which reveal their discontinuity.

The eschatological opposition between 'capitalism' and 'socialism' tends to obscure the fact that although industrialisation has occurred in a variety of social contexts and has been promoted by widely different methods, it possesses certain common functional imperatives which set limits upon the variability of social organisation. These include recruitment and motivation of the managerial and technical cadres, who not only have to be educated but given incentives to perform their roles and authority to do so effectively. The Party found in practice that it had to develop an appropriate system of economic incentives *(printsip lichnoi materyalnoi zainteresovannosti)*, and a parade of prestige and deference to maintain authority in the hierarchical system. It could easily dispense with independently minded intellectuals, but it needed the technical specialists. It found, however, that 'of the highly qualified technological and scientific intelligentsia, the writers and artists, it was only individual members who immediately and unconditionally came over to the side of the Soviet Government . . . . A considerable part of the old intelligentsia adopted a hostile, or at best a waiting attitude.'[3] Thus the Party embarked upon an operation designed 'to bring about a radical change in the class composition of the student body'. Early in 1919 the first 'workers faculty' *(Rabfak)* was created. In 1920 *Rabfaks* were attached to all universities (VUZY) in the RSFSR, and those who passed through them were given priority right in entering the VUZY. It is claimed that in the academic year 1924/25 they constituted 43.3% of all the entrants to the higher educational establishments,[4] a proportion which increased to 49.3% by 1928.[5]

The policy of 'proletarianisation' of professional personnel had as its background the fact that of 15,500 university trained engineers working in Soviet industry in that year, only 138 were Party members.[6] However, the social composition of VUZY students changed less than one might suspect from these figures. In 1928 workers or their descendants constituted 25.4%, peasants and their descendants 23.9%, and the descendants of the intelligentsia and others 50.7% of the newly enrolled students. A decade later, in 1938, the respective figures were 33.9%, 21.6%, and 44.5%.[7] Of the 100,600 specialists engaged in industry in 1928, 13,700 had higher education and 10,500 had a secondary specialised education.

During the first Five Year Plan the educational target for engineers was 176,000 (there

[3] F. Zauzolkov, 'The Formation and Growth of a Socialist Intelligentsia in the USSR,' *Kommunist*, 1958, No. 11.

[4] *Krasnoe Studenchestvo*, No. 11, p. 5.

[5] A. E. Beilin, *Kadry spetsialistov SSSR* (Moscow, 1935), p. 311.

[6] N. M. Kutuntseva, 'Rol rabochikh fakultetov v sozdanii kadrov narodnoi intelligentsii v SSSR,' *Vestnik Istorii Mirovoi Kultury*, 1958, No. 6, pp. 89-90.

[7] *Kulturnoe Stroitelstvo SSSR* (Moscow, 1940), p. 114; *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitelstvo SSSR* (Moscow, 1939), p. 126, states that workers and peasants constituted 50.2% of the students.

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were only 24,000 in 1930). It was claimed that 170,000 specialists with higher qualifications were in fact trained, of whom 65.2% were of worker and peasant origin in 1932 (twice as many as in 1929 but including 'specialists with secondary qualifications').[8] However, the policy of forcible proletarianisation had by that time to be relaxed; here too the social composition of the professional personnel shows a distinct divergence from what might be expected. In 1940 50.4% were descendants of the old intelligentsia and other heterogeneous elements, while the rest were of proletarian and peasant origin.[9] That in fact the percentage of the children of the old intelligentsia in the ranks of the new intelligentsia was even greater than is suggested by these figures can be inferred from other factors. Discriminatory practices in education created an additional incentive to surmount all obstacles and get into the university, and work hard when they got there. It was the one avenue of social mobility open to them, and their inclinations were reinforced by the high value traditionally placed on education among the old intelligentsia. They had to fight hard to overcome the handicap of their social origin and in order to succeed they had to have some additional drive. They had to work harder and, of course, be even more zealous politically than other students to acquire a protective colouring. The mechanism of the process had obvious similarities to that of social mobility through education in systems where the 'built-in' bias is against the lower classes. Only in this case it worked in the obverse sense, with different categories, and the Soviet 'lucky Jims' were handicapped by having political as well as social skeletons in the family cupboard.

This mechanism of compensation was obvious enough in the case of members of the old intelligentsia who jumped on the bandwagon. For their descendants the need to stress political loyalty in order to have a career or at least the possibility of a career was socially no less paramount. The Party card was therefore a more desirable object for the members of the intelligentsia than for workers or peasants (and also more difficult to obtain), as it gave an outward guarantee of political respectability. The influx into the Party of the new intelligentsia was as much due to this as to the deliberate effort of its leadership to effect a managerial-political personal union in order to solve the problem of political reliability and control. It was a paradoxical analogue of Michels' analysis of the German social-democratic party as an avenue of social mobility for workers deprived of the chance to rise through higher education. It is understandable that where conditions were reversed, and political criteria came to play a paramount role, it was the intelligentsia who often tried to use the 'workers party' as a vehicle for its own social mobility. The number of Party members among specialists with higher or secondary education rose steadily both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total. They constituted 10.4% in 1929, 25.1% in 1932, and 33.0% in 1956.[10] They also constituted a growing percentage of the Party cadres. In 1956 there were already 1,878,000[11] of them in the Party, and by 1959—2,300,000[12] (of the total claimed for the whole country of 7.5 millions).[13] Of 224,000 scientific workers in 1955, 97,000 (or 43%) were members of the Party, against 54,000 (or 37%) in 1947.[14] The trend is even more striking among those with the highest qualifications: in 1947 members of the Party constituted 31% of all the doctors,

[8] Zauzolkov, *op. cit.* 184,000 is the figure given by the same author for 1932 in *Uchennie Zapiski,* Moscow University, Vypusk 173, p. 205.

[9] Nicholas De Witt, *Soviet Professional Manpower* (Washington, 1955), p. 242. There is reason to believe that the social composition of graduates was considerably less plebeian than that of the entrants. The data collected by sociologists in Poland, where 'proletarianisation' of higher education was also put into operation in the postwar decade, confirm this, The same observation is made in some Western surveys showing the role played by cultural environment and family background in the educational attainments of schoolchildren and students of different class origin.

[10] Zauzolkov, *op. cit.*

[11] *Pravda,* 17 February 1956.

[12] *Ibid.,* 30 January 1959.

[13] *Kommunist,* 1958, No. 16, p. 32; 1959, No. 1, p. 25.

[14] *Kulturnoe Stroitelstvo SSSR* (Moscow, 1956), p. 248.

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36% of all the *dotsents*, and 32% of all the professors. In 1956 the respective figures were 55%, 60% and 59%.[15]

The first five-year plan concentrated on the engineering-technical cadres, the second showed some shift towards the training of medical and pedagogical staffs. 'By the end of the second five-year plan the old specialists had finally melted into the enormous army of the Soviet intelligentsia.'[16] The Rabfaks, which by 1934 had trained almost a quarter of a million,[17] entered the last period of their existence. Their number and their output diminished, and in 1940 they ceased to be. The last year for which figures on the social origin of students in higher educational establishments were published was 1937/38. Since then no official data have been available. In 1958 Khrushchev, in his memorandum on the educational reform, mentioned that in some universities the percentage of students whose parents are non-manual workers (i.e. belong to the 'new Soviet intelligentsia') reaches sixty to seventy.

THE modification of the policy of enforced occupational mobility reflects the requirements of Soviet industrial development. But the new educational reform is presented as a step which will rectify 'the serious shortcomings which have appeared in the selection of pupils for the higher educational establishments,'[18] and thus presumably deprive the children of the intelligentsia of their illegitimate advantages. This remains to be seen. The experience of the last forty years, when the obstacles put in their way were even higher, and did not produce an intelligentsia consisting exclusively of the children of peasants and workers conforming to the propaganda stereotype, is enough to justify scepticism. Among the new Soviet intelligentsia, *vydvizhentsy*[19] are as likely to try to pass on their status to their children as the descendants of the old intelligentsia. They may have approved the principle of selection by social origin when they were its beneficiaries, but not necessarily when it may put *their* children at a disadvantage.

With the relaxation of terror the intelligentsia acquires greater security of tenure. Technological progress necessitates continued emphasis on the production of highly skilled specialists, and these are more likely to come from intellectually more sophisticated homes. Thus although the middle and lower grades of specialists have lost their scarcity value, this does not necessarily mean that as a result of Khrushchev's educational reform the children of the intelligentsia will display a downward mobility trend. They may even be relatively more successful in by-passing obstacles on the road to higher education than were the children of the old intelligentsia. Unlike the latter, they cannot be described as 'counter-revolutionary' on account of their social origin. Even without nepotism they have a distinct advantage over their predecessors.

The upper layer of the Soviet intelligentsia is thus horizontally divided, according to educational criteria, into highly skilled specialists and those with secondary specialized education. More recently a new term has come into use (both in the Soviet Union and in the People's Democracies) which divides them vertically; the two categories are the technical intelligentsia and the creative intelligentsia. The former obviously describes technical occupations, the latter refers to 'humanistic' occupations, writers, artists, historians, journalists, philosophers, lecturers in Marxism-Leninism, etc. It is in this group that the element of continuity with the old intelligentsia is to be sought, as, in conditions of modern specialisation, they are the most likely to display interest in general, social, and political ideas. In the Soviet system they may be regarded as the nearest substitute for intellectuals, although they are not often free to apply an individual critical judgment to general ideas and are thus more passive and less creative—reproductive rather than productive.

But apart from the specialists with higher

[15] K. T. Galkin, *Vysshee obrazovanie i podgotovka nauchnykh kadrov v SSSR* (Moscow, 1958), pp. 161-162.

[16] Zauzolkov, *op. cit.*

[17] *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, 1957, No. 9, p. 79.

[18] Zauzolkov, *op. cit.*

[19] Those promoted from the bench or the plough. The Soviet success story begins typically not with a newspaper-boy but with a shepherd-boy.

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education and those with secondary specialised education, i.e. of the professional personnel which is now listed as 7.5 million strong, what other categories are included in the new Soviet intelligentsia?[20]

Konstantinov, discussing Khrushchev's theses at the 21st Congress, stated that 'at present the Soviet intelligentsia counts in its ranks more than 15 million people'.[21] Who are the remaining 7.5 million?

IN a paper presented to the Third World Congress of Sociology ('Changes in the Class Structure of the Population of the Soviet Union'), Academician V. S. Nemchinov reported that in 1955 the intelligentsia (families included) amounted to 14.1% of the population.[22] He also disclosed that the working class (including farm workers) accounted for 44.2% of the population. This is a rather revealing breakdown, because the percentage of workers and employees given in the Soviet Statistical Yearbook for 1955 is 58.3% of the total population (p. 19), which is, of course, the sum of the percentages given by Nemchinov. In other words, it seems that, at least for statistical purposes, the concept of the new Soviet intelligentsia is identical with the concept of 'employees' in Soviet usage. As all the workers in the Soviet Union are employed by the state and all the employees are working for the state, it is clear that some other criterion than 'work' and 'employment' must be used to differentiate between them for the purposes of a statistical breakdown. My own efforts in a conversation with Nemchinov to find out the criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of occupatonal categories used for his figures were not successful. It is clear that 'workers' are those doing manual work, and 'employees' are engaged in mental labour, in other words, all these coterminal concepts are 'in the final analysis' reduced to the simple Marxian dichotomy. This makes it difficult to analyse the actual social situation in realistic terms. The remaining 7.5 million members of the 'new Soviet intelligentsia' undoubtedly consist of various kinds of clerks, the counterparts of the Western 'white-collar' or 'blackcoated' workers. As in the West, their social aspirations and their actual status do not coincide. In the West, as one observer put it:[23]

> There are many indications that the division between manual and non-manual work is still a factor of enduring significance in the determination of class consciousness, despite changes in the relative economic position of the two groups. The differences between office and factory work are not merely technical but social . . . . Along the division between manual and non-manual work there has been no lack of competition for status.

In the Soviet Union the situation of 'status ambiguity' is even more pronounced. Official ideology sticks to the fiction of the workers' state; at the same time there has been a steady rise in the numbers of the intelligentsia, and the traditional status values have persisted. This derives, as Mr. Lockwood points out (in reference to Britain) from the social relations of modern industry, and more specifically from the structure of industrial organisation, especially from the relations of authority within the enterprise. Like his counterpart in the West, the Soviet clerk falls upon the distinction be-

[20] Molotov, speaking at the eighteenth Party Congrss in 1939, gave a total of 9.5 million members. Of these 1.75 million were administrators, directors, managers, etc.; 1.5 million army officers and officials; 2.6 million professional people, and 3.6 million clerical workers. 'Allowing for increases resulting from advanced training and further growth of the relevant occupational groups, we may accept a figure of at least 13 million for the current (1956) size of the group to which Molotov referred. We include in the intelligentsia people in the technical, responsible administrative, professional, and related activities, regardless of formal education, as well as the well-educated, regardless of occupation. This is roughly the way in which Soviet citizens use the relevant term *(intelligent)*, and roughly the way they classify themselves. It is to be noted that we *exclude* ordinary white-collar workers, clerks, typists, salesgirls, ordinary bookkeepers, bottle washers in laboratories, and place these people in a separate group called "employees".' R. A. Bauer, A. Inkeles and C. Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works* (Harvard, 1956), p. 174.

[21] *Kommunist*, 1959, No. 1, p. 25.

[22] The figures were later published by Nemchinov in *Vsemirno-istoricheskoe Znachenie Velikoi Oktyabrskoi Revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1957), p. 65.

[23] David Lockwood, *The Blackcoated Worker* (London, 1958), p. 131.

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tween manual and non-manual labour and exploits it symbolically in order to maintain his status. And this applies not only to such occupations as *zamglavbukha* (assistant to the chief accountant) or *zammag* (deputy storekeeper), which exist in the West, but also to a host of other occupations, basically clerical, but which are peculiarly Soviet and do not exist in the West, such as *normirovshchik* (norm-controller) or *planovik* (low-grade superviser of plan fulfilment at the grass-roots level).

Nemchinov divided the intelligentsia into three groups, and gave the following table:

	1929	1940	1955
1. Technicians, agronomists and animal husbandry	13%	17%	19%
2. Educationalists, medical and cultural workers	48%	59%	69%
3. Administrative workers in state, co-operative, and public organisations	39%	24%	12%
Total:	100	100	100

It is difficult to square these figures with other known data. They imply that the plan era showed a marked decrease in the relative number of various bureaucracies, which is contrary to every known indication. After NEP the state extended its scope. The Party has grown enormously, and so must its apparatus have done. The budgetary allocations on administration were growing until recently, when they became stationary. And, finally, Konstantinov's division of the Soviet intelligentsia into two halves, each of 7.5 million, contradicts this table. The categories in the first and second groups must all have higher or secondary specialised education, and so have some in the third; together they accounted for more than 88% of the total intelligentsia in 1955. How is it then that in 1959 they account for only 50%? Has there been an enormous increase in the non-specialised intelligentsia since 1955? All Soviet assertions suggest the contrary, and even if one is sceptical about the accuracy of official claims, there can be little doubt about the fact itself of increased specialisation.

The reason for these semantic and statistical casuistries is obviously the embarrassing necessity to square doctrinal dicta with actual developments. Most embarrassing from this point of view (but from no other) is the fact that on the official reckoning the numbers of the intelligentsia are now about equal to those of the industrial workers, and are growing faster.[24] Somehow this has to be adjusted to the pronouncements about the impending classless society.

Lenin wrote[25] that in the transition to a classless society the social group of specialists will remain until the highest stage of communism has been reached. The higher (second) stage of full communism is, according to Khrushchev, not a distant but a close prospect, and Soviet society has already entered it. But the 'social group of specialists' (together with the state and other categories condemned to wither away) show no signs of being put into 'the museum of antiquities.' It is perhaps the central contradiction in Marx that the society he visualised was to be based on a high degree of productivity, requiring modern division of labour and progressive specialisation, and was at the same time to solve the problem of 'alienation,' partly due to the division of labour into mental and physical, by a harmonious combination of various activities by individuals.

[24] The number of workers in 1955 was 14.3 million (*Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1956, p. 44). The planned increase in the number of workers and employees between 1959 and 1965 is 11.5 million (of whom 2.3 million specialists), as against an increase of 1.7 million between 1952 and 1958 (*Kommunist*, 1959, No. 1, p. 25). The total figure may be higher, as in the past the number of wage and salary workers continually exceeded those provided for by the government's plans. As to the internal composition of this group, the deputy director of the Central Statistical Administration, speaking about the preparation of the Soviet census taken in January 1959, referred to the greater relative weight of this group in the total population, but abstained from touching on the delicate subject of the relative weights *inside* the group (*Vsesoyuznoe Soveshchanie Statistikov*, Moscow, 1958, p. 78).

[25] Quoted by Nemchinov, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

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This is not a realistic prospect in Soviet (or any other) society. A different degree of intellectual and physical effort is, of course, always present in human labour, mechanisation may replace some forms of manual labour but it does not do away with skill-differentiation and specialisation which, if anything, accentuates the division between those occupations with a high intellectual, and those with a low intellectual component. 'Alienation', in the sense used by Marx and attributed by him solely to the iniquities of capitalism, continues with progressive specialisation, independently of the change in property relations. The Soviet navvies do not seem to be much nearer to the Nesmeyanovs and Kurchatovs. It is not surprising that a more outspoken Soviet author wrote recently: 'Forecasting the disappearance of the division of labour, V. I. Lenin clearly saw that communism will come to it "only in many years". And in fact many years have gone by since 1920 and the division of labour is still obvious in our society.'[26]

The division of labour must produce 'alienation' whether the society in question is capitalist or socialist. To overcome 'alienation' is not only an unattainable ideal, but is not always desirable. A perfectly integrated mass-society can only be an *antichambre* of hell. 'Alienation' provides the necessary distance from society and state for the development of culture. Its predicted ending in the USSR cannot take place while the 'technical intelligentsia' is becoming ever more specialised. On the other hand, 'alienation' is a *conditio sine qua non* for the 'creative intelligentsia' to become truly creative.

(This article will be concluded in a later issue.)

[26] S. T. Strumilin, *Na putyakh Postroeniya Kommunizma* (Moscow, 1959, p. 10).

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THE GENEALOGY OF THE POLISH INTELLIGENTSIA

K. A. Jelenski

IN 1945, when the communists came to power, a lively discussion about the intelligentsia was started in Poland. In this discussion the Catholics, who would have liked to preserve the traditional character of the intelligentsia, were pitted against the Marxists, who thought they held the key to desirable changes. The sociologist Jozef Chalasinski, of the University of Lodz, dismissed both parties non-suited in an essay on 'The Social Genealogy of the Polish Intelligentsia', published in 1946. For the Catholics, he said, the world of culture and of labour 'is no more than a grazing ground offered by God to pious Polish families'. As to the Marxists, 'despite the sociological foundations of their movement, they are committed to a naturalist-psychological conception of the personality, which puts them in a hopeless position from the point of view of knowledge'. Chalasinski subjected the traditional Polish intelligentsia to pitiless criticism. 'The ghetto of the intelligentsia,' he said, 'was a formidable reactionary social force, leading a parasitic existence on the body of Polish cultural life.' Anticipating the concept of 'peaceful co-existence', he looked forward to an intellectual renaissance on a national scale 'which would put provincial Poland on the level of the nations most advanced in the cultural and technical field'. He ended his article with the words: 'Our reforms and our labours at home should have universal significance.'

The Stalinisation of Poland put an end to this discussion. Slogans about a 'people's intelligentsia', or a 'worker and peasant intelligentsia' which was supposed to take the place of the pre-war intelligentsia, replaced ideas. The teaching of sociology being suppressed, and sociological research suspended, the dogma of the politicians could not be submitted to verification or scrutiny. The Poznan revolt destroyed the myth of the unity of the intelligentsia and the working class, a myth artificially maintained for eight years, and confirmed the doubts which young Polish intellectuals were beginning to entertain on this question since the 'thaw'. The re-establishment of the chairs of sociology at the universities, the creation of an Institute of Sociological Studies attached to the Polish Academy of Sciences, revived the interrupted process of self-knowledge of the Polish intelligentsia. One of the most urgent tasks confronting these centres was the study of 'the new intelligentsia', ignoring political dogma. Many research projects bearing on the lot of workers who had enjoyed 'social promotion', and of graduates who had taken their degrees after the war, were set going. An index of some thousands of members of the new intelligentsia was compiled in this way, based on sociological enquiries fashioned on the most advanced Western models. In 1957, with the help of the weekly *Po Prostu*, run by non-conforming young communists, the Lodz Institute of Sociology collected 746 autobiographies of young representatives of the post-war intelligentsia. These documents served as starting point for a new discussion.

In 1958 Jozef Chalasinski published an essay, 'The Intelligentsia and the Nation', in which he criticised the post-war intelligentsia as vigorously as, twelve years earlier, he had attacked the traditional intelligentsia. 'What is the balance of the last thirteen years?' he asked. 'The attempt to form a working class and peasant intelligentsia has been a failure.' Another eminent representative of Polish sociology, Professor Jan Szczepanski, devoted several essays to the same question, and he too deplored the amorphous character of the new intelligentsia, its lack of social conscience, the deficiency of its general culture, its economic proletarianisation, its loss of prestige. His most striking article—'Mental workers: proletariat, intelligentsia, or middle class?'—published

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18 December, 1958, in *Przeglad Kulturalny*, rules out altogether the traditional use of the word intelligentsia in present conditions. The Marxists reacted vigorously, asserting that 'the process of the formation of the new intelligentsia since 1944 was quite rightly directed to the goal of attaching it to the working class and the peasantry' (Stefan Zolkiewski in *Nowe Drogi*, July, 1958). Although Zolkiewski admitted that mistaken political methods had been used, the Marxists have announced their determination to persist in their intention of creating in Poland a new intelligentsia drawn from the working class and the peasantry and closely bound to them. The bearing of this discussion, which questions the role of the intelligentsia in a system where the determination of cultural values and political decisions are in the last resort the reserve of a machine, is obvious. The part played by the young Polish intellectuals of the post-1944 vintage in the Polish October seems to make both theses dubious. It is important to discover whether all the phenomena in question are specifically Polish or whether the criticisms of both Chalasinski and Szczepanski do not in part concern matters of universal scope, arising in some degree from the development of modern societies, regardless of their property system and their government.

IN writing of the Polish intelligentsia in a Western language we immediately stumble on a difficulty. In English as in French an individual member of the intelligentsia is an intellectual. But in Polish 'intellectual' (*intelektualista*) has a much more restricted meaning that the word *inteligent*, which denotes a member of the intelligentsia, and which cannot be translated. Poland and Russia are the only countries where the word intelligentsia denotes, not the aggregate of those who play a part in the development of culture, but a genuine social class which could be identified, at the end of the nineteenth century, below the landed nobility and the big bourgeoisie, and above the petty bourgeoisie, the working class, and the peasants. This class included all those engaged in mental labour and with a certain level of education (essentially, the equivalent of matriculation). The part played by the intelligentsia in the Polish revolt which preceded the turn of October, 1956, has been much debated in the West. Two important questions are raised: first, the place of the intelligentsia in a socialist society; secondly, its role in the anti-totalitarian revolution. But Western observers have obscured the problem by referring almost always to the 'intellectuals'. The very use of the word implies the assumption of the existence in Poland of a group of 'intellectuals' similar to that existing in Western countries. But what is peculiar to Poland is that its intellectuals belong traditionally to and in a sense feel themselves at one with a much larger section of the population, covering the university professor, the writer, the administrator, the lawyer, the teacher, and even the white-collar worker.

Professor Jozef Chalasinski was the first to undertake a systematic study of the formation of this stratum in his magistral essay, 'The Social Genealogy of the Polish Intelligentsia'.

What defined the particular shape of the Polish intelligentsia was its formation at a time when remnants of feudalism were still very much alive within the framework of an embryonic capitalism. While, in the countries of Western Europe, distinct professional categories became 'institutionalised' as modern society took shape, in Poland it was this intelligentsia *as a whole* which was institutionalised into one ill-defined body, sharing similar stereotypes, actuated by an internal solidarity, creating a common mythology.

The reasons for this development were manifold. In Poland the industrial revolution began at a time when the Polish state no longer existed. Capitalism was introduced in semi-colonial conditions, by foreigners. There was no third estate at the time of the partitions. The bourgeoisie was small in numbers, and frequently of German or Jewish origin. The nobility, on the other hand, were comparatively numerous (10 per cent. of the total population, compared with 1 per cent. in France in the same period). The nobility, after the fall of the Polish state (which was 'its' republic) and throughout the nineteenth century, suffered a progressive decline: the end of feudalism

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following the abolition of serfdom by the occupiers; national insurrections which led to the confiscation of the property of the patriotic nobles; inability to adapt themselves to the new forms of capitalistic farming. Only the richest and the strongest survived; the others were forced to leave their estates and to seek work in the towns. Thus the kernel of the Polish intelligentsia was formed, not from the social advancement of liberated popular masses, but from the lower nobility who 'emigrated' from the countryside. They had lost their property and some of their social prestige, but retained their arrogance and their prejudices. They looked down on business occupations, and few of them took an active part in the development of Polish capitalism, which was the work of foreigners. The Polish intelligentsia was a sort of by-product of capitalist development; its typical member was the white-collar worker. The intelligentsia of the second half of the nineteenth century thought, wrote, went to the office and to the café, but above all it talked. Its ideal was not the capitalist entrepreneur, nor the civil engineer, nor the doctor, but the writer, or the publicist. In the economic machine which can be taken to represent the life of a country, this class was rather like a wheel turning in space. Chalasinski, to describe its lack of ties with the nation's organic forces, invented the term 'the ghetto of the intelligentsia'. Within this ghetto the sense of conformism was so strong that it assimilated every recruit from the petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry, or the working class. The intelligentsia kept lively contact with the gentry and the aristocracy, but had scarcely any intercourse with the other classes. The 'ennoblement' which was a corollary of entry into the intelligentsia continued to operate until the very recent past.

MAINTAINING close connexions with the aristocracy and the gentry and sharing their prestige, the Polish intelligentsia, in the course of the nineteenth century, nevertheless took the place of the nobility as the class which 'incarnated' the nation. At a time when there was neither a Polish state nor ordinary political parties nor a free national press, it was the intelligentsia which took over from the nobility the function of 'thinking Polish', of exercising the 'moral government' of the nation. In his 'Spirit King' the romantic poet Juliusz Slowacki projects an esoteric vision of the history of Poland conceived as 'idea'. Among this intelligentsia, which organised the national insurrections and took part in all the revolutionary movements but remained detached from the economic and social realities of Poland, the spirit was indeed king. The Poland for which they fought and plotted, of which they spoke and wrote, was an abstract Poland, artificially Westernised. The intelligentsia, like the nobility, thought and acted as if it were a kind of aristocratic embassy of Western culture in an exotic and primitive peasant environment. This 'mission' of 'representing' Western culture (rather than of applying it to the modernisation of the country's economic and social structure) persisted for a long time among the Polish elite, and traces of it can still be discerned today. It was given a different interpretation by the sophisticated nobility, who 'represented' the Ritz, Maxim's, Lock, and Poole—the Europe of *Maîtres d'hotel* and tailors, and by the intelligentsia among whom, before the war, were the 'representatives' of Shaw, Russell, and Giraudoux. The snobbism, superficiality, and provincial conformity which Chalasinski noted as the characteristic attributes of the Polish intelligentsia, were determined by its social origin, by the period of its formation, but they did not necessarily prejudice its political opinions, with which Chalasinski does not deal.

With a good deal of simplification, two main political currents can be distinguished. The first was that of a national, Catholic, messianic, conservative, and conforming intelligentsia. Its idea of Poland was projected most clearly in the work of the novelist Henryk Sienkiewicz, its mythologist of whom it made a philosopher of history. Sienkiewicz gave a heroic and idealised vision of the Polish past, full of facile optimism. His historical romances—written, in his own words, 'to strengthen hearts'—affirmed the superiority of the Poles to all other peoples. His philosophic conclusion (accepted the more readily in that it required no effort) was that 'in one way or another, we shall come through allright'. These were the origins of the

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nationalist Polish right wing, anti-semitic and chauvinist, organised around Dmowski's 'National Democracy', for whom Catholicism was the cement binding the country together.

The progressive, promethean wing of the Polish intelligentsia was always smaller, but its influence on the course of history was no less. If Sienkiewicz is the writer who embodied the right, Stefan Zeromski incarnated the left. His work is particularly susceptible to sociological psycho-analysis, and though his last novel ends with communists marching against the seat of the government which had betrayed its promises to the people, it is still dominated by an ambiguity in which 'the nation' always takes precedence over 'the revolution' and the aristocracy is at least as much loved as hated. Zeromski's revolutionary heroes have a sado-masochistic love for princesses, and in turn slap them or are whipped by them. For this progressive intelligentsia retained the psychological posture of the nobility; its contempt for the bourgeoisie reflected that of the gentry, as did its detachment from economic pursuits. Only one Polish novel was concerned with the construction of the Lodz industrial centre, the only large-scale instance in nineteenth century Poland of the industrial revolution; this was Reymont's *Promised Land*. But this Polish Nobel prize-winner, however 'progressive', condemned not only the industrial sharks, but factory labour itself, as an absolute evil. Thus, for this 'left' intelligentsia, the revolution came after independence, mankind after the nation, and the people after the intelligentsia. The career of Jozef Pilsudski, offspring of the ruined nobility, revolutionary, socialist, commander of the Polish legions, head of the state, Marshal of Poland, and in the end conservative dictator is, so to speak, the apotheosis of the internal contradictions of this spiritual family.

The establishment of the Polish state in 1918 brought some changes in the position of the intelligentsia within society, but not in its traditional mentality. It was the intelligentsia which provided the administrative personnel of the state and became, in some sort, a new political 'apparatus'. Despite a large influx of young peasants and workers into its ranks, despite the progressive differentiation of its professional make-up, the intelligentsia remained a sort of caste, and its manner and style of life continued to be modelled on that of the nobility. Between the wars the political tendencies of both wings, right and left, became more radical. The new generation of the Catholic and chauvinist 'National Democracy' moved towards fascism. For its part the left intelligentsia showed, particularly in the last few years before the war, a tendency to move further to the left, though the number of communists remained minimal.

WE have seen how, in a particular historical context, the Polish intelligentsia thought of itself, primarily, as a cultural and political elite whose principal task was to safeguard values and maintain cultural continuity, with professional qualifications taking second place. After the capture of power by the communists, it became clear that all these traditional attributes were henceforth reserved for the party apparatus (which, in the current language, was presumed to embody 'the working class'). The party was faced with two tasks in connexion with the intelligentsia: to find qualified men for the immediate present and to create a new intelligentsia for the future which would give its devotion to the party.

Nationalisation and the establishment of an administrative and economic apparatus on the Stalinist model required the services of more non-manual workers than had ever been needed in Poland before. To provide these it was necessary to use, in their professional capacity alone, members of the pre-war intelligentsia and deserters from the former ruling classes, dispossessed of their property by land reform and nationalisation. As the political apparatus was manned largely by activists from the labour movement, lacking formal education and outside the ranks of the intelligentsia in the traditional sense of the term, it was argued that political qualities and the degree of communist consciousness counted for more in positions of leadership than professional competence. So a large number of communist workers were withdrawn from the factories and given responsible posts in the administrative and economic

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bureaucracy. The process was burdened with an element of ambiguity, for while the intelligentsia was despised for its 'reactionary' attitude and regarded as unworthy of confidence, the worker was uprooted from his factory—and, in effect, from the working class, represented as the 'ruling class'—and placed behind an office desk, and this was called 'social promotion'.

The party thus made use of the professional services of those members of the old intelligentsia who were considered susceptible of improvement, and gave positions of responsibility to activists whose political loyalty compensated for their lack of professional ability. At the same time it set about creating a new intelligentsia, described in advance as a 'people's intelligentsia' or a 'worker and peasant intelligentsia'. Three different methods were used for this purpose: special short-term courses for workers who, after one year of study, were given managerial posts; preparatory courses for workers without the required schooling to enter the universities; and recruiting young workers and peasants for the schools and universities.

Committed to the creation of a new intelligentsia, the party suffered at the same time from an anti-intellectual complex which doomed its efforts to failure. The economic and social status of the intelligentsia was deliberately lowered, and skilled manual labour was better paid than intellectual work. Among the workers 'promoted' to leading posts, some obtained leave to acquire the necessary professional training, but once their studies were completed were given positions inferior to those they had occupied previously; their diploma became, in fact, a handicap.

There have been several references, following the changes of October, 1956, to this anti-intellectual attitude among an important section of the apparatus, and it is characteristic that it has been retained within the so-called Natolin group, representing the impenitent Stalinists within the party.

In impairing the authority of science, Stalinism had lowered the prestige of the intelligentsia. It was not only that untrammelled research had to give way to dogma; scientific honours and the universities themselves were depreciated by the practice of appointing to professorships men whose only qualification was their devotion to the party, and filling the numerous 'research institutes' attached to the different ministries with people innocent of scientific attainments.

These were the conditions in which it was hoped to hatch out the new 'people's intelligentsia'. How did the pre-war intelligensia adapt itself to them?

IT might have been thought that the conservative, nationalist, Catholic wing of the intelligentsia would remain in opposition, at least passive opposition, to the regime, while its progressive wing would adapt itself more easily to the new circumstances. The reality was more complex. It is true that a group of left intellectuals who were not communists before the war joined the party after 1945. Czeslaw Milosz has given in *The Captive Mind* an admirable description of this move, at once masochistic and fervent; the left Polish intellectuals were not throwing their lot in with a communism of revolt, but rather submitting to an implacable machine which seemed to them to embody history. It is also true that the traditional Catholic intelligentsia at first resisted and tried to cling to the 'government of souls'. Wojciech Ketrzynski wrote (*Tygodnik Powszechny*, 1 July, 1945): 'The Polish intelligentsia today is the link which transmits to the generations the national culture; it is the guardian of our countless cultural treasures. Polish culture is not the culture of a single social class. It is the symbiosis, in full flower, of Roman civilisation and the Slav psyche.' But this same Ketrzynski was soon to become one of the founders of the PAX group of 'progressive Catholics' who were the most faithful allies of Stalinism in Poland.

Other formulas were also found to facilitate adherence to the new regime without adherence to the party. One was the establishment of the 'Democratic Party', presented as the 'political' representative of the intelligentsia within the framework of popular democracy. The Democratic Party retained some of the outworn vocabulary of the liberal left, although clearly serving as nothing but an agent of the United

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Workers Party. The essays of its general secretary, Leon Chain, have the character of a programme by which the intelligentsia can adapt itself to its new role, such as the one written in 1949—the title speaks for itself: 'The intelligentsia and the progressive middle class will not disappoint the hopes of the Polish workers and peasants.' In keeping with the slogan of 'national unity', a particular stereotype was constructed and popularised in literature and the press: this was the 'decent' and 'worthy' man, excellent at his job and highly cultivated, who 'was not interested in politics' but took part enthusiastically in national reconstruction and looked with serene sympathy on the social and economic changes brought about by the new regime. He was always a 'great' figure—a celebrated writer, an illustrious scholar, an eminent architect. The scene of his activities is the 'Committee for the Defence of Peace'. Neither a communist nor a Marxist, this new type of right-minded person signs all the manifestos submitted to him—the Stockholm appeal, protests against bacteriological warfare in Korea, against capitalist aggression, against spies at home, against the subversive machinations of America, against German 'revisionists', against the intrigues of the Vatican. Apart from a group of irreconcilable Catholics who chose internal emigration, it can be said that, between Cardinal Wyszynski's arrest in 1953 and his release in 1956, the intelligentsia of the right collaborated with the regime during the Stalin epoch and held itself aloof from the movement of intellectual revolt which began to take shape in 1954 and was to make such a powerful contribution to the changes of October, 1956. It may be added that it is this non-Maxist intelligentsia which today represents one of Gomulka's major supports. The truce between the party and the church, decollectivisation, Poland's relative independence and recovery of its national dignity, the end of arbitrary police action, are clearly of greater interest to it than liberty of the press, political democratisation, and the achievement of socialism—questions to which it has been indifferent under all regimes.

The attitude of the left Polish intelligentsia, with its radical origins and its close relations before the war with the Socialist party, was quite different. Apart from those of its members who joined the Communist party—and became its ardent propagandists during the Stalinist era—it withdrew into determined but passive opposition. Having long dreamed of socialism, it could not bear the mockery of socialism confronting it. It was to these men that, at the time of the 'thaw', the disillusioned young communist intellectuals turned. It was from this mingling of the left opposition and the repentant Stalinists that was born the 'revisionist' movement which acted as vanguard of the Polish revolt leading up to October, 1956.

THE two chief external features of the Polish intelligentsia today are its numerical expansion and its economic proletarianisation.

In 1931 the total figure for salaried non-manual workers in Poland was 664,500. Between 1949 and 1956 alone 700,000 young Poles received diplomas equivalent to matriculation at grammar and technical schools, of whom 168,000 went on to take university degrees. In 1938 Poland had 12,000 trained engineers and 36,000 technologists; in 1957 their numbers were respectively 66,800 and 148,700. There are now, relative to population, more engineers in Poland than in the United States (of each 1,000 persons employed outside agriculture there were in 1956 8.24 engineers in the United States, and 10.9 in Poland). In a single school year, 1954-55, 22,336 Poles took university diplomas.

To this massive output of the new intelligentsia there is a corresponding decline in its economic position. The Polish statistical handbook for 1957 gives the following percentage for salaries classified as medium and high in manual and intellectual occupations. Manual workers: mining 44%, steelworking 43%, building 33%. Intellectual workers: health services, barely 11%, administration 12%, education 17%, 'creative' cultural occupations 34%. Of 200 young provincial teachers among whom Polish sociologists conducted an enquiry, only four had been in an express train; 14 had travelled by tram; eight had eaten in a town restaurant; four had been to a café.

The autobiographies of young representatives

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of the intelligentsia were filled with bitterness. Professional disappointment mingled with resentment at the anti-intellectual bias and low standard of living. 'My diploma has been a fetter. They wouldn't employ me in the administrative side of industry because my qualifications are too high.' Or: 'After months of research, with my university diploma in my pocket, I've gone into industry as a workman.' Or again: 'When I compare my wages with those of a skilled worker, I regret having gone to a university and not to a technical school.' *All* the autobiographies of students who had completed their studies during the Stalinist epoch were extremely critical of the instruction as too fragmentary and too sectarian. Chalasinski quotes the following dialogue between a professor of the history of social thought and a student, in 1949:

'How is it that the phrases you use are constructed as if you didn't understand the meaning of some of the words?'

'I learnt it all by heart and I don't understand a great deal of it. I've been looking a long time for someone to explain it to me, but I haven't found anyone. I'm a stranger here. In the factory the comrades I work with don't understand it either. I'm a worker from the provinces. The party sent me to the university. I came to Lodz, and got a job as factory watchman so that I could study at the same time.'

'Haven't you any comrades among the students who could help you?'

'Professor, I go to the university only for the lectures and seminars; I don't know anyone among the students. I work quite alone, without much result. I began to read the *Anti-Dühring* but I didn't understand a single word.'

From the data collected Professor Chalasinski draws the following conclusions:

'Two characteristic traits of the new Polish intelligentsia must be emphasised. The first is that this new young intelligentsia, despite its working class and peasant origins, has no close ties with those classes. That is because it was formed under the influence of two dominant tendencies, the flight from the land, from agriculture, and the expansion of the bureaucracy under the new economic and political regime. The second trait, connected with the first, is its amorphous cultural character. This intelligentsia no longer reflects the cultural style of the nobility, but it has not yet acquired its own style. The new young intelligentsia is formless and chaotic in its social and cultural structure, as it is in its social psychology and social consciousness. It has no socio-cultural ties.'

Jan Szczepanski's criticisms run on similar lines, but since he had not criticised the old intelligentsia, as Chalasinski had, his attitude towards it is deeply nostalgic. 'The intelligentsia', he writes, 'was a stratum whose principal feature was its attraction to culture. . . . The social characteristics of the mass of intellectual workers today are quite different.' This new stratum 'is scarcely distinguished from the rest of the population by a particular attitude towards culture. . . . Intellectual workers are no longer socially independent nor have they the independence of mind which the traditional intelligentsia possessed'. They are influenced neither by the traditional stereotypes of the intelligentsia nor by the socialist culture being created; 'they are first and foremost the spiritual heirs of the pre-war petty bourgeoisie'. What then, according to Szczepanski, was this old intelligentsia? 'The kernel of this intelligentsia was formed by those who created aesthetic or scholarly values (writers, artists, scientists, journalists) around whom gathered those who, whether as creators or consumers, shared those values.' And he concludes: 'This old intelligentsia is quite clearly disappearing'.

Szczepanski underlines what Chalasinski said on the divorce between the new intelligentsia and the environment from which it came. 'Mental workers are not a part of the working class. They possess neither its consciousness nor do they share its social and political aspirations. On the contrary they try, at every opportunity, to emphasise their difference.' We have already suggested that the revolt of the Poznan workers implied the end of the myth of the unity of the intelligentsia and the working class. It was obvious, after Poznan, that the intelligentsia was regarded as part of the machinery of oppression. This revelation had consequences of two kinds: first, the efforts made, particularly by the Warsaw intelligentsia, in the

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months preceding October 1956, to re-establish effective contact with the working class; secondly, Stalinist oppression had made every member of the intelligentsia more or less suspect as a potential ally of the 'new class'. At the last congress of Polish engineers and technologists, in 1957, all the active members of the association asked that the technical intelligentsia should be recognised as part of the working class, the object of the demand being to escape the residual anti-intellectual prejudices of the chiefs of personnel appointed by the party, and to avoid the suspicions of the workers themselves.

SZCZEPANSKI'S criticism of the new intelligentsia is part of his thesis on the atomisation of Polish society as a whole, of the rupture of its 'organic bonds'. What organic bonds existed in the case of the pre-war intelligentsia? In the first place, the freedom of the universities and their partial autonomy. But in fact liberty has been restored in the higher educational institutions of Poland, and the admirable attiude of the majority of university teachers during the Stalin epoch seems to contradict Szczepanski's pessimism. Secondly, a certain measure of local democracy (it is impossible to speak seriously of democracy at the national level in pre-war Poland), and trade union activities (the teachers' union, traditionally left, and accused by the pre-war regime of being a para-communist organisation, was particularly active and lively). Nevertheless it is difficult not to think that Szczepanski is idealising the old intelligentsia when he contrasts it with the new.

This is a view expressed by the two former members of the staff of *Po Prostu*, Turski and Szacki. They did not advance doctrinaire arguments in their polemic with Szczepanski, as Zolkiewski and Werblan did, but, as members themselves of the new intelligentsia, they were offended by his contempt. Without knowing precisely what arguments to use in opposition to Szczepanski, they emphasised the humane quality of the new generation who showed, when they founded *Po Prostu*, that they were neither indifferent nor apathetic.

Professor Szczepanski is however undoubtedly right when he announces the end of the intelligentsia in the traditional Polish sense of the term. But is not this social stratum an anachronism, quite apart from the forms taken by the economic and social regime, at a time when the tertiary sector is constantly developing? Are not the frontiers between mental and manual labour becoming blurred everywhere? Might they not be eradicated with the spread of automation? In this respect the bureaucratisation of the communist regime has accelerated a natural development. It is obvious that in these conditions an administrative employee, a worker in one of the expanding 'service' occupations, cannot have, as can the university professor or the writer, the same somewhat artificial affinities that café life, newspaper reading, and social relations among 'educated persons' gave to the Polish Bouvards and Pécuchets of the last century.

The evolution of the stereotype of the Polish *inteligent* can be studied by comparing two radio serials, both enormously popular, dealing with a 'typical' family, one pre-war, the other started after October 1956. These two broadcast serials which trace day by day the life of a family, their work, their meals, their quarrels, the boy's studies and the girl's love affairs, have the same object—to reconcile the 'average listener' to the poverty of his material life, the greyness of his daily round, by raising to star status a family which is also poor, where people occupy themselves in the same way, and where everybody is 'good', 'positive', and likeable. The pre-war series was called 'The daily life of Mr and Mrs Kowalski'. The 'Mr and Mrs', the choice of name—quite common, but with a hint of noble descent, the father's occupation —in government service —everything placed the Kowalskis within the traditional intelligentsia. Their preoccupations and conversation reflected the same milieu; they kept up with the popular best sellers, they were concerned about their social position, they took part, at the lowest level, in the collective life of the intelligentsia.

The current series is called 'The Matysiak family'. The name speaks of a peasant origin; the father is a factory foreman, his children are students. Curiously enough, nobody in the family is a member of the party; the father's conversation suggests a social-democratic past,

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but since October 1956—when he was first heard on the air—he supports Gomulka, the party, and the government, for reasons which combine common sense with patriotism. The fact that the mass of the Polish intelligentsia has come to be passionately pro-Matysiak, and apparently recognises itself in them, proves that its internal solidarity has after all grown weaker, and that Szczepanski was right in saying that it is acquiring characteristics which bring it close to the pre-war petty bourgeoisie.

Thus we see a kind of split in the Polish intelligentsia, one part consisting of those who preserve the characteristics of intellectuals in the Western meaning of the word, and the mass of mental workers, who form a sort of middle class. Before defining their respective characteristics, let us note that the party's ambition to create a 'people's intelligentsia' anchored in the working class and the peasantry, has met with failure. Nor could it have done otherwise, given the structure of the regime. The creation of a 'people's intelligentsia', conceived as a first step towards a classless sociey, might be theoretically envisaged within an authentic working class democracy, but it is impossible in a regime where an established political machine exercises power 'in the name' of the working class. It is characteristic that the elite of the young left wing intelligentsia, during the great political debates of 1956-57, demanded changes which would have brought them closer to the working class, but their idea of a democracy governed by workers councils, their egalitarian watchwords, were stifled by the machine. It is probable that disillusion has made the young Polish intellectuals sceptical about the viability of an authentic revolutionary programme and has brought them closer to a more disillusioned, social-democratic, and anti-ideological point of view.

At the time of the 'thaw' and during the events of October it was certainly the elite of the Polish intelligentsia who were most active—writers, journalists, economists, students of philosophy and sociology. The schism in the intelligentsia had already been effected. The mass of mental workers did not feel called on to play a part at a decisive moment in history, as it had in the nineteenth century. The Polish intellectual elite had never been eliminated, as it had been in the USSR, and had never completely lost touch with Western thought. If the Polish intellectuals were able to play so important a part in the 'anti-totalitarian revolution', it was in part thanks to the peculiarities of Polish Stalinism. No Polish scholar or writer had been imprisoned in that time because of his opinions. What is more, certain cultural leaders of the party, such as Professors Schaff and Zolkiewski, allowed the philosophers and sociologists to continue quietly in the background with their researches and their work.

There is then nothing astonishing in the Polish intellectual elite being able to re-assert its independence of judgment once the Stalin myth was shattered, by an alliance between the best representatives of the pre-war generation and the young who were seeking to redefine socialism. This elite seemed to waver between two positions, withdrawing from one to the other as historical circumstances changed. In October 1956 it set out to think its Marxism afresh and to try to bring about the socialism whose caricature it had become familiar with in the Stalin epoch. This was the reforming, universal trend, in which the intellectual assumes responsibility for society. Polish 'immobilism', which is a function both of the country's geographical position and of the structure of the party apparatus, soon chilled these ambitions. It was then that another position began to take shape: in post-Stalin communism the intellectual is tempted to withdraw into the role the intellectuals played in the epoch of enlightened absolutism: if the rulers ensure him liberty of thought and of research, he will provide them with useful analyses and information without revealing these to the masses. It is between these two positions that the Polish intellectual is working out his destiny: potential reformer when historical opportunities offer, or enlightened and conscious servant of a dictatorship which he accepts without granting it a charismatic character.

Neither liquidated as a class nor definitively subjugated, the Polish intelligentsia is summoned once more, and in a way that may be decisive, to make its mark on the evolution of the system.

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